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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I engage with the topic of how popular culture and politics interact at the end of 
conflict. Using contemporary Hollywood action cinema from 2000 to 2014 and political 
speeches from the Bush and Obama administrations, I pose the question of how do these 
seemingly disparate fields forge intense connections between and through each other in order 
to create conditions of success in the War on Terror. I utilise the end of wars assemblage to 
argue that through intense and affective encounters between cinema screen and audiences, 
certain conditions of success emerge from the assemblage. These conditions include American 
exceptionalism and the values it exemplifies; the use of technology in warfare as co-productive 
of moral subjectivities; the necessity of sacrifice; and the centrality of the urban landscape and 
built environment. I then proceed to assess the resilience of the end of wars assemblage and its 
conditions of success by engaging with cinematic and political artefacts that have the potential 
to destabilise the assemblage through genre inversion and alternative temporalities. Ultimately, 
I argue that the assemblage and its conditions of success are strongly resilient to change and 
critique. The conditions of success that emerge from the assemblage through intense affective 
encounters can then be politically deployed make a claim that a war has ended or will end. 
Because audiences have been pre-primed to connect these conditions to victory, such a claim 
has greater persuasive power. 
 
In this thesis I utilise assemblage theory in order to ascertain how movies and political speech 
combine to create emergent properties that are more than the sum of the constituent parts. This 
thesis is at the intersection of conflict studies, war termination studies, and critical International 
Relations. As such, it makes a contribution to our understandings of how contemporary armed 
conflicts are brought to an end, the interaction between politics and culture, and it advances the 
ability of critical International Relations to engage with questions of culture, conflict, and 
closure. 
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Introduction: Conflict and Culture 
 
“It’s over Johnny, it’s over. 
Nothing is over! Nothing! You just don’t turn it off…I did what I had to do to win. But 
somebody wouldn’t let us win.” 
Rambo: First Blood (1982) 
 
“Sir, do we get to win this time? 
This time it’s up to you” 
 Rambo: First Blood part II (1985) 
 
“In Afghanistan, we’ve broken the Taliban’s momentum and will soon begin a transition to 
Afghan lead” May, 2011.1 “So this is a momentous day in the history of Libya. The dark shadow 
of tyranny has been lifted” October, 2011.2 “There is something profound about the end of a 
war that has lasted so long” December, 2011.3 That was Barack Obama speaking, respectively, 
in Westminster Hall, the White House Rose Garden, and at Fort Bragg announcing the effective 
end of the conflicts, or at least American involvement in the conflicts, in Afghanistan, Libya, 
and Iraq. Part of what contributed to Obama’s electoral victory was the pledge that he would 
end American engagement in the costly conflicts of the War on Terror and, formally at least, 
he did. There are only a handful of U.S. troops left in Afghanistan and Iraq, and only Special 
Forces and aircraft were ever deployed to Libya. But this raises the question of what actually 
makes a conflict end? We tend to think of parades in Times Square, victory on the battlefield, 
a decisive blow to the heart of your adversary, the stabilisation of the area you fought in. But 
as President Bush made clear in 2007, ‘Victory will not look like the ones our fathers and 
grandfathers achieved. There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship.’4 
President Obama made the same observation in 2013 saying ‘Our victory against terrorism 
won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony at a battleship, or a statue being pulled to the 
                                                          
1 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President to Parliament in London, United Kingdom’, The White House, 25 
May 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/25/remarks-president-parliament-london-
united-kingdom. 
2 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on the Death of Muammar Qaddafi’, The White House, 20 October 
2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/20/remarks-president-death-muammar-qaddafi. 
3 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President and First Lady on the End of the War in Iraq’, The White House, 14 
December 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/14/remarks-president-and-first-lady-end-
war-iraq. 
4 George W. Bush, ‘President’s Address to the Nation’, The White House, 1 October 2007, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html. 
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ground.’5  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to add to the discipline and study of International Relations by 
analysing how popular culture, and cinema in particular, interacts with politics to end a war. Or 
more specifically, how Hollywood blockbuster action movies from 2000 to 2014 work to create, 
circulate, and legitimise particular conditions of success that can be utilised to create a sense of 
ending for conflict. The conditions that will be analysed in this thesis are American 
exceptionalism and the values embodied in that concept; the moral use of technology and its 
role as co-productive of subjectivity; the necessity of sacrifice and its redemptive power; and 
the centrality of the built or urban environment. These conditions emerge from intense politico-
cultural interaction, conceptualised here as part of the end of wars assemblage. These conditions 
are, of course, not the only ones that are deployed when making a claim about the end of a war. 
There are a myriad of political, social, economic, electoral, and cultural discourses and material 
practices that go into the end of a war. The lines of flight around the end of a war discussed in 
this thesis serve as examples of the type of discourse and practice that work to create a sense of 
ending for conflicts. Contemporary conflicts in the War on Terror such as the War in 
Afghanistan, the Iraq War, and the NATO Intervention in Libya have all, according to dominant 
political discourses and popular understanding, ended with a victory for, variously, the United 
States, the Coalition of the Willing, the International Security Assistance Force, and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. However, the political realities in these countries is decidedly 
different to the simple narrative of “we won” often presented in political speeches, policy 
documents, and press statements. In this thesis, I investigate how this common-sense 
understanding of ending and victory is politically and culturally created.  
 
To achieve this, I look at the interaction between popular culture and world politics and tease 
out the connections that exist between them and what political realities popular culture creates 
the conditions of possibility for with regards to the ending of conflicts. What will be 
demonstrated throughout is that popular culture and political discourse forge intense and 
affective connections to create and legitimise these specific conditions of success that can then 
be deployed to create this sense of ending. I use the assemblage theory of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari to understand how these connections function and present the end of wars 
assemblage as a theoretical tool and model that can allow for a fuller understanding of how 
                                                          
5 The implicit critique of President Bush is clear here with the reference to statues being pulled down. Barack 
Obama, ‘Remarks by the President at the National Defense University’, The White House, 23 May 2013, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-
university. 
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these interactions take place. The conditions of success discussed in this thesis can be said to 
be emergent properties of this assemblage. The end of wars assemblage functions in multiple 
ways through a diverse range of political discourses, cultural artefacts, and other factors and 
has numerous emergent properties. No single work can discuss the breadth of artefacts that 
participate in this assemblage nor the variety of effects that this interaction produces, therefore 
in this thesis I investigate one aspect of it - contemporary Hollywood action movies between 
2000 and 2014 - and use this as a case study for understanding how particular conditions of 
success emerge. Tracing links between popular culture and world politics at the level of tropes, 
narratives, imagery, language, technique, and affect I argue that the films discussed here 
ultimately create a political space where conflicts in the War on Terror can be assigned the label 
of ended by the United States and, simultaneously, how this politico-cultural interaction can 
also allow for ongoing practices of political violence. 
 
War Termination 
Why study how wars end rather than how they begin? It can be argued that going to war is the 
most important or fateful decision that a country can take and thus should occupy the most 
prominent position in the study of International Relations, indeed this is what Kenneth Waltz 
proposes as the central question of international political theory: ‘Where are the major causes 
of war to be found?’6 War termination, for various reasons, is generally not as prominent in the 
study of conflict as war initiation. The beginnings of war are certainly an important site for 
critical academic study given the capacity for mass violence, death, instability, atrocity, and 
chaos that wars cause, as Waltz notes. However, the other side of conflict - how they are brought 
to an end - is an equally important aspect of conflict that requires much further critical 
interrogation within the discipline. Once the violence, death and destruction of war has been 
unleashed, it is necessary to understand how it is brought under control and how stability, peace, 
and reconciliation can be brought about. In this thesis, I do not present an argument for how the 
various conflicts of the War on Terror were ended on the ground, as it were, as it is clear that 
they are ongoing, albeit without the mass involvement of foreign troops. This thesis is not a 
military history or a strategic manual. Rather, the argument presented herein is designed to 
address the question of how endings in conflict are shaped by popular culture and how certain 
movies participate in the shaping of conditions of success for these conflicts. Furthermore it is 
also intended to demonstrate that popular culture is a useful and important site of critical 
enquiry in the fields of International Relations, conflict studies, and war termination studies.  
                                                          
6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001), 12. 
4 
 
 
Popular culture provides a unique and useful insight into how political discourses are 
articulated, how they are legitimised, and how popular culture works to affectively connect the 
reservoir of tropes, narratives, and imagery of success to political discourses of victory. Not 
only does popular culture recirculate political narratives of conflict, but it creates and co-
constitutes those narratives. The role that the selected cultural artefacts play in the ensuing 
chapters is not one of critique, or of speaking truth to power, or of challenging these discourses 
but rather one of mutual constitution, support, and legitimisation. Given that the major ground 
and air wars, conflicts, insurgencies, interventions (and official statements about these conflicts 
use all of these at various stages) of the War on Terror have drawn largely to a close, such a 
study is timely and may prove useful as other interventions are mooted, argued for, and carried 
out. As such, this research presents a critical and timely intervention in war termination studies, 
the study of popular culture and world politics, and the broader discipline of International 
Relations taking, as it does, ambiguously concluded conflicts and popular culture as its major 
sites of enquiry. 
 
The historic and ongoing lack of attention to war termination is identified as early as 1970 by 
William Fox who explains that during the Cold War political scientists were more concerned 
with war avoidance, deterrence, and ‘pervasive doubts that thermonuclear war can be kept from 
running its full course.’7 This disregard for an understanding of the processes by which wars 
end was, however, not confined to the Cold War period. Writing in 2001, Heikki Patomaki 
suggests that peace research is also declining in the post-Cold War era suggesting that ‘Western 
funders do not appear enthusiastic; peace research conferences are increasingly losing their 
colour, or disappearing altogether; and in Moscow ideas of peace research have once again been 
sidelined.’8 This trajectory has not noticeably been reversed in the intervening years as Joakim 
Kreutz, introducing the Uppsala Conflict Data Project’s (UCDP) Conflict Termination dataset 
in 2010, also notes that quantitative data on war termination ‘has largely been neglected and 
not subjected to the same methodological rigor found in datasets used for the study of war 
onset.’9 While the literature regularly identifies a lack of academic interest in how wars are 
                                                          
7 William T. R. Fox, ‘The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War’, The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 392 (1970): 1; See also Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1971); and David J. Oberst, ‘Why Wars End: An Expected Utility War Termination 
Model’ (U.S. Army War College: Defense Technical Information Center, 1992), 2. 
8 Heikki Patomäki, ‘The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at the Start of the New Century’, 
Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 6 (2001): 729–30. 
9 Joakim Kreutz, ‘How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset’, 
Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 243, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353108; Also Tansa 
George Massoud, ‘War Termination’, Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 4 (1996): 491–96. 
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brought to a conclusion and how peace is established, as well as an increasing lack of funding 
of such projects this is despite claims of clear links between how wars end and the much more 
prominent study of how they begin. As Donald Wittman argues, ‘there is a great amount of 
symmetry between how a war ends and how a war begins.’10 To understand this link, as well as 
how this study contributes to our understanding of how conflicts come to a close, it is necessary 
to interrogate how war termination studies have typically approached the question of how wars 
end. 
 
The vast majority of academic studies of war termination have been based on a methodology 
of rational choice theory or game theory, to the point of being near-hegemonic in the field. 
Tansa Massoud argued that rational choice models ‘appear to be the dominant tool’ used in war 
termination studies and that ‘decision-makers are assumed to make rational calculations.’11 This 
methodological dominance means that a large number of studies use a rational choice model 
such as variations on utility theory,12 cost-benefit analysis,13 information that decision-makers 
derive from battles,14 logic,15 war termination equations, bargaining processes,16 and other 
formal quantitative, logical, and game theoretical methods. It appears that the general aim of 
the war termination literature is to create a formal and generalisable model to map and 
understand the conditions that are necessary for limited and conventional wars either between 
states or between a state and a sub-state group to conclude in either victory, ceasefire, peace 
agreement, or stalemate. It is based on the assumption that the decision-makers of states and 
sub-state groups will make logical, rational decisions, informed by the information that is 
presented to them in the build-up to and battles of a war and that these decisions will be based 
on a cost-benefit analysis of the utility of the war to their group. If the war no longer has utility, 
they will end it one way or another, depending on the specifics of the situation. Rational choice 
theory is not without its problems though. As well as the assumption that leaders will take 
rational decisions based on a dispassionate account of the information that is presented to them 
                                                          
10 Donald Wittman, ‘How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 
4 (1979): 743; See also Francis A. Beer and Thomas F. Mayer, ‘Why Wars End: Some Hypotheses’, Review of 
International Studies 12, no. 02 (1986): 95, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500114019. 
11 Massoud, ‘War Termination’, 491; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro also makes this point Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 
‘Quagmires in the Periphery: Foreign Wars and Escalating Commitment in International Conflict’, Security 
Studies 7, no. 3 (1998): 94–144, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419808429352. 
12 Wittman, ‘How a War Ends’. 
13 Taliaferro, ‘Quagmires in the Periphery’. 
14 Kristopher W. Ramsay, ‘Settling It on the Field Battlefield Events and War Termination’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 52, no. 6 (2008): 850–79, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708324593. 
15 Branislav L. Slantchev, ‘How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace’, 
American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (2004): 813–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-
5853.2004.00103.x. 
16 Andrew H. Kydd, ‘Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution’, Annual Review of Political 
Science 13, no. 1 (2010): 101–21, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.032108.135916. 
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on the basis of utility, there are myriad further issues such as bias in selection despite a 
“scientific” approach, anomalies being ignored, a lack of empirical success, and other 
methodological problems.17 William Connolly takes this critique of rational choice theory 
further and engages with it ontologically, rather than just methodologically when he refers to a 
patient with ‘ventromedial prefrontal damage’ whereby the patient has lost access to ‘somatic 
markers’ (that is, the intersubjective, linguistic, and cultural concepts, beliefs and histories) as 
akin to a rational choice theorist.18 To reduce complex decisions down to a cost-benefit, utility, 
or rational choice therefore is to remove all aspects of decision making that involve the 
affective, the embodied, the historical, the intertextual, and the cultural contexts in which they 
are embedded.  
 
R. B. J. Walker makes a similar point when he argues that ‘politics is not reducible to the 
administration of things, nor to a rational calculus of individual self-interest, no matter how 
important these have become.’19 Likewise, David Campbell has argued that because 
‘understanding involves rendering the unfamiliar in the terms of the familiar, there is always an 
ineluctable debt to interpretation such that there is nothing outside of discourse.’20 
Understanding how wars end exclusively through the lens of rational choice models, and 
variations thereof, is a limiting perspective. It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse the 
rationality of political leaders, nor to assess the political or strategic logic of decisions to end a 
war. This research does not engage in a sustained critique of rational choice theory because it 
analyses a different category of politics - the ways that conditions of success are constructed, 
presented, and legitimised and how intensive and affective politico-cultural interaction allows 
for their emergence. Instead of looking at the end of conflicts per se, I look at how the conditions 
of success to be declared are created through politico-cultural interaction. To develop a fuller 
understanding of the conditions that cause a conflict to be assigned the label “ended,” we must 
take into account factors beyond the traditional, mainstream, or orthodox understanding of 
International Relations. Popular culture, and cinema in particular, is one site where such a 
                                                          
17 For a much more detailed critique of methodologies in the rational choice literature see Donald P. Green and 
Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); For a feminist critique of rational choice theory see Paula England, ‘A 
Feminist Critique of Rational-Choice Theories: Implications for Sociology’, The American Sociologist 20, no. 1 
(1989): 14–28, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02697784. 
18 William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002), 33–35; David Campbell argues along related lines when he states that ‘We should no longer regard those 
who occupy the secretive domains of the national security state as being outside of the cultural parameters of the 
state.’ David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998). 
19 R. B. J. Walker, After the Globe, Before the World (London: Routledge, 2009), 84. 
20 Campbell, Writing Security, 4. 
7 
 
critical analysis of the conditions necessary to end a war can take place. 
 
While much of the war termination literature takes rational choice theory as its ontological and 
methodological starting point, in more recent studies of war termination there has been an 
increase of critically oriented work that rejects the rational choice and formal modelling 
methodologies that have been dominant, even if these studies have tended to be ‘bracketed and 
set off from the real projects’ of International Relations and war termination studies.21 This 
mirrors the broader critical turn that International Relations, as a widely conceived discipline, 
and studies of conflict have undergone over the past thirty years, discussed in more detail below. 
As Michael J. Shapiro has argued, ‘conflict, war, or any domain of human understanding is 
always-already textualized or shot through with figuration that has a venerable history.’22 Bruce 
Cronin argues, as Massoud and Taliaferro do, that most scholars seeking to understand how 
wars end assume intentionality and rationality on the part of decision-makers. However, Cronin 
approaches rational choice modelling in a critical fashion arguing that postwar settlements are 
not intentionally created by rational actors working on a cost-benefit utility analysis but rather 
‘by the type of discourse among the principal political leaders concerning postwar 
reconstruction.’23 He argues that this discourse is, in turn, defined by the war aims of the parties 
to a conflict that shift over time to reflect changing realities. Cronin’s use of political discourse 
is laudable for its move away from formal modelling, but he fails to take into account where 
this discourse emanates from and what factors may impact on it. Rather than being a static 
entity that always-already-is, it is rather a fluid process that is always-becoming.  
 
Political discourses and actions are ever changing and influenced by myriad factors, popular 
culture being one of them. Simon Dalby, for instance, notes that ‘movies provide many of the 
metaphors and the imagined landscapes that are used in political discourse, regardless of the 
stated intentions of director, actors, or producers.’24 Ewa Mazierska notes, echoing Shapiro’s 
point above about human understanding being textualised and imbued with history that, 
                                                          
21 Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, ‘Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and 
the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 1, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2600576; Although some have attempted to bride the gap between rational choice theory 
and critical theory, see for example James Johnson, ‘Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between 
Critical Theory and Rational Choice’, The American Political Science Review 87, no. 1 (1993): 74–86, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2938957. 
22 Michael J. Shapiro, ‘Representing World Politics: The Sport/War Intertext’, in International/Intertextual 
Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, ed. James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (New York: 
Lexington Books, 1989), 71. 
23 Bruce Cronin, ‘Be Careful What You Wish for: War Aims and the Construction of Postwar Political Orders’, 
Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 6 (2010): 791, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310381621. 
24 Simon Dalby, ‘Warrior Geopolitics: Gladiator, Black Hawk Down and The Kingdom Of Heaven’, Political 
Geography 27, no. 4 (2008): 443, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.03.004. 
8 
 
‘[c]inema is part of history, namely a discourse on the past.’25 Furthermore, as Jason Dittmer 
has argued, winning in popular cultural artefacts (he discusses comic books) inscribes 
legitimacy upon the victor.26 Rather than a political discourse of postwar reconstruction creating 
the conditions of possibility for ending a war and victory then, we have a situation whereby 
these conditions of possibility are culturally as well as politically articulated. In this thesis, I 
present a number of conditions of victory that are politically and culturally constructed, 
legitimised, and strengthened through interaction between political and cultural artefacts. These 
conditions are, again, the values inscribed in American exceptionalism, the moral use of 
technologised political violence, sacrifice, and urbanity.  
 
A discursive approach of any sort however is also always an approach that is fraught with 
problems as the recent Chilcot Report highlighted. This demonstrated that the UK government 
did not proceed on a rational and intentional course of action towards postwar reconstruction 
based on a cost-benefit analysis, but neither was postwar reconstruction based on the political 
discourse of war aims statically articulated during the campaign against Iraq in 2003. Indeed, 
the Chilcot Report suggested that there was, at best, very limited postwar planning at any stage 
leading up to or during the conflict. The executive summary of the report states that ‘the 
Government was unprepared for the role in which the UK found itself from April 2003. Much 
of what went wrong stemmed from that lack of preparation.’ Furthermore, the report goes on 
to argue that all ‘fundamental elements’ relating to the post-conflict period were lacking in the 
UK’s approach.27 This is also evidenced by the delay between the invasion of Iraq and the 
publication of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq by the US government thirty-two 
months later in November 2005.28 To an extent, the Chilcot report undermines Cronin’s 
argument about postwar planning being determined by discourse by demonstrating that during 
the Iraq War there was simply no planning.29 Although official reports into the 2011 NATO 
Intervention in Libya have not been produced, the country’s descent into a civil war between 
rival militant factions also points towards a lack of post-conflict planning. 
 
                                                          
25 Ewa Mazierska, European Cinema and Intertextuality: History, Memory and Politics (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 1. 
26 Jason Dittmer, ‘The Tyranny of the Serial: Popular Geopolitics, the Nation, and Comic Book Discourse’, 
Antipode 39, no. 2 (2007): 264, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00520.x. 
27 John Chilcot et al., ‘The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary’ (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 2016), 134. 
28 National Security Council, ‘National Strategy for Victory in Iraq’ (Washington, 30 November 2005). 
29 For a good account of the failure of post war planning in Iraq see Sultan Barakat, ‘Post-Saddam Iraq: 
Deconstructing a Regime, Reconstructing a Nation’, Third World Quarterly 26, no. 4–5 (2005): 571–91, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500127800; See also Charles Ferguson, No End in Sight (Magnolia Pictures, 
2007). 
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Further in this more critical approach to the question of how wars end is Victoria Carty’s article 
about how anti-war social movements that were mobilised in the build-up to the Iraq War 
worked to eventually end US involvement. Carty argues that vast networks of various anti-war 
groups from around the world, both virtual and real, applied pressure, through elections, to 
politicians to end involvement in foreign interventions.30 This is an interesting point, and then-
Senator Obama made much of his anti-Iraq War credentials in the 2008 Presidential election 
cycle. However, Carty perhaps overstates the power of the anti-war movement. While US 
involvement in Iraq did eventually, if not end entirely, then at least diminish significantly, and 
President Obama formally announced the end of the Iraq War, Carty does not take into account 
other factors that influence voters at the ballot box, most specifically the economic crisis of 
2008. That being said, Gary Jacobson partly supports Carty’s view and states that ‘the Iraq War 
was, through direct and indirect pathways, ultimately the single most important contributor to 
Obama’s presidential victory.’31 While the Iraq War was important to Obama’s victory, the 
relationship between popular opposition and the specific social movements and protest groups 
is somewhat murkier. Indeed, Carty appears to valorise and ascribe a significant amount of 
power to what Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams term “folk politics.” Srnicek and Williams note 
that 
 
[m]illions march against the Iraq War, yet it goes ahead as planned, Hundreds of thousands protest 
austerity, but unprecedented budget cuts continue. Repeated student protests, occupations and 
riots struggle against rises in tuition fees, but they continue their inexorable advance…Despite the 
desires of millions for a better world, the effects of these movements prove minimal.32 
 
The question that emerges from Carty, Jacobson, and Srnicek and Williams is whether the 
organised opposition to the Iraq War was the sole or most important cause of Obama formally 
bringing the intervention to a close, or whether there were also other factors at work. Following 
on from discussions above, and as will be elaborated on in more detail below and in the 
following chapters, I argue that to understand how wars are brought to an end requires taking 
more factors into consideration. It is the argument of this thesis that popular culture, and 
specifically contemporary Hollywood action movies, forms connections with politics through 
intensive and affective encounters that is conceptualised as the end of wars assemblage. These 
encounters then allow particular conditions of success to emerge from that assemblage. These 
                                                          
30 Victoria Carty, ‘The Coalition of the Unwilling: Contentious Politics, Political Opportunity Structures, and 
Challenges for the Contemporary Peace Movement’, Peace and Conflict Studies 18, no. 1 (2011): 79–115. 
31 Gary C. Jacobson, ‘George W. Bush, the Iraq War, and the Election of Barack Obama’, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1 June 2010): 208, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2010.03755.x. 
32 Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (Verso 
Books, 2015), 5. 
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emergent properties can then be politically deployed to make a claim to truth that a conflict has 
ended or will end. 
 
Before turning to alternative approaches to understanding how conflicts are ended, and my own 
argument that conditions of victory are created through the intense connections between popular 
culture and politics forged through the assemblage, it is useful to understand how the endings 
of contemporary wars are notably different to historic conflicts. As noted in the opening 
paragraph of this introduction, both Presidents Bush and Obama recognised and made clear that 
the War on Terror would not end in the “conventional” way, with a surrender ceremony on the 
deck of a battleship as in the Japanese surrender on the USS Missouri in 1945. While much is 
made in politics of the history and successes of American involvement in wars, particularly 
World War II, the reference to the ending as radically different is interesting. For instance, 
President Obama saying to troops at Bagram Air Base in 2010 that ‘you’ve earned your place 
in American history alongside those greatest generations.’33 Or President Bush justifying the 
use of military tribunals in 2001 saying that ‘These are extraordinary times. And I would remind 
those who don’t understand the decision I made that Franklin Roosevelt made the same decision 
in World War II. Those were extraordinary times too.’34 Both presidents were clear that there 
was to be no official surrender, no ticker-tape parades in Times Square, no historic armistice or 
peace treaty signed, no open-ended occupation of captured territory. Nonetheless, the conflicts 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya were assigned the label of ended (at least temporarily) and this 
assignation was broadly accepted. The question then arises of how this assignation took place, 
what factors allowed for the label of “ended” to be applied to these conflicts? The rational 
choice models discussed above, while potentially useful for dyadic inter-state conflicts, have a 
limited utility in understanding these more amorphous and ambiguous contemporary conflicts. 
The question is no longer one of cost-benefit, logic, game theory or rationality, but one of how 
claims to truth are articulated, circulated, and legitimised. Popular culture is one of the fields in 
which these conditions of success are formed, enter popular imaginations, and become the 
means through which these claims are made. 
 
Aesthetics and Popular Culture 
So far, the factors that have been traditionally used within the field to explain how conflicts end 
                                                          
33 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President to the Troops at Bagram Air Base’, The White House, 3 December 
2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/03/remarks-president-troops-bagram-air-
base. 
34 George W. Bush, ‘President Discusses War, Humanitarian Efforts’, The White House, 19 November 2001, 
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have been based on rational choice theory, game theoretical modelling, formal logic, and social 
movement studies. But what has been demonstrated above is that none of these approaches can 
fully explain the complex factors that feed into how an ending for a war, whose end point is 
open to contestation, is able to register as credible. While they are all interesting, valuable, and 
valid arguments that, perhaps, can be integrated into a more complete understanding of the end 
phases of a conflict, as touched upon above there are myriad other factors at work in the 
political, economic, social, and cultural fields that must also be taken into account. The politico-
cultural interactions and how they contribute to the end of wars are the subject of this thesis. To 
further understand the nature of how conflicts end and to build on the formal modelling 
described above, we have to move beyond the representational logic that has dominated the 
field of International Relations for much of its existence. Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker 
emphasise the need to understand that the discipline of International Relations, or indeed any 
field of human endeavour, is not about moving ever closer to an objective truth through 
understanding and creating direct or perfect representations of reality. A central argument of 
their seminal piece from 1990 critiques the ontological foundation of, in the case of this thesis, 
game theoretical models of conflict ending. They argue that ‘every representation appears not 
as a copy or recovery of something really present in some other time or place but as a 
representation of other representations - none original, each equally arbitrary, and none able to 
exclude other representations in order to be a pure presence, an absolute origin of truth and 
meaning in itself.’35 This question of representation is one that is productive to discuss. This is 
in part because the crisis of International Relations that they talk about is part of a broader crisis 
of modernity that is also, in part, a crisis of representation.36 They rightly argue that 
representation is not a mirror of some original “reality” but rather just a representation of a 
representation of a representation and so forth. Instead of taking the ending of a conflict as 
something that exists “out there” that can be studied from “in here,” wherever the two respective 
places might be spatially and temporally located, we can instead approach this oft-neglected 
subject of war termination from a different point of view. If the end of conflict is just one more 
representation within an endless chain, then how do these various representations interact with 
one another, and with lived experience, to create something that is (politically, socially, 
economically, culturally) accepted as an end of conflict? How can this chain of representation 
be thoughtfully, critically, and rigorously analysed? If we can put it differently, we can ask, 
how do we break free from the chain(s) of representation? 
                                                          
35 Ashley and Walker, ‘Conclusion’, 378. 
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To answer this vital question, it first needs to be expanded upon to help us understand what is 
meant by the chain(s) of representation within the heterodox literature on conflict endings, the 
field of popular culture world politics more broadly, and within International Relations as a 
discipline. The ontological assumption that underlies most research on how conflicts end to 
date has been a predominately representational one. Roland Bleiker discusses the 
representational aspects of International Relations and suggests that ‘No representation, even 
the most systematic empirical analysis, can be identical with its object of inquiry.’37 27 years 
earlier, Shapiro made much the same assessment about science and, by extension, the social 
sciences, arguing that it ‘rests on an idolatrous metaphysics, objectifying phenomena on the 
basis of a model of certainty of representation…an epistemology of representation connected 
to a notion of man as a being with a [privileged] viewpoint.’38 Bleiker takes the critique of a 
representational logic further however and argues that the aesthetic domain can help to 
problematise the representational logic that has dominated studies of International Relations. 
As highlighted above, the game theoretical or logical modelling or utility theory based analyses 
of how conflicts end are bound up in this representational logic whereby they seek to understand 
empirically, objectively, and fully, how wars come to an end. In so doing, they are ignoring the 
influence that aesthetics, culture, society, the academy and their own place within these 
structures exerts on their own work. A representational logic can also fruitfully be thought of 
as a mimetic one. Bleiker states that mimetic approaches have dominated the field of 
International Relations and ‘seek to represent politics as realistically and authentically as 
possible, aiming to capture world politics as-it-really-is.’39 Of course it is, to all intents and 
purposes, impossible to reduce and represent something as complex and complicated as the end 
of armed conflict as it really is. Rather than accepting the political realities of conflict 
termination that are created as common-sense, this thesis seeks to embrace the complexity of 
the end of wars in order to denaturalise the processes, interactions, and discourses that work to 
create the conditions of success for conflict. This denaturalisation of taken-for-granted 
assumptions and claims can help us to more critically engage with the termination of wars and 
can also prove useful in developing a fuller critique of war and political violence more broadly. 
Building on the understanding that ‘representation is always an act of power,’ this research does 
not seek to substitute one mode of representation for another.40 Rather, by engaging in an 
                                                          
37 Roland Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory’, Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 30, no. 3 (2001): 532, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298010300031001. 
38 Michael J. Shapiro, ‘Literary Production as a Politicizing Practice’, in Language and Politics, ed. Michael J. 
Shapiro (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 216. 
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assemblage-led analysis of non-representational practices in culture and politics and how they 
influence one another, this thesis argues that politico-cultural interaction is an important site for 
the construction, maintenance, and legitimisation of the end of wars. Of course, this does not 
and should not imply that this is the sole or even most important driver of these processes, but 
rather that it is a critical and original contribution to a fuller account of war termination. 
 
How, then, do we operationalise the aesthetic in order to problematise, critique, or challenge 
the dominant representational logic that is at the heart of studies of conflict termination? Using 
popular culture as both a political and aesthetic site of analysis helps us to challenge the 
representational epistemology of game theory, logical modelling, and utility analysis. While it 
is certainly possible to fall into the same representational trap when discussing popular culture 
and world politics - that is, arguing that how popular culture represents world politics is more 
useful than how game theory represents it - what we must also try to uncover, and certainly 
what this thesis intends to uncover, is the methods, modes, and impact of interaction between 
popular culture and world politics. By understanding how popular culture influences world 
politics it is not meant to improve upon current representations of the end of war, and nor is it 
meant to create a new and better representation of it, but it is rather to interrogate, in a critical 
manner, what factors play into the decisions needed to create the conditions of possibility for 
the ending of a conflict - how the conditions of success discussed in this thesis are formed, how 
they circulate, how they are legitimised, and how they are open to challenge and contestation. 
Rather than creating academic representations based on cultural representations of political 
events, this thesis is about embracing the complexity of politico-cultural interactions and 
articulating a language that allows us to interrogate how these encounters between culture and 
politics help to create a space for certain political realities to come into being.  
 
Much work has of course already been done on the intersection and interaction of popular 
culture and world politics and the dissident challenge it can present to “mainstream,” 
“orthodox,” or “traditional” forms of International Relations. As part of the postmodern, the 
aesthetic, and the cultural turn in International Relations, groups of scholars have put forward 
the idea that culture broadly, and popular culture in particular, are legitimate, useful, and 
interesting areas for a detailed and rigorous analysis of contemporary politics and political 
events.41 Work on popular culture and world politics has spanned multiple areas of culture 
                                                          
41 For a good introduction to many areas of the study of popular culture and world politics see Federica Caso and 
Caitlin Hamilton, eds., Popular Culture and World Politics: Theories, Methods, Pedagogies (E-International 
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including movies, television, music,42 tourism,43 video games,44 art,45 zombies,46 comic books,47 
children’s literature,48 science fiction49 and celebrity culture50 to name just a few examples. Just 
as the cultural artefacts that they draw on are diverse, so too are the political situations that they 
wish to explore through these media. 
 
I should say that studies of popular culture and world politics are not monolithic however. 
Merely because they share a concern about links between the cultural and the political does not 
mean that they share ontological, methodological, or theoretical approaches. As such, my own 
work builds on some of the methodological and theoretical developments that emanate from 
this literature. Like any sub-field, there are multiple approaches to the study of popular culture 
and world politics. Some have used zombies or The Lord of the Rings to talk about International 
Relations theory;51 Kathryn Starnes uses folklore as a method to understand how International 
Relations theory is made, sustained and challenged;52 others see the value of pop culture 
pedagogically, bringing movies, music, and television into the classroom;53 another theme is 
using popular culture as a metaphor to talk about foreign policy such as reading Obama’s pivot 
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to Asia through Pacific Rim;54 audience studies use cultural artefacts to discuss how people use 
pop culture to create particular geopolitical imaginaries; James Der Derian tracks the link 
between cultural and military simulation and technology in a similar vein to Paul Virilio;55 more 
“dissident” work, in Ashley and Walker’s terms, is Saara Särmä’s cultural and artistic practice 
of collages to engage with international nuclear politics.56 As such, the study of popular culture 
and world politics is not a homogeneous field with a strictly laid out core of what is 
ontologically, epistemologically, or methodologically valid. The field, while still in the process 
of developing and establishing itself, is nonetheless too varied and extensive to present a 
coherent and detailed review of here. 
 
My own work builds on the idea of the popular culture-world politics continuum suggested by 
Grayson, Davies, and Philpott. Developing a critique of the representational or mimetic 
approaches to politics and culture, Grayson et al. argue that ‘popular culture should not merely 
be reduced to a superstructure that reflects a political base.’57 Rather, they suggest that politics 
and popular culture are mutually constitutive of one another and engage in a form of symbiotic 
relationship. In other words, it is not that culture slavishly represents occurrences, events, and 
discourses from politics but rather that popular culture can itself be a site of political 
contestation. My position on this politico-cultural interaction is that not only can culture be a 
site where politics takes place, but is also a site where the conditions for political action are 
created, circulated, enacted, legitimised, and challenged. The assemblage theory of Deleuze and 
Guattari, discussed in depth in the following chapter, allows for an understanding of the 
relationship between politics and culture as one where not only are they symbiotic with one 
another, creating and shaping discursive and material practices in each field, but are mutually 
imbricated with one another to the extent that the line between them becomes blurred or non-
existent. Narratives and tropes that are uttered in political speeches are cultural, just as the 
speeches of movie stars in action movies are political. This is also different to an intertextual 
understanding of politico-cultural interaction where one field is deliberately referenced in 
another. While still discussing them as separate spheres of influence that interact, the end of 
wars assemblage allows for this interaction to be seen as a collective. Political discourse is not 
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just enacted through popular culture, but rather that interaction itself, conceptualised through 
the assemblage, creates certain political realities and possibilities as emergent properties of the 
assemblage: in the context of this thesis, the creation of conditions of victory. It is thus the 
interaction of these seemingly heterogeneous fields that forms the possibility for these 
conditions to be formed. 
 
Within this theoretical context, it is my intention to discuss those works that have a direct 
influence on my own research - namely those that engage primarily with cinema, and those that 
deploy similar theoretical approaches to understanding the intersection and interaction of 
popular culture and world politics. The war film has featured prominently in analyses of 
politico-cultural interaction from World War Two, through Vietnam, and into the War on 
Terror.58 Cynthia Weber, for instance, talks about the convergence between official American 
foreign policy in the early stages of the War on Terror such as the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive 
strikes with narratives in films that were (re-)released in the year after 9/11, the blurring and 
blending of real/reel politics, and how cinema helped to construct an idea of “moral 
America(ns).”59 Weber’s Imagining America at War is an excellent account of cinematic and 
political attempts to construct an identity and make sense of the events of 9/11 and the early 
years of the War on Terror. The focus on films that deal explicitly with America’s past wars 
such as World War Two, Vietnam, and the Bosnian War is most certainly justifiable and Weber 
provides a fascinating insight into the politico-cultural interaction that occurs when nations go 
to war.60 However, in this thesis I do not just look at war films nor the conditions created for 
states to enter into wars but rather specifically at films that omit any direct mention of specific 
conflicts and how the interactions that occur between them and politics allow for the conditions 
of possibility of those wars being ended. The reason for avoiding (though not entirely 
excluding) films that are about particular wars is expanded upon in some depth in chapter two 
where I trace the evolution of the combat genre into the contemporary action movie and the 
justification for looking at the end of wars, in addition to the prima facie, is explored above. 
Movies that are specifically about the War on Terror such as The Hurt Locker, Zero Dark Thirty, 
or American Sniper are largely absent from this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, as Susan 
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Carruthers has noted, there was a “vanishing audience” for such films as the War on Terror 
dragged on.61 As these films are less commercially successful than their counterparts discussed 
here, their role in shaping conditions of success is more limited as their audience reach was 
lower that the action genre. Secondly, many films that are set during the War on Terror are 
neither war movies nor action movies as will be explored in chapter two.62 For reasons of 
specificity, this research is focused on one particular genre in order to trace how this style of 
film contributed to the end of wars assemblage. Thirdly, even though none of the films 
discussed herein are about the War on Terror, they still contribute to the creation, circulation, 
and legitimisation of conditions of success in that conflict. In fact, it is precisely because they 
are not about the War on Terror that analysing them is so interesting and revealing.  
 
Another form of War on Terror cinema is the documentary film, discussed by Pat Aufderheide 
who admits that such films do not have a very wide appeal but can still shape politics through 
social media and small scale screenings to interested parties such as military families and anti-
war activists.63 While the impact that documentary cinema can have on audiences is interesting, 
again the small scale effect of such films renders them less useful for the ensuing analysis. 
Rather than discussing how specific films about the War on Terror can help shape public 
discourse about that war, in this thesis I argue that the films themselves, through the affective 
encounters they produce and the other artefacts they interact with through the end of wars 
assemblage, can have an effect on politics and help to forge the conditions of success that can 
then be politically deployed to end a war. As such, looking at films with the greatest reach (and 
therefore the greatest capacity for affective encounters) allows us to explore the dominant 
cinematic genre and the effect it has on political reality. This idea that cinema itself, rather than 
the effect that it can have on audiences to vote, as Aufderheide argues, is explored by Shapiro 
as he argues that movies screened ‘both [at] film festivals and in movie theatres in general 
articulate resistance to the new violent cartographies. They counter the state’s “truth weapon” 
with a form of critique, a juxtaposition.’64 As such, it is cinema itself or the particular movie 
itself that interacts with political realities. Shapiro’s argument is, for me, a convincing one and 
in chapter one I utilise Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory to articulate a mode of 
thinking that can help us analyse how this interaction occurs.  
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Where I diverge from Shapiro, however, is that my research takes a more pessimistic or critical 
view of Hollywood cinema. Rather than seeing cinema as a vehicle for critique of dominant 
political events, narratives, and realities I argue that blockbuster action films actually help to 
create the conditions of possibility for contested endings to conflicts to be constructed. This 
divergence with Shapiro’s more optimistic argument is perhaps due to the difference in 
cinematic objects that we engage with. For Shapiro, the film festival, world cinema, and 
arthouse movies are the dominant cultural artefact while in this thesis I focus on big-budget 
Hollywood product designed for huge box office returns and mass appeal. As such, their ability 
to articulate critiques of American political discourse and policy is naturally limited by the 
constraints of making money. Shapiro’s work on cinema as agent in itself rather than cinema 
as representational or cinema solely as medium is also reflected in Deleuze and Guattari who 
say that ‘the way an expression relates to a content is not by uncovering or representing it. 
Rather, forms of expression and forms of content communicate through a conjunction of their 
quanta of relative deterritorialization, each intervening, operating in the other.’65 We can apply 
this in light of the above discussion and argue that cinema has a political effect itself, it can 
create certain of conditions of possibility. None of this is to say that Shapiro is wrong with his 
argument that certain cinematic artefacts have the potential to critique and juxtapose nor is it to 
say that audience studies are missing a meaningful point by discussing how geopolitical 
imaginaries or voting intentions are influenced by culture. It is, however, yet another way of 
thinking about politico-cultural interaction that interrogates how this interaction takes place and 
the political realities that it creates the conditions of possibility for. 
 
Addressing the question of how wars are brought to a conclusion by utilising the concept of the 
end of wars assemblage is particularly useful for a number of reasons. Firstly, it allows for an 
elucidation of the roles that non-political artefacts play in bringing wars to a conclusion. In the 
context of this thesis, that primarily includes popular culture and the contemporary Hollywood 
action movie. More specifically, it provides a framework in which we can understand how 
interactions between politics and popular culture allows conditions of success to emerge from 
the assemblage. It is the ability of these cinematic texts to induce encounters between audiences 
and movie that allows for politico-cultural interaction that creates these emergent properties. 
As Audra Mitchell has noted, assemblages explain how ‘collective agency can emerge from the 
confluence of heterogeneous bodies.’66 The agency to claim that a war has ended or will end, 
                                                          
65 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 87–88. 
66 Audra Mitchell, ‘Only Human? A Worldly Approach to Security’, Security Dialogue 45, no. 1 (2014): 12. 
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then, is not embodied solely in the politician making this claim to truth, but rather in the 
complex web of connections that made such a claim possible. Secondly, utilising the end of 
wars assemblage as an object of study allows me to trace how it developed over time. While 
assemblages are always in a process of constant production and flux and are not static entities, 
exploring how the end of wars assemblage was shaped in the early stages of the War on Terror 
and how it was subjected to critical pressures in later years allows us to track its emergence and 
resilience. In the early stages of the War on Terror initial conditions of success were articulated, 
but those conditions are always subjected to pressures and critique. How resilient they are to 
change in later years is an interesting and productive question to ask. As this thesis is 
constructed chronologically, we see that between 2000 and 2007 there were four main 
conditions of success that emerged from the assemblage: American exceptionalism and the 
values it embodies; the moral use of technological superiority; sacrifice; and the geographical 
location of the built environment. Although politico-cultural interaction is always fluid, the 
assemblage came under renewed pressures from 2007 and the election of President Obama. In 
addition to this, processes of critique, genre inversion, pastiche non-linear cinematic 
temporalities also challenged the stability of the assemblage. Tracing the contours of the 
assemblage over this time period allows us to assess whether it is stable, how resilient it is, and 
how it may change and evolve in the future. 
 
Chapter one expands this theoretical approach through a more detailed engagement with 
assemblages and how they are utilised in this thesis. 67 However, I should note that while I find 
assemblages to be exceptionally important and useful in the study of popular culture and world 
politics I am by no means the first to have discovered this.68 Each interaction and use of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy is necessarily different with each taking different interpretations, a 
necessary part of their work and something that is seemingly intentional on their part. As Jason 
                                                          
67 New materialism also has an interesting and useful approach to assemblages for mapping and uncovering the 
connections that exist between physical objects and how matter is constitutive of politics. For example, Mark B. 
Salter, ed., Making Things International 1: Circuits and Motion (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2015); Mark B. Salter, ed., Making Things International 2: Catalysts and Reactions (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016); Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter 
Comes to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 3 (2003): 801–831; Diana H. Coole 
and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010). 
68 See, for instance, Caroline Holmqvist, ‘Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, no. 3 (2013): 535–52, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829813483350; Peer Schouten, ‘Security as Controversy: Reassembling Security at 
Amsterdam Airport’, Security Dialogue 45, no. 1 (2014): 23–42; Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould, ‘An 
Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare: AFRICOM and the “Hunt” for Joseph Kony’, Security Dialogue, 1 
June 2018, 0967010618777890, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010618777890; Patrick Weir, ‘Networked 
Assemblages and Geopolitical Media: Governance, Infrastructure and Sites in BBC Radio’, Geopolitics 0, no. 0 
(2018): 1–31, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1465043. 
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Dittmer argues, ‘There is a range of ways of “thinking assemblage”, each with a different 
lineage and emphases.’69 Dittmer himself utilises assemblage theory to discuss geopolitical 
materiality and the emergent more-than-human world.70 Shapiro uses the related Deleuzian 
concept of “interference” to argue for a link between cinema and philosophy.71 Connolly’s 
reading of Deleuze’s engagement with cinema, in a similar vein to Shapiro’s, is about how ‘we 
can map more closely the geology of thought in everyday life’ and that cinema has created a 
‘subterranean intertext’ between thought and film.72 Rather than engaging in an intertextual 
reading of politics and cinema however, I will argue that the saturation of particular tropes and 
the formal aspects of the cinema - montage, close-up, long shots, lighting, music, editing and 
so forth as well as their interaction with the narrative and movement of cinematic aesthetic 
subjects allows conditions of success to emerge.73 How these techniques affect the ‘visceral 
registers of viewers’ through the encounter helps shape the political realities that allow for the 
endings of conflict to be declared.74 These cinematic techniques, the visual register of movies, 
their narratives and plots and importantly how these factors induce affective encounters in 
audiences will all form part of the analysis of the films in the ensuing chapters. The use of these 
three categories of cinematic analysis is important as they represent major elements of cinema 
as both art form and economic product. These categories can also help us understand more fully 
how cinema works within the end of wars assemblage to create, shape, legitimise and 
potentially critique the emergence of conditions of success. 
 
Chapter Outlines 
Following on from this introduction, chapter one will discuss how assemblages can help to 
explore and explain how popular culture and world politics interact at the end of conflicts as 
well as a reflection on methods. This framework, outlined in brief above, theoretically structures 
the remainder of this thesis as each chapter traces the development and evolution of the end of 
wars assemblage over time. Ultimately, what will be shown is that the connections between 
popular culture and politics induced through embodied, intensive, and affective encounters with 
film open up the political space for the creation of conditions of success in the War on Terror. 
These conditions can then be deployed politically in order to make a claim about whether wars 
                                                          
69 Jason Dittmer, ‘Geopolitical Assemblages and Complexity’, Progress in Human Geography 38, no. 3 (2014): 
386, https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132513501405. 
70 Dittmer, 397. 
71 Michael J. Shapiro, ‘A Philopoetic Engagement: Deleuze and The Element of Crime’, Theory & Event 18, no. 
2 (2015). 
72 Connolly, Neuropolitics, 95. 
73 Michael J. Shapiro, Studies in Trans-Disciplinary Method : After the Aesthetic Turn (London: Routledge, 
2013), xiv. 
74 Connolly, Neuropolitics, 96. 
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have ended or not. Because these conditions arise not only from political speech, but also the 
cultural milieu in which audiences are embedded, the claims to truth that they represent can be 
thought of as stronger and more legitimate. Furthermore, these conditions, in a double move, 
also allow for the ongoing practices of political violence in different and various global conflict 
zones. While these conclusions may seem mutually exclusive, the complexity of the interactions 
within the assemblage allows for, and even encourages, both sets of outcomes to come to pass: 
as one conflict is given the status of “ended,” another one can be given the status of “begun.” 
As explored earlier in this introduction with reference to war termination studies, how wars end 
is just as important as how they begin and, furthermore, understanding the conditions of 
possibility that lead to the ending of a war can help us to understand the conditions of possibility 
that allow for wars to begin in the first place. At the end of chapter one I describe in more detail 
the methodological assumptions and processes through which individual films were selected 
for each chapter. Any method of textual selection must, by necessity, leave other potentials out 
of the analysis, but demonstrating that these methodologies have a degree of rigour and 
reflexivity is necessary in the context of social scientific research and this project. 
 
Chapter two performs three important functions within the thesis. Firstly, I make the case that 
utilising popular Hollywood action cinema is a productive site for analysing how conditions of 
success that emerge from the end of wars assemblage. This is because I argue that the 
contemporary action movie has a particular history within the development of cinema and can 
trace it roots to the World War Two combat movie. Furthermore, because the action genre is 
one of the most commercially successful genres of cinema, it has a reach and effect on audiences 
that goes beyond any other style of movie. Simply put, more people watch action movies than 
any other type so therefore it must have an outsized effect on the politico-cultural emergence 
of conditions of success. Secondly, I trace the history of the modern Hollywood blockbuster 
action movie back to its origins with the World War Two combat film. Understanding the 
history of the action genre, with roots in World War Two, the Korean War, Vietnam, and the 
Cold War, helps us map contemporary conflict onto the cultural artefacts that are engaged with 
and also provides an extra layer of analysis. By understanding the antecedents to both 
contemporary conflict and contemporary popular cinema, we can engage with the conditions 
of success that emerge from the end of wars assemblage in more detail. This historical 
grounding of the research is returned to throughout the thesis in order to explore how movies 
function within their genre and how this effects the assemblage. As I make clear in chapter two, 
and throughout the thesis, I am not proposing a general theory of what cinema does, always and 
for ever, in the context of the end of wars assemblage. Rather I am firstly constructing and 
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supporting an argument of how films, in the context of their genre, through encounters and their 
interaction with political rhetoric allow particular conditions of success to emerge from the end 
of wars assemblage. Secondly, I am putting forward a mode of articulation to assist in 
understanding politico-cultural interaction more broadly. 
 
Chapters three to six proceed in a rough chronology from 2000 to 2014. There are multiple 
possible ways of organising this research - by cinematic theme, conflicts in the War on Terror, 
presidential administrations, different articulations of support or critique of political violence, 
and so forth - and the chronological structure of this thesis is not meant to be definitive. The 
reason for this chronological structure is twofold. Firstly, as explored above, it allows us to 
trace how the end of wars assemblage has developed during the War on Terror. What I will 
argue in the following chapters is that between 2000 and 2007 certain conditions of success 
emerged from the assemblage and then from 2007 to 2014, these conditions were potentially 
open to change given a new presidential administration and developments within the action 
genre. The end of wars assemblage, like all assemblages, is subject to multiple processes acting 
on it simultaneously. Territorialising and deterritorialising, coding and decoding, emergence 
and erosion all exert force on the assemblage at the same times. Structuring the thesis 
chronologically allows me to not only trace the contours of the end of wars assemblage over 
time and demonstrate how it has evolved, it also allows me to analytically separate processes 
of stabilisation (chapters three and four) from processes of potential destabilisation (chapters 
five and six). It should be made clear that this is not a teleological view of the assemblage that 
it progresses from simplistic to complex; from stable to unstable; or from territorialisation to 
deterritorialisation, but rather a recognition that assemblages are always subject to forces that 
shape, change, and evolve it. However, separating these two forces of stabilisation and 
destabilisation allow for a greater focus on them, as well as argumentative clarity. Furthermore, 
it is not the case that during the Bush administration the assemblage was static while under 
Obama it was more fluid. Rather, the chronological structure analytically divides assemblage 
formation from assemblage change in order to address these processes separately while 
acknowledging that they can be simultaneous. In other words, chapters three and four deal with 
processes of assemblage stabilisation while chapters five and six deal with processes of 
(potential) destabilisation. The election of Barack Obama as the 44th president is the moment 
where the argument shifts from analysing stabilisation to analysing destabilisation and 
resilience. Obama’s election represented the potential to radically reshape the end of wars 
assemblage through his rhetoric of “hope and change,” his opposition to costly military 
23 
 
interventions, and his promise to end the war in Iraq.75 As will be shown in these chapters, 
however, this rhetoric and accompanying cinematic movements did not radically destabilise the 
assemblage. Secondly, by addressing politico-cultural interaction chronologically rather than, 
say, thematically, this thesis argues that the simultaneity of political and cultural articulations 
of success is especially productive of affective encounters. As the films under discussion are 
concurrent with the political rhetoric of the time, audiences can encounter both nearly 
simultaneously. As such, the audiences that face both politics and culture can take one and 
apply it to the other more easily. Furthermore, the moment of a movie’s release can be 
particularly productive of intensity. While many movies go on to be watched on DVD, Blu-
Ray, or a streaming service, the time it is in the cinema (and particularly the opening weekend), 
is of greatest importance critically and commercially as well as providing a moment where 
audiences watch it at the same time. Thirdly, from the point of view of research design, a 
chronological structure facilitated the research process. By splitting the thesis into sections 
based on a time frame aided in textual selection processes as well as the writing of the thesis 
itself. Fourteen years is a long period to trace the end of wars, and dividing this into manageable 
blocks of time was a useful and productive process. Finally, a chronological structure can be 
useful for a reader as it breaks up a large time period, multiple articulations of victory, and 
diverse cultural artefacts into logical sections that will hopefully make for an easier and more 
enjoyable reading experience. 
 
Chapter three, then, analyses politics and cinema between 2000 and 2003 in order to elucidate 
what conditions of success emerged during this period. Here, I argue that the values embodied 
in American exceptionalism and the moral use of technological supremacy are two main 
conditions of success that emerge from the cultural and political landscape. The specific time 
frame covers major events in the War on Terror from the attacks of September 11th 2001, the 
beginning of the War on Terror, the most bellicose statements of President Bush, the invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the (in)famous ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech of May 1st 2003 
declaring that ‘major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United 
States and our allies have prevailed.’76 Cinematically, this chapter uses X-Men (2000), Training 
Day (2001), Spider-Man (2002), and Tears of the Sun (2003) to map how American 
exceptionalism and the use of technology as a “moral amplifier” helped to shape rhetorical and 
material understandings of success in the War on Terror from an early stage. Furthermore, they 
                                                          
75 The election is a potential ‘bifurcation’ in DeLanda’s terms. Manuel DeLanda, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear 
History (New York: Zone Books, 1997), 14. 
76 George W. Bush, ‘President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended’, The White 
House, 1 May 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html. 
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create an understanding of inevitable victory in what was being constructed as a generational 
struggle of the War on Terror, a theme returned to in chapter six. Ideas of American 
exceptionalism and the moral use of technological superiority obviously predate the War on 
Terror, something that is explored in the chapter, and it is for this reason that three of the films 
were either released, being filmed, or in post-production before the attacks of September 11th. 
By selecting films that predate the formal start of the War on Terror, it is emphasised that the 
themes, narratives, tropes, language and imagery of this cinematic and political moment are not 
necessarily novel but, like the cinema and politics they are embedded in, have a history that 
forms part of the resilience of the end of wars assemblage. Nonetheless, in the context of the 
early stages of the War on Terror, these movies work to intensify exceptionalism and 
technology as core and powerful conditions of success. 
 
Chapter four deals with the urban and the (post-)apocalyptic, their relation to religious 
narratives, and to questions of what is necessary in the War on Terror to achieve victory. 
Chronologically, this chapter starts after major combat operations in Iraq have ended, the 
development of the insurgency in Iraq and ends around the time of the troop surge of 2007 
designed to ensure that ‘We can, and we will, prevail’ in the battle for Iraq.77 What is analysed 
in this chapter is the pervasive idea, influenced by a Judeo-Christian theology, of the need for 
sacrifice in order to achieve redemption. Furthermore, the location of this sacrifice is the urban 
(built) environment. Announcing the troop surge, President Bush argued that redemption and 
victory could only come through the sacrifice of American troops and, linking the theme of 
sacrifice and salvation to the urban, argued that the city is the key site for such events to play 
out. The focus on Baghdad as the main site for sacrifices to occur is mirrored in cinematic 
renditions of the (post-)apocalyptic and dystopian sacrifices and urban landscape. Using War 
of the Worlds (2005), Children of Men (2006), and I am Legend (2007), this chapter traces the 
connections between cultural and political artefacts through the tropes of the apocalyptic, the 
dystopian, and the urban. Building on the previous section, and moving through time, this 
chapter argues that these movies allow for the emergence of sacrifice and urbanity as conditions 
of success in the War on Terror. Much like in the previous chapter, these conditions are not sui 
generis but have a long history in Western thought, politics, warfare, and culture. However, 
with the increase in US fatalities in Iraq during this period as well as the focus on Baghdad in 
the troop surge, these conditions of success do have a particular resonance within this period 
that contributes to their intensity and emergence. Politically, these conditions can then be 
                                                          
77 Bush, ‘President’s Address to the Nation’. 
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deployed to argue that because sacrifices have been made in an urban environment fighting the 
enemy that redemption, salvation, and ultimate victory is inevitable. This is supported, 
enhanced, and actively cultivated by dominant cinematic tropes explored through the three 
films. 
 
Chapter three and four collectively argue that the politico-cultural aspects of the end of wars 
assemblage have produced at least four emergent properties: American exceptionalism, 
technology, sacrifice, and urbanity. These four emergent properties are some of the conditions 
of success that can be politically deployed to make a case that ambiguously concluded conflicts 
are over and that American political violence was successful. While other conditions emerge 
from the assemblage before, during, and after these years these four form the basis of 
subsequent analysis. Chapters five and six analyse the assemblage as it evolves and pose the 
question of how resilient are these conditions and the assemblage as a whole to change. While 
chapters three and four discuss the stabilisation of the assemblage, chapters five and six discuss 
its potential destabilisation. Chapter five analyses a changing political and cultural milieu and 
argues that even though the political rhetoric and action genre of the time articulated potential 
critiques of these conditions of success, they ultimately remained intact. Politically, the years 
2007 to 2010 saw the election of President Obama on his platform of hope and change and 
promise to end the conflicts in the Middle East. This had the potential to alter the conditions of 
the success that emerged from the assemblage by altering the political rhetoric that it is partly 
conditional on. Likewise, cinematically Hancock (2008), Inglourious Basterds (2009), The A-
Team (2010), RED (2010), and The Expendables (2010) all offer potential critiques of the 
previously established conditions of success. These potential critiques are articulated in a 
number of ways. Inglourious Basterds challenges the idea that American political violence is 
morally superior and thus implicitly critiques American exceptionalism as a condition of 
success. Hancock presents us with a radically different type of superhero who is immoral, 
destructive of the urban environment, and African-American. As will be explored in the chapter, 
the superhero is often read as the avatar for American identity and American exceptionalism. 
By depicting one who does not conform to the norms of the genre and who destroys large parts 
of LA, Hancock can also challenge the idea that exceptionalism and urbanity are conditions of 
success. The A-Team, RED, and The Expendables all offer a version of the action genre that is 
based on pastiche. By laying bare the conventions of the genre, these movies have the potential 
to undermine how other genre movies allow for the emergence of conditions of success through 
the assemblage. However, I also argue that these critical potentials are unfulfilled. Each movie 
reasserts dominant genre conventions, exceptionalism, technology, sacrifice and urbanity by 
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the end of the third act. By reasserting these, the assemblage remains largely unchanged and 
the conditions of success previously enumerated continue to emerge. Furthermore, because the 
assemblage and the conditions were subjected to a mild critique, it can be argued that they are 
even stronger and more resilient as a result. Nonetheless, it is possible that these movies presage 
a different style of action movie that can articulate a more critical stance to dominant political 
and conflictual conditions of possibility. 
 
Chapter six continues this analysis of the resilience of the end of wars assemblage to change. 
While chapter five discussed how specific conditions of success may be undermined politically 
and culturally, in this chapter I discuss how the nature of time and temporality impacts on the 
assemblage culturally and politically. The conditions of success analysed throughout this thesis 
are not only political tools to be deployed once a conflict is over. They also engage in the 
construction of the War on Terror as a temporally linear and teleological conflict. In other 
words, the US will inevitably win because of their exceptional morals, their technology, their 
sacrifices, and their focus on the urban. In chapter six I argue that the War on Terror was 
inscribed with a linear and teleological temporality from the start. By analysing three films that 
deploy a non-linear temporality, Source Code (2011), Looper (2012), and Edge of Tomorrow 
(2014), I examine how these cinematic depictions of non-linear time might work to challenge, 
change, and undermine the linear temporality of the end of wars assemblage. Drawing on the 
emerging literature within International Relations on the nature of temporality as socially, 
culturally, and politically constructed, chapter six begins with an exploration of how this has 
been enacted during the War on Terror and what effect it has on the emergent conditions of 
success. The chapter then progresses to analyse these three films that deliberately use non-linear 
time in order to elucidate whether they challenge and critique the temporality of the end of wars 
assemblage. Through the analysis of style, plot, and affect it will be shown how these films 
function within the end of wars assemblage to reinforce dominant linear temporality rather than 
undermine it. Similar to chapter five, I will examine why these films that have the potential to 
critique dominant conceptions of linear and teleological time through the use of non-linear 
temporalities, do not fully exploit this possibility and instead conclude with a reinforcement of 
the dominant construction of linear time. Using the idea that temporality functions within a 
matrix of sovereignty, I argue that contemporary Hollywood action blockbusters, driven as they 
are for profit maximisation, perceive critiques of hegemonic discourses of any kind as a risky 
business manoeuvre for which they may be punished at the box office. This disciplining speaks 
to a major theme in this research whereby Hollywood “product” does not engage in the critique 
of ongoing political violence unlike other cultural artefacts that are less mainstream, such as 
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documentaries, arthouse, or international cinema. 
 
This thesis as a whole argues that the end of wars assemblage is a useful and productive way to 
analyse how wars are brought to an end. 2000 to 2014 were politically, socially, economically, 
and culturally tumultuous times. By tracing how the end of wars assemblage was established in 
the War on Terror, what conditions of success emerged from it, and how these conditions were 
challenged is an important contribution to our understanding not just of the relationship between 
politics and culture, but the broader question of conflict in International Relations. This thesis 
does not seek to analyse how these conditions of success were politically deployed, rather it 
presents a case for how they emerged as potential political tools. Similarly, I do not want to 
argue that popular culture and the action genre in particular are the only or most important 
aspects of the end of wars assemblage. The assemblage is necessarily composed of a multitude 
of things both material and discursive from elections, military strategies, and armaments to the 
economy, international relations, and the experiences of those living in conflict zones around 
the world. Nonetheless, it is argued that popular culture represents an important site where 
political ideas, meanings, and actions are created, shaped, challenged, and enacted. As such, 
the following chapters represent a necessarily limited, but novel and important approach to the 
understanding of the mutual constitution of world politics and popular culture. The end of wars 
assemblage and the conditions of success that are its emergent properties are deployed here in 
such a way as to help articulate how contemporary Hollywood action cinema works to create 
conditions of political possibility in the War on Terror that can then be politically deployed as 
powerful discursive and material devices. I use cultural and political artefacts from 2000 and 
2014 to trace how the assemblage was formed, how certain conditions of success emerged, and 
how these were challenged over time. Through such an understanding it becomes more possible 
to critically engage not just with politico-cultural interaction at the outset of wars and how 
culture and politics intermix to create support for these wars but also, crucially, how that support 
is mobilised to create the conditions whereby those wars are thought of as concluded. 
Understanding how wars are brought to an end, however arbitrary that end might be, can 
provide us with the tools necessary to critique these endings, and to hold future beginnings and 
endings to greater scrutiny. 
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Chapter One: Assemblages and Emergence 
 
“Avengers…” 
Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. Orientating 
this research towards an understanding of the end of wars as an assemblage has a number of 
advantages. Firstly, it allows for an understanding of how conditions of success emerge from 
politico-cultural interaction rather than solely political discourse, rational choice, or 
intertextuality. Secondly, it allows for an engagement with questions and processes of affect 
which helps us to understand the power of popular culture within politics. Thirdly, it allows for 
a chronological approach to the changing nature of the end of wars by understanding how the 
structures of the assemblage emerged, evolved, and are subjected to forces that may alter it. 
Finally, it presents a novel approach to the study of how wars end by moving the debate beyond 
rational choice theory, political discourse, and securitisation.  
 
The interactions between popular culture and politics take place on multiple levels, have been 
conceptualised in different ways, and are characterised by complexity. Films are important sites 
of political, cultural, and societal expression, debate, and contestation. They allow audiences to 
engage affectively with cultural and political artefacts, narratives, imagery, and tropes that 
allow them to interact with the geopolitical world. There are many interpretations of how 
politics affects culture and how culture, in turn, influences politics. For example, audience 
studies seek to learn how people craft their own political orientation from their interaction with 
cultural artefacts such as superheroes, Homeland, or James Bond.78 People have used cultural 
artefacts in a pedagogical way to teach students of international politics about the theories of 
IR.79 Some think that culture’s utility in understanding politics is in its representational quality.80  
But more importantly in the context of this thesis, films can also function through intense and 
affective encounters and resonate strongly with political imagery, political narratives, political 
                                                          
78 For example Jason Dittmer and Klaus Dodds, ‘The Geopolitical Audience: Watching Quantum of Solace 
(2008) in London’, Popular Communication 11, no. 1 (2013): 76–91, 
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(London: Routledge, 2014); Drezner, Theories of International Politics and Zombies. 
80 Hanska, ‘Popular Culture, US Security Policy, and the Asian Pivot’. 
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language and political tropes. This resonance allows connections between film and politics to 
be formed. Conceptualised here as part of the end of wars assemblage, these conditions shape, 
circulate, and legitimise the conditions of success necessary to conclude conflicts in the War 
on Terror. This resonance, as William Connolly puts it, is  
 
when causality, as relations of dependence between separate factors, morphs into energized 
complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore unconnected or 
loosely associated elements fold, bend, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, forging a 
qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation.81 
 
Applying this to the end of wars assemblage, we can use the concept of resonance to explain 
how these seemingly unconnected spheres of politics and cinema can merge into a collective 
machine through the simultaneity of their themes, the commonalities they share; and the affects 
they produce in audiences that confront both politics and cinema. While the audience for action 
movies is global, the geographical focus in this thesis is on American political rhetoric, 
American movies, and American wars. As such, we can productively think of the audiences 
here as American. This machine or assemblage, that functions through resonance and affective 
encounters can then allow for the emergence of conditions of success in the War on Terror that 
are irreducible to the component organs. 
 
It is true that politics and cinema have had multiple interactions since the advent of film from 
the Spanish-American war of 1898 that saw the first use of Edison’s motion picture camera in 
war up to the US Department of Defence supporting films such as Michael Bay’s 2012 film 
Battleship.82 Nonetheless, to claim that popular culture and politics can be conceptualised as 
two components of a larger machine that contributes to the ending of wars may, at first glance, 
appear strange. What an assemblage-led approach to the study of conflict termination allows us 
to do, however, is to think about film and politics merging, blending, interacting, and strongly 
influencing each other affectively and in an unintentional and non-linear way which 
differentiates this approach from a purely discursive or intertextual one. As explored in the 
Introduction, it is not the approach of this thesis that culture slavishly represents politics, nor is 
it that politicians deliberately appropriate cultural tropes. Rather, it is a non-linear relationship 
whereby the two seemingly separate fields interact through an assemblage to allow certain 
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conditions of success to emerge. 
 
This chapter proceeds through six stages. I will start with an exploration of some examples of 
assemblages in order to introduce the concept. Following this, I unpack how the end of wars 
assemblage functions through intensive, affective encounters in order to produce conditions of 
success as its emergent properties. Thirdly, I engage with the material and discursive, process-
oriented, and non-linear nature of assemblages. Fourthly, I lay out why an assemblage-led 
approach is different to an intertextual one both conceptually and practically. Fifthly, I engage 
with the structure of assemblages and how we can understand some of the forces that act on it. 
Finally, I lay out my methods and discuss their implications and limitations. What will be 
demonstrated in this chapter is that understanding the end of wars as an assemblage rather than 
a political fact allows us to analyse how politico-cultural interaction, affect, and encounters 
create, shape, and challenge how political claims to truth around the end of a conflict are 
established, circulated and legitimised. This is referred to throughout as the conditions of 
success of the end of wars assemblage. Following this more theoretically focused chapter, the 
ensuing empirical section of the thesis will engage with specific cultural artefacts and analyse 
in depth how the affective encounters they can produce shape and challenge the assemblage 
and how they work with concurrent political narratives to produce conditions of success.  
 
1.2 Examples of Assemblages 
Many things can be thought of as assemblages but perhaps one of the more obvious, and most 
illustrative, examples is the internet. The internet is made up of various types of material object 
(computers, tablets, smartphones, wearable tech) that connect with one another through various 
media (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, copper wires, fibre optic cables). They exchange discursive content 
that is created by machines, algorithms, massive corporations, governments and individuals.83 
Although initially a military project it has been used for many different purposes from 
organising protests against governments to mass data surveillance by states. It is managed by a 
complex arrangement of companies, non-profits, servers, and data centres as well as the nodes 
and content creators that make and consume it. 
 
The internet can be readily identified and understood as a ‘thing’ made up of unconnected 
elements (what else brings together the US Department of Defence, your smartwatch, a 
telephone cable, and cats?) which combine - along with people who make content, design, build, 
and manage hardware and software, and those of us who browse it – in strange and 
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unpredictable ways to forge something that it so much more than the sum of its constituent 
parts. The connections between these material and discursive, organic and inorganic 
components allow for certain possibilities but also the capacity to forge new forms of politics 
and identities and at a speed not seen before. These potentials and possibilities are positive and 
negative, progressive and regressive. The assemblage of the internet in itself is not necessarily 
good or bad, though it allows for the organisation of protest and mass government surveillance; 
drone strikes and art that critiques those strikes; misogyny and equality; love and hate.84 
Thinking of the internet as an assemblage allows us to understand how the possibilities it 
generates are more than the sum of its parts and are forged through the interaction of material 
and non-material components. 
 
Although I refer to the end of wars assemblage in the singular throughout the thesis, it is 
important to note that these are always assemblages of assemblages, or inter-assemblage 
assemblages. What is meant by this seemingly minor distinction is that all assemblages are 
made up of other assemblages, themselves made up of various other assemblages. Indeed, 
DeLanda claims that ‘Although each assemblage is a unique historical entity it always belongs 
to a population of more or less similar assemblages’ as a result of its assembly processes being 
regular and persistent.85 To illustrate this let us consider the assemblage of ‘popular culture.’ 
Obviously, popular culture is more than cinema which is what is discussed most in this work, 
but also includes music, literature, television, video games, and internet culture. Each of these 
has their own genres, formats, styles, categorisations, and fascinating histories that connect with 
other aspects to form their own assemblage – the assemblage of music, of television, of cinema 
and so forth. Increasing the specificity, we can say that each individual artefact is itself an 
assemblage – the assemblage of a song, of a television show, or of a movie. Taking this last 
example in more detail as it is films that are the subject of this thesis a movie is an assemblage 
of shot, editing, lighting, sound, narrative, script, direction, acting, production, finance, 
distribution and a thousand other factors that go in to making a multi-million dollar film. 
Directors, editors, scriptwriters, cameramen, actors, executives, marketers, grips and foleys all 
contribute to the making of a movie. All of these inputs, factors, and actors then have their own 
particular history and meaning and connect with each to make a movie. The final product is 
therefore an assemblage of all these parts, but yet is irreducible to them. A movie is more than 
the frame, the acting, the soundtrack, or the script because each component adds something 
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extra to our understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment of watching a movie. There is also the 
genre that it is part of, the time it was released, audience expectations based on a director’s past 
form or the trailer. Deleuze talks about movies as an assemblage and their indivisibility or 
irreducible nature in his books on cinema:  
 
The divisibility of content means that the parts belong to various sets, which constantly 
subdivide into sub-sets or are themselves the sub-set of a larger set, on to infinity. This is why 
content is defined both by the tendency to constitute closed systems and by the fact that this 
tendency never reaches completion. Every closed system also communicates…But it is certainly 
not a “whole” although this plane or these larger and larger sets necessarily have an indirect 
relationship with the whole.86 
 
A further important point that Deleuze makes here is that this process of interaction works both 
ways. Not only do “larger” assemblages act on “smaller” ones (such as the assemblage of 
cinema influencing specific movies) but also that the “smaller” assemblages act on “larger” 
ones (so the assemblage of cinema is also remade through the individual film). As Sean Carter 
and Derek McCormack note, this understanding of film as a multiplicity of factors ‘encourages 
us to think of film itself as a kind of intervention into multilayered fields of affect, or more 
accurately, as an assemblage of techniques and technologies of affective event amplification.’87  
 
We can also think of politics as an assemblage along the same lines. Politics is made up of 
multilayered fields such as elections, legislatures, presidents, law, international organisations, 
alliances, and rhetoric.88 All of these factors shape this phenomenon we call politics, but are 
also shaped by each other and what we consider politics to be. Political meanings can also be 
embedded in material places such as the White House, Houses of Parliament or Tahrir Square 
such that a political speech given in the Rose Garden carries a certain weight that one made at 
Mar-a-Lago may not. Political speech, such as that of US presidents discussed throughout the 
thesis are both components of the assemblage of politics and themselves assemblage-like in 
nature. Increasing our specificity further, we can look at the various components that make up 
a speech of a US president: the opening bars of “Hail to the Chief,” the autocue, the bulletproof 
glass, aspects of the speech that are specific to time or place, elements that are part of a 
politician’s stump speech and bits that are new. Each of these have a specific history and 
meaning yet we cannot reduce a State of the Union address to just these, or any other, factors 
as they combine to become more than the sum of their parts. All of these elements and more 
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merge and blend together to form that particular assemblage of presidential speech, which is 
itself an aspect of the assemblage of politics. These two assemblages – cinema and presidential 
speech – are not necessarily distinct from one another as they themselves merge, blend, and 
combine together through the end of wars assemblage as well as acting on one another. 
Nonetheless, they interact and combine in non-linear ways to help construct and shape 
conditions of success that emerge from the end of wars assemblage.  
 
Thinking of the end of wars as an assemblage rather than a political fact, a consequence of 
political discourse, or the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis by a rational actor allows us to 
analyse how wars end not just through the lenses of strategy, discourse, or rational choice theory 
but rather as an outcome of a process that takes the discursive, the material, the political, and 
the cultural into account. Not only does this provide us with a stronger understanding of this 
important political issue, it is also a novel approach to something that has been under-researched 
within studies of conflict. In the case of this thesis, the end of wars are analysed from the 
perspective of politico-cultural interaction through affective encounters in order to show how 
four conditions of success are culturally and politically articulated. Obviously, political speech 
and popular culture are not the only things that influence the end of wars assemblage. There are 
multiple factors that feed into the claim that wars will end or have ended: social questions such 
as support for a conflict; economic issues including the cost of waging war; electoral 
calculations on how to position a candidate; moral quandaries about the role of violence in the 
contemporary world; (geo)strategic problems about balances of power; tactical decisions about 
the progress being made in the combat zone, and so on. But rather than trying to ascertain what 
political policies allow claims about a war ending to be made, or whether these claims are 
justifiable given battlefield conditions or such like, this thesis seeks to understand how these 
claims and conditions emerge from and are reinforced through popular culture and political 
rhetoric.  
 
One of the conditions of success to be discussed in more depth in chapter three is American 
exceptionalism. In that chapter, we will explore how the moralities and values that are 
exemplified by the concept of American exceptionalism are created and circulated through 
cultural artefacts. I argue that there are two important sequences in X-Men that connect the 
violation of individuality (a key tenet of American exceptionalism) with negative imagery. 
Thus, when American exceptionalism is politically articulated as a condition of success in the 
War on Terror, there is a reaction in audiences that associates exceptionalism with positive 
connotations, thus strengthening the claim to truth that utilises this condition. Furthermore, in 
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chapter four I will argue that depictions of sacrifice in I am Legend and Children of Men work 
to pre-cognitively reinforce the idea that redemption and victory are achievable only if we make 
sacrifices. Again this increases the power of sacrifice as a political tool to justify concluding a 
war because the audiences that confront both the movie and the politics have experienced a 
cinematic encounter that embed the condition of sacrifice at a pre-cognitive, or affective, level. 
Having gone “below” the end of wars assemblage to see what partly comprises it, we can also 
go “above” it to see what this assemblage itself connects with. It connects with assemblages of 
international relations, of military or geopolitical strategy, of balances of power, of elections, 
of moral standing and so forth. That is not to say that the chain of causation only goes one way 
of course. Just as a movie is influenced by the assemblage of politics or war so too the end of 
wars assemblage can affect how movies are produced and how presidential speech changes. 
What is important to bear in mind in this discussion is that assemblages are formed of other 
assemblages and they can all have effects on each other in complex and non-linear ways. 
Although a focus on action cinema cannot paint a full picture of why or how conflicts end, it is 
nonetheless part of the complex chain of non-linear causation that shapes political decisions, 
allows them to be made, and makes them acceptable to audiences. To further justify this focus, 
Protevi notes that we can design what he calls ‘experiments’ to isolate a particular factor ‘as 
long as we realise that such experimental design is an abstraction for a particular purpose.’89 By 
isolating contemporary Hollywood action cinema and the end of conflicts in the War on Terror, 
this thesis could potentially be thought of as constituting such an experiment to understand one 
aspect of the end of wars assemblage. 
 
The major contribution of this work is to add to our understanding of how wars end. By 
conceptualising the ending of conflicts as an assemblage that is partially predicated upon 
cinema and political discourse, understanding how the interaction of these two fields creates 
conditions of success is vital. Intensity and affect are what allow the end of wars assemblage to 
form and allow conditions of success to emerge. These intense and affective encounters can 
both stabilise and destabilise the assemblage in regressive and progressive ways, with negative 
and positive conditions of political possibility being created. Carter and McCormack summarise 
how these cinematic intensities relate to assemblages when they say that ‘rather than ideological 
signs, cinematic images become refigured as bodies of affective intensity with the capacity to 
affect other kinds of bodies…[and] on one level this is most obviously manifest in depictions 
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of moments of battlefield intensity.’90 It is vital to bear in mind that intensity in this sense is not 
representational. What is meant by this is that the key point being made by these depictions that 
Carter and McCormack identify and that are analysed throughout the thesis is not that they 
represent or depict an intense moment, but that they induce an intensive, affective encounter 
with the audience that allows for the emergence of conditions of success from the assemblage. 
 
1.3 Emergent Properties 
Exploring this idea of intensity producing affective encounters which can then influence the 
assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari argue that: 
 
An assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, material flows, and social 
flows simultaneously…There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the 
world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather, 
an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn from each of these 
orders.91 
 
What we can read from this is firstly that the intensive and multiple connections between 
elements of an assemblage function simultaneously with one another and there is neither order 
nor linear causality in their interfacing. It is not intertextual in that cinema creates tropes, 
narratives and imagery that are then taken up in the political space by virtue of their popularity; 
similarly, it is not the case that political narratives and events are slavishly represented by 
cinema. Secondly, it is not the case that the conditions of success that emerge from the end of 
wars assemblage are solely exterior to that assemblage, or solely a product of that assemblage 
but that these conditions are deeply enmeshed within the assemblage and continue to shape it 
through complex feedback loops and homeostatic processes.92 Thirdly, the assemblage is the 
machine, the ‘collective machine of enunciation,’ that brings these multiplicities, intensities, 
and connections together into something that produces more than, and is irreducible to, the sum 
of its parts. Finally, it is vitally important to remember, in a self-reflexive way, that my own 
reading, analyses, writing, and argument are also enmeshed within the assemblage and work to 
shape, change, and hopefully challenge it in certain ways. As Deleuze and Guattari note, ‘Each 
of us is caught up in an assemblage of this kind, and we reproduce its statements when we think 
we are speaking in our own name; or rather we speak in our own name when we produce its 
statement.’93 
 
                                                          
90 Carter and McCormack, ‘Film, Geopolitics and the Affective Logics of Intervention’, 235. 
91 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 22. 
92 Protevi, Political Affect, 6–7. 
93 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 38. 
36 
 
Throughout this thesis, I argue that conditions of success in the War on Terror are properties of 
the end of wars assemblage that emerge from intensive and affective encounters between 
audiences and cinema. Related to Connolly’s concept of resonance, and important in our 
understanding of assemblages, is emergence. John Urry has argued that emergence explains 
how system effects that materialise within complex systems are greater than the sum of the 
components of that system.94 Thus, the conditions of success discussed in this thesis can be 
thought of as the system effects of the end of wars assemblage that is partly predicated upon 
politico-cultural interaction. Just as Connolly’s resonance indicates that seemingly unconnected 
elements merge to form ‘energised complexities’ that are difficult to explain in a linear fashion, 
emergence is understood by Protevi to entail ‘reciprocal or circular causality.’95 Not only is the 
process of emergence non-linear, properties that are created through this process are not 
reducible to either the sum of the parts of an assemblage or the interactions between them.96 
Rather, emergence is the ‘construction of functional structures in complex systems that achieve 
a…focus of systematic behaviour as they constrain the behaviour of individual components.’97 
Thus, the process of emergence is not reducible solely to the components of an assemblage but 
must also take into account how they interact with one another, it is non-linear, and it works to 
allow for and constrain the possibilities that an assemblage creates. The emergent properties of 
the end of war assemblage that is under analysis in this thesis, then, are the conditions of success 
for conflicts in the War on Terror. These emergent properties are irreducible to the component 
artefacts of the assemblage (the speeches and movies) and the causes of their formation are non-
linear. Through this thesis, I explore how the simultaneity, resonance, and intense affective 
encounters between political and cultural artefacts as well as audiences allow these properties 
to emerge. For instance, in chapter three I argue that the climactic battle scene of Tears of the 
Sun induces an encounter that directly links American technologies of war to victory in conflict. 
Through this encounter, the idea that victory is predicated on technology and morality can 
become embedded at a pre-cognitive level in audiences. Therefore, when a political leader 
utilises technology and morality to make a claim about the end of a war, it is more readily 
acceptable to audiences that confront cinema and politics. Furthermore because, as DeLanda 
states, ‘each level of scale retains a relative autonomy and can therefore be a legitimate unit of 
analysis,’ the main analytical unit will be the micro-level of movies and speeches rather than 
the macro-level of how these conditions of success are materially or actually enacted.98 
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1.4 Affect, Intensity, Encounters 
To understand how these conditions of success emerge from the end of wars assemblage further, 
we need to elaborate on how political and cultural artefacts interact with one another through 
audiences and intensity or affect to produce these conditions. In the opening pages of A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari write that  
 
As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other assemblages. We will never 
ask what a book means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in 
it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not 
transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed.99 
 
In other words, the point of an assemblage oriented understanding of the end of wars is not to 
attempt to elucidate some hidden or deeper meaning of a cultural text in order to see how it is 
appropriated or utilised politically. Rather, the approach is to analyse artefacts with the question 
of how they display the capacity to affect and be affected, and what other elements, 
assemblages, machines, and discourses this affect works to produce conditions of success at 
pre-cognitive levels.100 
 
What follows in this work then will not be focused on the political meaning of a film or the 
cultural meaning of a presidential speech, but rather an exploration of the linkages between 
political and cultural artefacts. Mapping the connections between these seemingly disparate 
areas allows for an understanding of how they merge into a collective and how that collective - 
that assemblage - then allows for conditions of success to emerge. It is not how a specific movie, 
or group of movies, or a presidential statement or press conference makes it known that a war 
will end or has ended but rather how the intense and affective encounters induced by these 
artefacts allow for particular conditions of success to develop as emergent properties of the 
assemblage.101 As Rizzo notes, ‘films are not treated as texts to be analysed for a hidden 
meaning or for their signification.’102 Furthermore, it is not the inherent or implicit meaning of 
an artefact that allows them to come together in the end of wars assemblage, but rather the 
affects they can induce based on their formal elements such as framing, editing, sound, language 
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as well as their narrative elements such as plot and dialogue. These can also be thought of as 
the qualities of a movie that are read by audiences. But, as Brian Massumi makes clear, qualities 
are not just ‘logical properties or sense perceptions,’ but rather they are a potential to affect and 
be affected. Importantly, the effect of this potential is developed through an encounter between 
two or more ‘form complexes.’103   
 
As discussed in the introduction, the understanding of politico-cultural interaction that creates 
these conditions of success as emergent properties operates at a level removed from the 
representational, mimetic, and conscious. This interaction between culture and politics operates 
through affect rather than through representation. In other words, where a representational 
understanding of politico-cultural interaction would focus on the semiotics of particular 
utterances, an affective analysis works to understand how these artefacts are experienced by 
audiences and what intensities this produces. Audiences, of course, are active ones and as such 
I do not want to essentialise the affects or encounters that are experienced. All cultural artefacts 
have the potential for diverse articulations and alternative lines of flight depending on the 
cultural, social, economic, and personal qualities of an audience. As such, the affects, 
intensities, and encounters that are discussed in this thesis are not to be read as definitive or 
total, but rather probable or possible. They are based on analysis of form, narrative, and 
experience. Affect, then, is not just the meaning of a text as it relates to itself, the world, or 
other texts, but is also how that text has the capacity for an emotional, physical, biological, or 
neurological impact on audiences and what that then allows for. As will be discussed further on 
in this chapter, this differentiates my approach from an intertextual one. Affect is the ‘product 
of an encounter’ that is not passive but rather active and pre-cognitive.104 That is, it is produced 
not at the level of conscious thought, but rather at a non- or unconscious level. Affect is also a 
process that can create ideas, opinions, knowledge, and power. Within the context of the 
political and cinematic dimensions of the end of wars assemblage, affect is that which allows 
for conditions of success to emerge with neither intentionality nor a conscious process of 
thought on the part of audiences. As Woodward and Lea remark, ‘affect de-privileges the 
human as the reservoir of agency in the world.’105 Rather than the agency to end wars resting 
solely on the shoulders of politicians then, an affective understanding posits that these endings 
are allowed for through the interaction of human (politicians, moviemakers, audiences) and 
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non-human (political speech, films, particular forms of cinematic technique) entities.  
 
Within Deleuzian ontology, Brian Massumi has described affect as coterminous with intensity 
or, as he puts it, affect is ‘the simultaneous participation of the virtual in the actual and the 
actual in the virtual, as one arises from and returns to the other.’106 Being coterminous with 
intensity means that affective encounters are intensive ones.107 Protevi has also written on the 
importance of affect to the formation of assemblages and bodies politic and, despite affect not 
being ‘the enemy of cognition,’ it indicates that we negotiate our world not solely through 
representational, cognitive, and conscious practices but also through ‘a feeling of what the 
encounter…would be like.’108 In terms of the analysis of movies, both Rizzo and Steven Shaviro 
argue for a deeper engagement with the affects of cinema.109 A further important thing to take 
away from this is that it means that an analysis of politico-cultural interaction cannot be reduced 
to an analysis of meaning or intentionality on the part of politicians or film-makers. It also 
allows for the potential for new and exciting forms of political possibility to emerge from the 
almost accidental or seemingly aimless interaction of these two outwardly disparate fields. As 
will be discussed in chapter five for instance, there is the potential for a more critically oriented 
mainstream cinema to emerge that could change the end of wars assemblage as it had been 
constituted up to that point and so undermine the foundations upon which political violence is 
legitimised. Furthermore, it prevents this analysis from veering too far into Wag the Dog (1997) 
territory where the White House uses a film to conjure up a fake conflict in the Balkans or a 
Team America: World Police (2004) scenario where actors are hell-bent on using their celebrity 
status to ban war. 
 
This distinction between the representational and the affective is noted by Dittmer when he 
states that ‘this concern with the mediation of affects has become an object of study within the 
previously avowedly representational popular geopolitics, with analyses slowly shifting to 
incorporate understandings of various media networks.’110 We understand that culture 
influences politics in certain ways but, as discussed in the Introduction, to fully understand it 
we must break free from the representational logic that has been the usual method of 
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approaching it.111 This relates to the central problematic of this thesis in a specific way. To 
understand the politico-cultural interaction that creates the conditions of success at the end of a 
conflict, we do not just need to look at how endings are presented in cinema and analyse how 
these narrative techniques map onto political endings. It is not just an analysis of, as Richard 
Neupert says, the ‘story, or represented level…[and] narrative discourse [as] representational 
level.’112 Rather, we must understand how these levels of story and narrative as well as various 
other aspects of the cinematic mise-en-scène operate at an affective, embodied and intensive 
level and what conditions of political possibility these encounters allow for. 
 
Part of the way that conditions of success emerge from politico-cultural interactions is through 
the audience that confronts both politics and cinema and the pre-cognitive intensive affects that 
are produced as a result. Essentially, the cinematic space is a space of encounter. As Shapiro 
notes, ‘what constitutes the aesthetics of knowledge from both Rancière’s and Deleuze’s 
perspectives has to do with the way the encounter leads to an alteration in sensible 
experience…aesthetics and politics are homologous.’113 The encounters that allow for 
conditions of success to emerge are deeply affective ones that have an impact on cinema 
viewers; this impact creates a political space within an audience that then allows for certain 
political realities to become possible. To re-iterate, this takes place in a non-linear fashion. 
Films are not created (primarily at least) for the base propaganda value where audiences are 
prepared for war, as some World War II films were, nor is there a centralised intentionality to 
achieve these slowly.114 Audiences watch movies with certain political events and encounters 
in their mind and can interpret them in light of these encounters. Similarly, people can observe 
political events, watch the news, or listen to political speeches with cinematic encounters in 
mind and interpret the former through the latter. Connolly makes a similar point, saying that as 
you leave a cinema after a movie, ‘numerous thoughts arrive and depart with lightning speed, 
faster than they could be spoken. Their shape and texture are triggered by a series of encounters 
between scenes in the film and affective memories they trigger in you.’115 Therefore, following 
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this, if audiences encounter affective moments that relate to, for instance, American 
exceptionalism, the use of technology, sacrifice, or the city then when these conditions are 
deployed politically at the same time, the cinematic encounter has the effect of pre-priming 
audiences to accept the claim to truth that is articulated. To quote Shapiro in order to expand 
on this further, politics is micropolitics ‘based on an ontology of encounter rather than a 
macropolitical politics based on official institutional dynamics.’116 Cinema can be read through 
politics and politics through cinema and both come to realisation through the encounter between 
them. 
 
Shapiro reinforces this non-linear aspect of politico-cultural interaction when he writes that 
films ‘develop political implications that exceed the particular moments experienced by the 
bodies moving across the landscapes.’117 From this we can see that the political potential of 
movies are not limited to the particular plot structure or narrative of the film itself, but rather 
cultural artefacts have potentials that exist beyond the text. The affective encounter that cinema 
induces is felt long after the viewer has left the theatre. These affective encounters can most 
readily be associated with the horror genre: hiding behind sofas, physically jumping in your 
seat, looking through fingers, or other bodily reactions. But they can also be clearly seen in the 
action genre. Its fast paced movement, explosions, shouting, visceral depictions of violence and 
quick edits have a strong bodily response in an audience. Speaking of violence in television, 
James Monaco suggests that a lot of critique of such violence centres around its affective power 
on viewers.118 And as Patricia Pisters notes, ‘[w]hat affects the body has an effect in the mind.’119 
The violence we bear witness to in cinemas inflects our response to the violence we bear witness 
to on the 6 o’clock news. Such affective encounters with cinema must necessarily factor into 
our affective encounters with political realities. At the cost of being repetitive, it is worth again 
remembering that this is neither intentional nor directly causal. As Kyle Grayson, Matt Davies 
and Simon Philpott note, ‘violent films or video games may not cause young men to go out and 
kill but they may provide one layer in the complex continuum that congeals into deeply seated 
antagonisms towards particular others.’120 Films are not designed to desensitise us to violence, 
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and this perceived desensitisation in itself does not permit the conditions of possibility of 
political violence. Rizzo relates the affective power of cinema to a disagreement with theories 
of cinematic representation. She states that ‘representational thought produces impoverished 
and limited concepts,’ and that film theory’s dominant use of representation closes off any 
serious consideration of film viewing as an affective experience that engages the sense.’121 
 
Affective encounters between audiences and cinema are, as noted above, particularly prevalent 
in the horror genre but can also be perceived in the action genre as well.122 Likewise, affective 
encounters can be determined to exist in engagements with political discourse and news media. 
The role that these affective encounters play within the assemblage is to allow conditions of 
success to emerge. As discussed earlier, affect is a process that can construct ideas, knowledge 
and power. Relating this to the end of wars assemblage, I will argue that moments of intensity 
within the films under discussion can embed ideas such as sacrifice within audiences that then 
allow them to be utilised politically as conditions of success in the War on Terror. Such an 
example can be seen in Children of Men, discussed in chapter four, where the main character 
sacrifices himself to allow humanity to survive. The final sequence highlights the idea that 
sacrifice is necessary to success through the visuals of fog clearing to reveal a ship as a saviour, 
the use of choral music to sonically emphasise the main character’s necessary death, and the 
imagery of a person’s life slowly sapping away. The result of this moment of intensity is to pre-
prime audiences to accept that victory can only come through sacrifice. Protevi notes that 
sensory inputs allow the brain to fall into patterns, or ‘basins of attraction,’ that constrain our 
decision making process. As ‘the affective aspects of the way we navigate our world…are 
essential’ this means audiences are affectively conditioned to accept sacrifice as necessary for 
victory.123 Thus, when a political leader makes the claim that a conflict is successfully 
concluded because of the sacrifices that have been made, audiences can more readily accept 
this claim to truth. These affective encounters are, highly importantly, embodied encounters. 
The embodied nature of cinematic encounters can be both molar and molecular; stabilising and 
destabilising; encourage being and becoming. As Rizzo notes, ‘what is important when 
considering the concept of assemblages in relation to the cinematic experience is that they can 
operate not only as extensive, molar orderings…but also as molecular intensive multiplicities, 
which produce becomings and bodies in process.’124 These molecular becomings are produced 
when audiences are confronted with disruptive or intensive cinematic moments. 
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While this can be the technical disruptive power of avant-garde or arthouse cinema, it can also 
be the disruptive potential of the Michael Bay-esque explosions and violence of the action 
genre. Such cinematic violence, with all its attendant qualities of bright colours, loud noises, 
vibrations in your seat, and general sensory overload can produce an affective encounter 
between the screen and the viewer. While these affective encounters might produce a reaction 
in the sense that the bodily responses of the viewer can be physically disrupted through light 
and noise, the effect of this encounter is, quite often, to enhance the nature and power of the 
violent cinematic object within the assemblage. This becoming is certainly not what Patton calls 
the revolutionary-becoming, but more often within action genre encounters it is the violent-
becoming, or the political-becoming, or the negative-becoming. This becoming, rather than 
challenging the emergence of conditions of success within the assemblage, serves to reinforce 
it. This is of course not true of cinema as an art-form in general, and many movies are ‘well 
suited to offer alternative perspectives on what is or could be the case. As Gilles Deleuze 
suggests, cinema can encourage reflection on and negotiation of alternative perspectives 
because of the way it functions without a dominant centre.’125 However, at the end of a violent 
and cathartic action blockbuster, rather than a visually, temporally, and affectively confusing 
and disruptive film, viewers can leave the cinema feeling that the particular cinematic conflict 
has been resolved through the utilisation of the conditions of success that we also find in the 
War in Terror.126 The molar being is both unmade and remade through the molecular becoming. 
Many of the movies to be discussed throughout this thesis will contain themes of corrupt 
industrialists, cowardly generals, and morally bankrupt politicians. However, despite the 
critical potential of these lines of flight, I argue that they still largely work to allow the four 
conditions of success to emerge from the end of wars assemblage.  
 
The affective encounter that cinema creates is part of its externality that allows it to connect to 
other artefacts within the machine of the assemblage. These connections exist rhizomatically 
and contingently on viewers, bodies, space, time, and other more physical aspects of the place 
of viewing. They are ever changing and difficult to pin down, but nonetheless, these encounters 
with certain cultural artefacts create a political space in cinema viewers. The affective nature of 
political encounters (not discussed as in-depth as their cinematic kin here, but functioning in 
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broadly similar ways and driven by the similarity in other forms of externality of the artefacts 
such as lighting, language, and trope) also creates a cultural space in political viewers. The 
interinvolvement of these separate factors at an affective and embodied level is one of the 
driving forces behind the machine of the assemblage that produces the conditions of success 
necessary to bring conflicts in the War on Terror to a close. 
 
Rizzo goes on to suggest that it is the embodied nature of cinema, and the embodied affects that 
it allows, that is its true power. This is important when we consider the role of cinema within 
the end of wars assemblage. Rizzo says that ‘the body, identity and subjectivity decompose and 
recompose according to different encounters and through different connections. Film viewing 
could be understood as one of these encounters that produces connections that decompose and 
recompose the body, identity and subjectivity.’127 The political possibilities that these affective, 
embodied, and intensive encounters allow for is something that assemblages allow us to 
analyse. By examining movies and exploring where, how, and to what ends affective encounters 
are used, we can understand how conditions of success emerge from the end of wars assemblage 
and how they accrue political power. It encourages us to think of cinema not as something 
external to politics, but rather as something that plays an active part in the construction of 
meaning and processes of subjectivity. Dittmer summarises this non-human or post-human 
trend in the study of popular culture and world politics: ‘because power is enacted through the 
assemblage, it must be understood as distributed among the various components of that 
assemblage, human and non-human.’128 It is not just political leaders who can declare wars over, 
nor is the ending of a war purely a product of battlefield conditions or cost-benefit analysis. 
Rather, the power to end a war is embedded in multiple human and non-human elements – 
among which are political leaders, audiences, and movies. It is the affective interactions 
between these components, among others, that allow wars to end. 
 
1.5 Materialist ontology 
The previous examples of assemblages as well as the engagement with affect and encounters 
also serves to illustrate Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist, or process, ontology. As DeLanda 
has noted, all entities are ‘the product of specific historical processes and whatever degree of 
identity they have it must be accounted for via the processes which created them and those that 
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maintain them.’129 The internet is the product of processes of cable laying, computer building, 
meme making, and cat cuteness; popular culture is a product of processes of shot formation, 
movie editing, and music production; politics is a product of processes of campaigning, speech 
writing, and voting.130 The end of wars assemblage is thus also the product of political and 
cultural processes, as well as the process of the affective encounter. While the assemblage of 
the internet, or any other assemblage, is material and process oriented, it is by no means 
reducible to this. While Newtonian and Euclidian physics conceives material as inanimate and 
active only when an exterior force is applied to it, and the legacy of Cartesian dualism indicates 
that there is an ontological distinction between “dead” material and the cogito of thinking 
subjects, the understanding of materiality utilised in assemblage thought is somewhat different.  
 
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost argue that there is no ontological difference between organic 
and inorganic or material and discursive but rather that ‘materiality is always something more 
than “mere” matter: an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or difference that renders matter 
active, self-creative, productive, unpredictable.’131 Thus, processes, reality, identity, political 
action and so forth are not reducible to matter in its simplest form but rather are products of 
complex material and discursive processes at micro and macro levels; or as Protevi notes, ‘our 
perspective is materialist, but not eliminative.’132 Tom Lundborg and Nick Vaughan-Williams 
further explore this relationship between the material and discursive when they argue that the 
two are ‘fundamentally interrelated and inseparable.’133 Furthermore, they warn that the New 
Materialisms literature risks reifying the material and thus losing the contribution of language 
and discourse to our understanding of human/nonhuman assemblages. Assemblages then are 
not merely material, but are formed of a combination of material and discourse; human and 
non-human; animate and inanimate. Therefore, my engagement with, and understanding of, the 
end of wars assemblage includes both the material and the discursive. The discourses and 
narratives of popular culture and world politics, but also the physical and pre-cognitive affects 
that these artefacts create in audiences through the encounter. 
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1.6 Non-linearity and lack of Intention 
In addition to being both material and discursive, it is important to note that the end of wars 
assemblage is not intentionally designed in a particular way nor does it progress to a pre-defined 
goal. Connolly makes the important point that assemblages are not consciously designed but 
come into being through affinities between their constituent elements, a point reiterated by 
Mark Salter when he says that ‘assemblages are understood as uncoordinated processes that 
nevertheless have a concerted effect.’134 Although Connolly discusses the relationship between 
capitalism, evangelical Christianity and Republican politics in the US, this lack of intentionality 
on the part of the assemblage is also applicable to the ending of wars. In this light it is vital to 
note that this work will not look in detail at how, for instance, 
 
government intelligence specialists have been secretly soliciting terrorist scenarios from top 
Hollywood filmmakers and writers…to brainstorm about possible terrorist targets and schemes 
in America and to offer solutions to those threats.135 
 
Or more historically, how cinema was used during World War II to, in part, demonstrate how 
the military functioned and to introduce civilians in movie theatres to weapons and tactics.136 In 
addition to not looking at the admittedly fascinating world of co-operation between Hollywood 
and Washington and the Department of Defence, this thesis will not be a list of how politicians 
use film to support their political aims or how films convince politicians and publics to think or 
act in certain ways. Rather, as discussed above, this thesis is about how movies produce 
affective encounters which, in turn, allow for conditions of success to emerge from the 
assemblage and become strengthened politically. 
 
Another dimension of assemblages that relates to this is their contingency. They are temporally, 
spatially, and analytically contingent on certain things. As Manuel DeLanda states, ‘despite the 
tight integration between its component organs, the relations between them are not logically 
necessary but only contingently obligatory.’137 This means that the end of wars assemblage is 
not a given and nor is it a necessarily inevitable consequence of the existence of the component 
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organs, but its emergence is dependent upon certain affinities, certain connections, and certain 
intensities being present. It is not an eternal structure and is certain to undergo change 
continuously over time. As DeLanda has noted, assemblages are conceived as the result of 
historical and ongoing processes of formation and maintenance and their identity ‘is not 
guaranteed by the existence of a necessary set of properties constituting an unchanging 
essence.’138 We can also use DeLanda’s terminology to say that the end of wars assemblage is 
loosely territorialised and lightly coded.139 However, the connections between the elements of 
this assemblage can be said to exist in in an ontological and material sense. Deleuze and Guattari 
mention that  
 
to the essential properties of the matter deriving from the formal essence we must add variable 
intensive affects, now resulting from the operation, now on the contrary making it 
possible…then following where it leads by connecting operations to a materiality, instead of 
imposing a form upon matter: what one addresses is less a matter submitted to laws then a 
materiality.140 
 
From this, we can deduce that while the assemblage may not be an inevitable structure, the 
connections and intensities that compose it are and, by following these flows and lines, we can 
analytically bring the assemblage and its emergent properties under analysis. Protevi expands 
on intensity in Deleuzian thought by explaining how there is a ‘threefold ontological difference 
in which the intensive serves as a mediating register between the virtual and the actual.’141 The 
actual is, in turn, material and stable and is bound by certain behaviour patterns while the virtual 
is what Protevi calls a ‘purely differential field.’142 The virtual and the actual can be thought of 
as two aspects of reality, as Constantin Boundas notes, they are ‘two mutually exclusive, yet 
jointly sufficient, characterisations of the real.’143 The intensive affects that Deleuze and 
Guattari describe above are what allow for changes to the “actual’s” behaviour patterns and can 
be considered deterritorialisations, lines of flight, or becomings.144 Intensive differences and 
connections between elements of an assemblage, then, are what drive patterns of behaviour. I 
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have already discussed how affective encounters between audiences and cinema can help to 
produce the emergent properties of the end of wars assemblage, through the creation of basins 
of attraction at pre-cognitive levels. Intensity is another way of theoretically understanding this 
encounter. Furthermore, there is the possibility that these patterns can change if encounters are 
intensive enough to shock the system.145 It is this contingency and susceptibility to change and 
evolution that the structure of this thesis is, in part, designed to analyse. With respect to the War 
on Terror we can say that end of wars assemblage emerged shortly after 9/11. However, the 
component artefacts of its politico-cultural dimension do not remain static. As these 
components change over time, there is the possibility that the assemblage and its emergent 
properties also change. Chapters five and six engage with this evolutionary process by 
questioning whether films such as Hancock undermine the centrality of American 
exceptionalism as a condition of success or Edge of Tomorrow presents a radically different 
temporality to the linearity of the War on Terror. 
 
This research develops and advances an understanding of how simultaneous affinities between 
political and cinematic artefacts interact with one another through affective encounters and what 
political realities these interactions create the conditions of possibility for. It has been 
mentioned in passing already in this chapter, but it worthwhile briefly unpacking the non-
linearity of an assemblage oriented approach to the end of wars. Rather than the idea that politics 
influences cultural practice or cultural practices influence political action in the manner of a 
billiard ball striking another one, thus causing it to move I explore how the simultaneity of 
political and cultural artefacts allows conditions of success to emerge. As Protevi explains, 
‘There is no linear causal chain of input, processing, and output. Instead there is continual 
looping as sensory information feeds into an ongoing dynamic system, altering or reinforcing 
pattern formations.’146 For our purposes of understanding the end of wars as an assemblage, it 
is important to be clear that there is no billiard-ball style causality where a particular movie or 
group of movies directly causes a politician to articulate a particular point, or that a political 
decision is made in audiences at the conscious level as a result of watching particular movies. 
However, because of the intensity, affective capacities, and resonance of connections between 
political and cultural artefacts that are to be explored in this thesis, we can talk, as DeLanda 
does, of a “machine-like” mechanism whereby ‘lower scale entities form the working parts of 
a larger scale whole, a whole which emerges…by the interactions between the parts.’147  
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1.7 Differences to Intertextuality 
It is also worthwhile making clear the distinctions between this research and an intertextual one. 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest similarities to intertextuality in their claim that they will not seek 
the internal meaning of a book but rather, ‘We will ask what it functions with, in connection 
with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its 
own are inserted and metamorphosed.’148 There is obvious overlap here with Graham Allen’s 
argument that ‘Meaning becomes something which exists between a text and all the other texts 
to which it refers and relates, moving out from the independent text into a network of textual 
relations. The text becomes the intertext.’149 However, they go further in A Thousand Plateaus 
by also saying that an assemblage is semiotic, material, and social simultaneously with no 
dividing line between them rather than the purely textual approaches of intertextuality.150  
 
Intertextual approaches to politics and culture have made a valuable contribution to our 
understandings of how politics and culture can interact with one another, but it is important to 
differentiate my approach from a purely intertextual one in pragmatic as well as conceptual 
terms. Notwithstanding the above discussion on how the two are not as differentiated as they 
might appear at first, an intertextual approach to the end of wars would involve exploring how, 
in Lene Hansen’s words, ‘texts build their arguments and authority through references to other 
texts: by making direct quotes or by adopting key concepts and catchphrases.’151 Or as Dittmer 
suggests, the way that ‘authors borrow from, or refer to, other texts to create a totality.’152 There 
is, firstly, a conceptual difference as an approach informed by assemblages would conceptualise 
causality not as a direct cause and effect relationship (such as that between original and 
referenced text) but as non-linear so that texts can influence each other even without deliberate, 
intentional, or unintentional reproduction. Secondly, an assemblage-led approach argues that 
the artefacts themselves can have a degree of agency in shaping conditions of success in the 
War on Terror whereas an intertextual approach would imply that meaning can only be created 
through people, text and discourse. Related to this is a more practical difference whereby using 
assemblages allows for an engagement with affect, as discussed above. The causal link between 
components of an assemblage is not just at the level of the linguistic or textual but also at the 
level of (pre-)cognition and feeling. The resultant effect on the research process is that I do not 
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just look at the text of movies and how their quotes, concepts, or catchphrases are taken up and 
redeployed in political speech. Rather, there is also a focus on the affective power of cinema to 
shape ideas about politics and war at the pre-cognitive level. The non-linguistic aspects of 
cinema can thus be integrated into our analysis of the end of wars assemblage. An example of 
this would be in chapter four where I discuss Alfonso Cuaron’s use of a long tracking shot to 
highlight the urban setting of the climactic scene in Children of Men. It is not that this style is 
adopted in political speech or media representation and so causes the connection to be made. 
Rather, this tracking shot serves to highlight the centrality of the built environment to sacrifice, 
thus making an affective and pre-cognitive connection between sacrifice, victory, and urbanity. 
Similarly, in chapter three the overwhelming sound in the final battle scene of Tears of the Sun 
reinforces the relevance of technology and American exceptionalism to the end of wars. Again, 
it is not that the sight and sound of military hardware is appropriated by political leaders to 
cement the idea of American exceptionalism and technology as crucial for success, but the 
affective encounter that is induced by this scene allows audiences to connect success with 
exceptionalism at a pre-cognitive level.153 Instead of establishing a strict dichotomy between 
the material and the discursive or the intertext and the assemblage though, the ontological 
tendency of Deleuze and Guattari as well as the substantive focus of this work seeks to, if not 
reconcile them, then at least to integrate them both into our understanding of politics, the world, 
and the end of wars. As Coole and Frost argue, ‘society is simultaneously materially real and 
socially constructed: our material lives are always culturally mediated, but they are not only 
cultural.’154  
 
1.8 Molar, molecular, and the structure of assemblages 
The affective, embodied and intensive aspect of cinema is related to what Deleuze and Guattari 
term the molar and the molecular, and the related concepts of being and becoming. The molar 
and the molecular can also be thought of as related to the arborescent and rhizomatic. Being is 
that which is reinforced; becoming is that which is encouraged by the affective, intensive, and 
embodied nature of the artefact that is encountered. Rizzo suggests that the molar plane is that 
which orders and the molecular plane is that which disrupts.155 As discussed above, the 
disruptive in the action genre can be the quick-edit, the shaky cam, the noise and explosions. 
We can think of molar being as that which strengthens the assemblage and molecular becoming 
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as that which weakens or disrupts it. But of course, as with much to do with Deleuze and 
Guattari, it is not that simple. The molar and molecular are not necessarily opposed to one 
another. As Deleuze and Guattari state quite categorically: 
 
There is no question, however, of establishing a dualist opposition between the two types of 
multiplicities, molecular machines and molar machines: that would be no better than the dualism 
between the One and the multiple. There are only multiplicities or multiplicities forming a single 
assemblage, operating in the same assemblage.156 
 
We can take this lack of a binary opposition to molar/molecular a stage further and suggest that 
molecular becomings can also strengthen the assemblage, or at least, allow in certain cases, for 
the creation of the conditions of possibility of particular political realities. It is not the case that 
the molecular must always destabilise and molar must always stabilise assemblages, and it is 
also not the case that the molecular is revolutionary and the molar is ordering. Certainly, the 
molecular has, perhaps, the greater potential for being destabilising and revolutionary. Patton 
notes this capacity saying that Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘version of poststructuralist politics 
remains a tactical rather than a strategic style of political thought, directed at particular or local 
forms of revolutionary-becoming rather than wholesale social change.’157 The link between 
molar as territorialising and molecular as deterritorialising is also something that should be 
questioned. Such a binary opposition is not in keeping with the thought and work of Deleuze 
and Guattari, and it is my contention that Hollywood blockbuster action films encourage 
becomings in an audience through an affective encounter with the cinematic artefact, but that 
this is one that strengthens the emergence of conditions of success. 
 
DeLanda provides us with a rough schematic of assemblages in a general sense. He argues that 
they are organised along two main axes: one that defines the roles that the components play – 
material or expressive – and one that defines the processes in which the components are 
involved – whether they stabilise or destabilise the assemblage (or, to use Deleuze and 
Guattari’s terms territorialise or deterritorialise the assemblage).158 Patton argues further that 
the first axis described above is ‘composed of discursive and non-discursive components,’ 
while the second is ‘defined by the nature of the movements governing their [assemblages] 
operation.’159 Using this schema, what Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘tetravalent model,’ we could 
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158 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, 18–19; See also, Parr, 
The Deleuze Dictionary, 18. 
159 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 44. 
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possibly map out where certain components lie on it.160 It is important to note that DeLanda 
also identifies a third, or z, axis for this model. This axis defines  
 
processes in which specialized expressive media intervene, processes which consolidate and 
rigidify the identity of the assemblage or, on the contrary, allow the assemblage a certain latitude 
for more flexible operation while benefiting from genetic or linguistic resources (processes of 
coding and decoding).161 
 
This axis functions through and because of the other two, and assesses the rigidity of an 
assemblage, or how resistant it is to the factors identified on the other two axes. This axis is 
utilised in chapters five and six of this thesis where I assess how stable the end of wars 
assemblage and its emergent properties are to processes of cultural and political decoding. It is 
first necessary to establish the material and discursive components that form the assemblage 
and allow conditions of success to emerge from it. This is the function of chapters three and 
four. It is not easy then, to identify the position of the z axis until more is known about the other 
two. Indeed, where we might place components on one axis is determined in part by where they 
might be on the other, making mapping an assemblage a difficult and, as will be shown below, 
ultimately fruitless task. 
 
Obviously, it is difficult to visually represent where an artefact such as Spider-Man (2001), 
discussed in chapter three, might lie on this potential graph. This is in part due to what Teresa 
Rizzo identifies as the rigidity of the tetravalent model that ‘cannot account for either the 
temporal aspect of cinema, or the constant embodied and affective interactions between the film 
and the viewer.’162 This temporal aspect of cinema as well as political artefacts also means that 
their location is, firstly, constantly shifting due to differing readings and connections that are 
formed and, secondly, that artefacts may display strong material as well as expressive quantities 
while simultaneously deterritorialising and reterritorializing an assemblage. Jason Dittmer 
highlights this: ‘any component can be working to territorialize the assemblage at any given 
moment, and soon thereafter exercise a capacity to deterritorialize it.’163 Indeed, as will be 
explored in later chapters, political and cultural artefacts can be engaged in the processes of 
deterritorialising and reterritorializing the assemblage simultaneously.164 Understanding 
territorialisation as a process rather than a property further undermines a static and two 
                                                          
160 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 88. 
161 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, 19. 
162 Rizzo, Deleuze and Film, 9. 
163 Dittmer, ‘Geopolitical Assemblages and Complexity’, 387. 
164 It is also important to remember that, as Parr notes, ‘the relationship deterritorialisation has to 
reterritorialisation must not be construed negatively; it is not the polar opposite.’ Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary, 
69. 
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dimensional representation of an assemblage as it suggests that the intensity of these processes 
changes through time and through differing readings. Furthermore, it is important to highlight 
that assemblages themselves are never a static entity, but something that is in constant flux. 
 
Although one could perhaps represent DeLanda’s axes as a graph with each artefact being given 
co-ordinates to a point (artefact a would be at (x, -0.75, y, +4.6) for example), such averaging 
of the position of an artefact detracts from the manifold nature of its potential multiplicities, 
and discounts the possibility that an artefact could conceivably be at all four extremes of such 
a graph at the same time. Furthermore, such a positioning negates the temporal and embodied 
aspects of artefacts, and it is this nature that allows them, in large part, to connect so freely and 
easily with other elements in the assemblage. Additionally, mapping artefacts concretely onto 
such a graph would imply a rigidity of assemblage structure entirely out of keeping with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of it as multiple, fluid, contingent, and subject to not only 
change, but the continuous process of development. A further problem with such a mapping is 
that to fully explore the end of wars assemblage, one would need to map all of its components 
on to it, which is clearly beyond the scope of this, or any other single work.165 Nonetheless, this 
tetravalent model is a useful template of how we can understand the forces that act upon an 
assemblage and the limits that it faces. It is important to note here that the end of wars 
assemblage that I discuss throughout the thesis can be said to be not very highly territorialised 
as it has, in DeLanda’s words, ‘fuzzy and fluctuating’ boundaries that include processes, 
artefacts, identities, and phenomena that go beyond the scope of this thesis.166 A further 
parameter of this assemblage is that it is reasonably decoded as the political actions it creates 
possibilities for are determined not only by the components discussed here but various other 
political, social, economic, cultural, and international factors. 
 
1.9 Reflective methodologies 
This chapter has explored how assemblages emerge, function, interact, and create conditions of 
possibility in some depth, but without many detailed examples of how this functions at the end 
of wars. Chapters three to six engage with this in much more depth and, as explained in the 
Introduction, take a chronological approach. In between the theory and practice, it is necessary 
to take time to explain methods, methodological choices, what these methods and structures 
allow for, and how they impose constraints and limitations on the research and conclusions. 
This section proceeds in several parts: firstly, I will explain how particular texts were selected 
                                                          
165 Although Deleuze and Guattari do a pretty good job of mapping out feudal society in a single page, Deleuze 
and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 89. 
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for analysis and how that analysis took place. Secondly, the question of why the thesis is 
structured chronologically will be tackled and how the themes of chapters map and do not map 
onto this schema. Finally, the benefits and limitations of this periodization will be explored. 
 
Before any analysis took place of cinematic artefacts, the movies themselves had to be selected. 
There are several aspects to the process of textual selection that should be highlighted. Firstly, 
there is the question of genre. Part of the argument of chapter two is to lay out a justification 
for the use of action films throughout the thesis as they can be read as the successor to the 
traditional combat films of World War Two, thus participating in a long history of politico-
cultural interaction. This will be argued through in a chronological fashion from the World War 
Two era to the present day that traces the evolution of the genre over time following Jeanine 
Basinger’s excellent work The World War II Combat Film. Secondly, once the justifications 
for genre selection have been established, there is the question of specific texts. This thesis 
seeks to explore how conditions of success emerge from the end of wars assemblage during the 
War on Terror, as such, the vast majority of films that will be analysed in chapters three through 
six are from after the events of 9/11 – though some older movies will be touched upon. As Lene 
Hansen argues, ‘the majority of texts should be taken from the time under study, but historical 
material that traces the genealogy of the dominant representations should also be included.’167 
Notwithstanding Hansen’s focus on representation here, this remains a useful and productive 
approach. Having established the genre of cinema to be analysed, as well as the chronological 
range in which they were released, I use a range of tools to ascertain which films in this genre 
are best suited to analysis.  
 
Between 2002 and 2015, the British Film Institute (previously the UK Film Council) states that 
there were a total of 6,221 films released in the UK (for a week or more), averaging 518 films 
a year, a number that has been steadily increasing over the past decade.168 The BFI define films 
partly on the basis of their genre. While they admit that their categories are imprecise, if we 
take a broad approach to the action genre (including the BFI’s categories of action, thriller, and 
adventure) it is clear that the films I analyse in subsequent chapters make up a significant 
proportion of releases and box office revenue. Between 2002 and 2014, the broadly conceived 
action genre made up an average of 18% (1,143) of total releases and 25.4% of box office 
                                                          
167 Hansen, Security as Practice, 82. 
168 ‘Statistical Yearbook’, British Film Institute, accessed 14 July 2016, http://www.bfi.org.uk/education-
research/film-industry-statistics-research/statistical-yearbook I have not used the BFI Statistical Yearbook to 
determine which films to analyse because it does not take into account international audiences or box offices, nor 
does it collate reviews by critics and viewers. 
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revenue (£3.2 billion). Indeed, the BFI’s own narrower categorisation of action was in the top 
three genres by box office revenue for eleven of the thirteen years (fourth in 2005 and 2010), 
making it a relevant study subject. It is necessary to have a process whereby the large number 
of films released during these years are winnowed down to a more manageable number for 
analysis. iMDB’s “MovieMeter,” Rotten Tomatoes, Metcritic, and Box Office Mojo are some of 
the websites that collate professional reviews, viewer ratings, and box office success often 
resulting in a score out of 10 or 100. While these are undeniably crude tools for determining 
which films are useful for analysis, they allowed me to consider audience and reception. While 
it would be possible to undertake a large-n study of the action genre in the twenty-first century 
and use this corpus to analyse dominant themes, tropes, narratives and so forth it would not 
allow me to investigate the potential affects that particular moments of cinematic intensity 
induce and their political impacts. Such a study may prove to be illuminating and interesting 
but it would require a radically different research design involving different theories, methods, 
questions, and arguments. 
 
Despite using the metrics provided by these websites, the BFI’s data, and the demands of 
academic study, it is still necessary to watch a large number of films for each chapter as detailed 
in the filmography. Over the course of my research I analysed in depth over one hundred films 
specifically for the thesis, as well as innumerable others that I watched in less detail for both 
professional and personal reasons. Furthermore, it is inevitable that a degree of selection bias 
and personal preference are inherent in any decision regarding the selection and analysis of 
artefacts. It is useful to explain my approach to watching a large number of films for each 
chapter and how I select those to be explored in depth. As outlined earlier in this chapter, it is 
about exploring how film works to produce affective encounters with audiences that allow for 
conditions of success to emerge from the end of wars assemblage. Using the metrics outlined 
above, I watch a number of films (usually somewhere between ten and thirty) for each time 
period and keep detailed notes on plot, imagery, language, and tropes. I also utilise the film 
studies literature in order to assess cinematic techniques such as colouration, shot composition, 
montage and so forth in order to ascertain what role particular directorial choices might be 
playing in order to induce affects and encounters in audiences. In social scientific terms, I 
“code” the films according to these categories.  
 
I had decided to structure the thesis chronologically early in the design process, and the research 
proceeded sequentially – beginning with the history of the combat and action genres in chapter 
two through 9/11 to the Iraq troop surge in chapter three and so forth. For each chapter, once 
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the large number of films from the period under discussion were collected, viewed, and coded, 
it was necessary to narrow down the number even further. As mentioned above, and explored 
earlier in this chapter, the approach of this thesis is to ascertain what potential affects moments 
of cinematic intensity induce and how these affects produce particular conditions of success as 
emergent properties of the end of war assemblage, not a corpus analysis of Hollywood cinema. 
Within each group of films identified, some movies were more similar than others and as such 
could “hang together” as a coherent group. This similarity was usually along lines of plot, mise-
en-scene, visuality, and potential affects and allowed for the thematic profiles of each chapter 
to emerge: American exceptionalism, technology, urbanity, sacrifice, genre inversion, and 
temporality.  
 
These themes arose from the viewing of movies released during the period, which provided the 
conditions of success discussed in this thesis. In other words, I did not start the research process 
with a pre-determined list of conditions that were important to the ending of war and select 
movies to fit these themes, but vice versa. That being said, each of the themes analysed, in 
chapters three and four in particular, does conform to historically important aspects of US 
foreign policy and warfare that makes them relevant to the end of wars assemblage. For 
example, the discussion of urbanity in chapter four mirrors the urban focus of the troop surge 
in Iraq at the time. These themes represent some of the conditions of success that emerge from 
the assemblage, but are not exhaustive. I am not presenting a definitive list of conditions of 
success either from the time under discussion or generally, neither am I approaching these 
conditions as a priori to the cinematic analysis, and nor am I suggesting that these conditions 
were the only significant ones in these particular time periods. Rather, I am exploring how 
movies within a certain genre and from a certain time contribute to the emergence of conditions 
of possibility that allow wars to be brought to an end.  
 
Once the movies for a particular time period had been viewed, analysed, roughly categorised, 
and their affects traced I analysed how they resonate with contemporaneous political speech. 
To do this I analysed over four hundred speeches, press releases, statements, and press 
conferences of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama from 9/11 until 2014. While 
there are many more political sources that could be analysed, the focus on presidential speech 
is for similar reasons to the selection of the action genre: presidential speeches and statements 
reach a lot of people; are prominent in culture, politics, and the news media; and often have the 
most important consequences for direction of US foreign policy. As Jeffrey Cohen notes, ‘Mere 
presidential mentions of a policy area seem to elicit a public response, thus, presidents do not 
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have to resort to substantive arguments to sway public opinion.’169 In other words, Presidential 
speech has an outsized effect on public opinion generally and within the context of this thesis, 
the focus that presidents place on articulations of success in conflict can stabilise or destabilise 
their emergence and the assemblage. Presidential speech was analysed to ascertain whether the 
themes that emerged cinematically were resonant with political discourses. Again, the starting 
point for the thematization of the chapters was the movies – not the political actions or 
discourses. However, had themes been identified that were absent from political discourse (say, 
the cliché romantic love interest so common in the action genre) then their relevance for the 
end of wars would necessarily be much less.170  
 
As mentioned above, I had decided to structure the thesis and research chronologically early on 
in the process and this has necessarily shaped the structure, meaning, and reading experience 
of the final product. The periods under discussion in each chapter are not, however, entirely 
arbitrary but track important events and campaigns in the War on Terror. Chapter three begins 
from just before 9/11 and concludes with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The period under 
discussion in chapter four tracks the post-invasion situation in Iraq until the troop surge of 2007. 
Chapter five begins with the election of Barack Obama to the White House and the challenging 
of theretofore dominant political discourses. Chapter six takes the thesis from NATO 
Intervention in Libya until the beginning of Operation Inherent Resolve (the US-led campaign 
against ISIS in Iraq and Syria) and the reframing of the War on Terror away from Al-Qaeda 
and towards ISIS.  
 
The themes discussed in each chapter – American exceptionalism, technology, sacrifice, 
urbanity, inversion, and temporality – do not necessarily map neatly on to the time period under 
discussion and neither are they meant to. It is not that American exceptionalism was only 
prevalent, popular, or pertinent between 2001 and 2003 or that a linear temporality only came 
into being from 2011 to 2014. American exceptionalism has been part of US culture and warfare 
from Winthorp’s sermon to Mayer’s “The Awakening” to Captain America. And as Thomas 
Mahnken notes, ‘American strategic culture was…imbued with exceptionalism…and 
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technology-intensive approaches to combat’ from its earliest days.171 The linear framing of the 
War on Terror discussed in chapter six was happening from 9/11. Urbanity as discussed in 
chapter four was part of political discourse right through the War on Terror – from New York 
and Kabul to Baghdad and Benghazi. Similarly, these themes and tropes were not necessarily 
cinematically sui generis at these times: sacrifice for instance is a common trope in World War 
II combat movies, as discussed in the next chapter and has a long history in Western culture.172 
Genre evolution and inversion, as discussed in chapter five, is always part of the formation of 
cultural categories.173 Again, sometimes these themes resonate more deeply with the time under 
discussion such as urbanity and the troop surge,174 or exceptionalism in the aftermath of 9/11 
and the post-apocalyptic cinema analysed in chapter four was perhaps more common in those 
years than previously or subsequently. 
 
But not only are these themes not necessarily unique to the time under question, the 
chronological periodization of the thesis is not a reflection of the end of wars assemblage’s 
progression. It is not that the assemblage moves from simple to complex, or from stable to 
unstable, or from low entropy to high entropy.175 As noted above, the themes under discussion 
in each chapter are acting on the assemblage through the same and different artefacts right 
through the entire period that the thesis covers, as well as before and after. Similarly, forces of 
stabilisation and destabilisation are simultaneous and, again, may emerge from the same artefact 
– a movie like Inglorious Basterds, discussed in chapter five, is both stabilising and 
destabilising, sometimes in the same scene.  
 
There are several reasons for the periodization of the thesis. As discussed earlier, it was built 
into the research design and aided in the research process by narrowing down potential artefacts 
from the thousands to the dozens and it was also hoped that it would make the reading 
experience clearer and more coherent. Furthermore, analysing movies chronologically is an 
established method within film studies as genre is an evolving category and filmmakers can 
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reflect on, build upon, and develop ideas in movies that appeared beforehand.176 Within the 
literature on assemblages, affect, and emergence, John Protevi’s Political Affect and Manuel 
DeLanda’s Philosophy and Simulation follow broadly chronological or evolutionary paths. 
Even DeLanda’s avowedly nonlinear A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History has a broadly 
chronological structure. DeLanda poses the question of whether this contradicts his goal of 
exploring the possibilities of nonlinear history and answers that ‘a nonlinear conception of 
history has absolutely nothing to do with a style of presentation, as if one could truly capture 
the nonequilibrium dynamics of human historical processes by jumping back and forth among 
the centuries.’177 None of these works make the case that the object under analysis progresses 
towards an ultimate end or that their evolution is strictly linear and nor should this thesis be 
read as such. However, the structure does have limitations and drawbacks as will be discussed 
momentarily. 
 
The main reason, however, was to analytically divide processes of stabilisation from processes 
of destabilisation while acknowledging that they are, or at least can be, simultaneous with one 
another. As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, I argue that four conditions of success 
emerged from the assemblage between 2001 and 2007 which is what chapters three and four 
analyse. These are not the only possible conditions of success, but they are the ones identified 
from the corpus under analysis here. Between 2007 and 2014 it is certainly probable that other 
conditions of success emerge from the assemblage, but the purpose of chapters five and six is 
not to trace what they might be, but rather to assess the resilience of the previously enumerated 
conditions of success to processes of destabilisation and change. 2007 is taken as the point of 
potential bifurcation primarily because of the campaign and election of Barack Obama. 
Campaigning as he did on “hope and change,” and with his oft-touted opposition to the Iraq 
War, it was certainly possible that this could resonate with popular culture in such a way as to 
destabilise the assemblage and the conditions of success that are its emergent properties. As 
DeLanda notes, ‘when a system switches from one stable state to another…minor fluctuations 
may play a crucial role in deciding the outcome.’178 As these chapters will demonstrate, 
however, this was not the case and both cinema and Obama’s political rhetoric functioned to 
reassert the four conditions of success and perhaps even stabilise and strengthen them further. 
 
                                                          
176 See, for instance, Basinger, The World War II Combat Film, 2003; Binns, The Hollywood War Film; Geoff 
King, Spectacular Narratives: Hollywood in the Age of the Blockbuster (London: IBTauris, 2000); Timothy 
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Despite these caveats, it is inevitable that the research design and subsequent structure will have 
some drawbacks. There is the potential that the stabilisation and destabilisation processes that 
are analytically divided here will be read as singular and chronologically determined forces 
rather than as multiple. This is the possible implication that stabilisation and emergence needs 
to occur before destabilisation, critique and decoding can work. Or, within the language, that 
an assemblage needs to be fully territorialised before it can be deterritorialised. Rather than this, 
assemblages are based on interconnecting multiplicities of forms, forces, objects, practices, and 
processes and are not a static entity but always in a process of flux and change. Instead of a 
stable being, it is a fluid becoming. There is also the limitation that it might appear that the 
themes discussed in certain chapters are specific, unique, or particular to that time period. 
While, as discussed above, it may be the case that there may be certain temporal resonances at 
play these themes will always play out across the entire time period discussed in the thesis as 
well as historically and in the future. The themes analysed herein emerged from the movies 
under analysis rather than from any pre-determined sense of what would be appropriate 
conditions of success within the War on Terror. Each condition of success does, however, speak 
to relevant issues within contemporary warfare, and particularly within contemporary Western-
led counter-insurgency warfare. The fact that these themes were identified firstly from movies 
speaks to the enduring power of popular culture, and cinema in particular, to reflect, shape, and 
co-constitute the reality of International Relations. 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
Building on the idea that the end of wars can be productively thought of as an assemblage, this 
chapter and thesis seek to develop an understanding of how this assemblage allows certain 
conditions of success to emerge through politico-cultural interaction. The connections that exist 
between political and cultural artefacts can be thought of as contingent, non-linear, material and 
discursive, and formed through intensive affective encounters. The affective encounters 
inculcated by cinematic artefacts work with concurrent political narratives around conflict in 
order to produce the four conditions of success that are to be analysed in this thesis: American 
exceptionalism, technology, sacrifice, and the city. These conditions are not, however, static 
and unchanging. They are they product of particular affective processes and are subjected to 
forces that strengthen and weaken them. The chronological structure of this thesis is designed, 
in part, to trace the contours of the assemblage in order to ascertain how resilient it is to change 
while accepting that these processes are concurrent with its formation. The affective encounters 
that are induced by cinema and politics are products of both the internalities of the artefacts in 
a particular sense (shot, lighting, editing, trope, language, narrative etc.) but they are also the 
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externalities that allow for their connection between, across and through each other. The 
important distinction to bear in mind is that the connections between politics and culture are 
not dependent on the cultural meaning of political artefacts or the political meaning of cultural 
artefacts as they might be defined by an analyst. As such, this research takes a different 
conceptual and practical path to an intertextual one. The affective encounters between screen 
and viewer are embodied, contingent, and highly intensive. Encounters such as that between 
cinema and cinema viewer or political speech and 6 o’clock news viewer can create affective 
responses that allow for conditions of success to emerge and their political enactment to be 
accepted. In line with Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of being and becoming, I argue that 
these political becomings do not necessarily allow for revolutionary potential but in fact work 
to stabilise, or territorialise, the assemblage that is formed through politico-cultural interaction 
and forges the conditions of victory in the War on Terror. 
 
This is because the assemblage, while being composed of the various parts that constitute it, 
also has the effect of being able to take these various components and make something that is 
more than the sum of their parts. In the case of the end of wars assemblage that I am analysing 
in this thesis, it is my contention that the political possibility that emerges from its assembling 
processes are the conditions of success necessary to conclude conflicts in the War on Terror. 
Being even more specific than this, I would argue that the effect of the assemblage is so strong 
that it allows for these conditions to become highly resilient. Before moving into an exploration 
of how these conditions of success emerge from the encounters between audiences and cinema, 
the following chapter will position the action genre within a broader historical context that 
traces its roots back to World War II.  
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Chapter Two: War and Action 
 
“What do we do now? 
We start all over.” 
The Green Berets (1968) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Before we come to an analysis of the end of wars assemblage, and how its conditions of success 
emerge from affective cinematic encounters during the War on Terror, it is first useful to situate 
the analytical objects of this thesis – action movies – within their cinematic and genre history. 
By tracing the evolution of the contemporary Hollywood action genre and how it shares certain 
affinities with the older combat movie we can engage more fully with the modern cinema that 
I analyse through the remainder of the thesis. Understanding the historical antecedents to 
current phenomena is a useful way to critically engage with and analyse those phenomena. 
When we consider the long history of direct cooperation and mutual influence between politics 
and cinema, from Nazi propaganda in the 1930s to the very close cooperation between 
Washington and Hollywood in Zero Dark Thirty, an understanding of how cinema and politics 
have interacted and mutually shaped both one another and our understanding of conflict 
historically is a useful way to contextualise and situate this thesis.179 
 
Furthermore, by engaging with cinematic history and film theory, it should be possible to 
deepen our understanding of the contemporary end of wars assemblage. It is important to bear 
in mind that the resonance between culture and politics, or cinema and conflict in particular, is 
not confined to the contemporary era of the War on Terror, but as this chapter will show it has 
existed in various forms since at least World War Two. As such, the contemporary end of wars 
assemblage is the product of historical processes that this chapter will help, in part, to trace. 
Just as Sara Ahmed notes that a table is a form of assemblage itself with emergent properties 
(commodity, function, tool for writing and so forth) that are the products of historical processes 
and must be understood in this frame; so too is the end of wars assemblage a product of 
historical processes that help to forge its emergent properties – in our case the creation of 
conditions of success.180 Perhaps more interestingly, the affinities between the films analysed 
in this chapter and the politics of their contemporaneous conflicts match the thematic typologies 
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that subsequent chapters discuss: American exceptionalism, technology, sacrifice, and urbanity. 
While the conditions of success outlined in this thesis were not pre-determined before the 
research commenced and emerged from the cinematic space, they all have longer histories than 
is perhaps implied in subsequent chapters. This is one aspect of their emergence that might 
contribute to their resilience when subjected to forces of destabilisation as discussed in more 
detail in chapters five and six. In order to explore this further, this chapter will proceed in two 
parts. Firstly, I will expand upon the necessity of a brief historical positioning in order to 
contextualise the remainder of the thesis within the lineage of a genre. Secondly, I will offer an 
outline of how the genre of the war film has developed since World War Two until the present 
day. The core argument being made throughout is that the resonance between cinema and 
politics that the remainder of the thesis discusses with reference to the War on Terror and the 
contemporary action genre are not sui generis but rather are part of an ongoing process of 
interaction. The historical existence of these resonances contributes to the intensity of 
connection that shapes the end of wars assemblage and its emergent properties today. 
Furthermore, this chapter also traces how contemporary action cinema draws on elements of 
the historic combat film thus maintaining the intensity of connection that has been developing 
since at least the Second World War. Ultimately, this chapter will demonstrate that 
understanding genre, cinematic history, and how resonant intensity has a particular past aids in 
our understanding of how the end of wars assemblage functions during the War on Terror. 
Furthermore, how genre functions within that assemblage and how the historical nature of the 
politico-cultural interaction will be shown to contribute to our understanding of what follows 
in subsequent chapters with relation to the endings of conflict. 
 
Charting the development of such texts, being aware of their particular histories, their particular 
genre lineage, and their antecedents as well as the history of the end of wars assemblage will 
help to illuminate and allow us to engage with modern contexts with more historical depth than 
would otherwise be allowed. What I hope to highlight through this brief overview of the history 
of the war film is that analysing cultural artefacts in temporal isolation, unaware of their 
historical legacies, leads to a situation where those cultural artefacts are not exploited to their 
full potential. While Deleuze and Guattari call the rhizome an ‘antigenealogy,’ being aware of 
the conventions of genre, as well as their variations, will help those interested in the interactions 
of cinema and politics to better understand, examine, and critically analyse cultural artefacts.181 
Given that this phenomenon of politics being influenced by popular culture is not a recent one, 
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a historical perspective on the resonance between these two sites will not only ground my 
research historically, but will also function to aid in exploring how the end of wars assemblage 
functions in contemporary cinema and conflicts. Ultimately this will aid in the exploration and 
development of an understanding of how culture and politics interact to allow conditions of 
success to emerge. 
 
2.2 Historical perspective 
Basinger, in her seminal book on the World War Two combat film, suggests that politico-
cultural interactions are more symbiotic than many imagine: 
 
A famous newsreel of World War II shows General Eisenhower going among his troops on the 
eve of D-Day, talking to them, laughing with them, just being one of them. Did he learn to do that 
at West Point? From reading The Red Badge of Courage? From his natural instincts as a born 
leader of men? Or did he learn it from going to the movies? 182 
 
Beginning the more empirical section of this thesis with a historical overview of the 
development of the action genre is useful for a number of reasons. Firstly, it helps to advance 
the argument that the action genre is an important and useful site of political analysis. As will 
be argued throughout this chapter, action movies are not just a dominant genre by box office 
receipts, as noted above, but emerge from and draw upon the tropes of the combat film. As 
Tzvetan Todorov noted in 1976, new genres emerge from old ones: ‘A new genre is always the 
transformation of one or several old genres: by inversion, by displacement, by combination…it 
is a system in continual transformation, and the question of origins cannot be disassociated, 
historically, from the field of the genres themselves.’183 Given the impact that war films may 
have had on politics, exemplified by the Basinger quote above, it can be argued that action 
movies have the same potential to create conditions of possibility for certain political actions 
today. Secondly, as discussed in the previous chapter, the end of wars assemblage did not just 
come into being after the events of September 11th 2001 but rather has a history, development, 
and emergence as a product of particular processes. As Patton notes when discussing the 
application of Deleuze and Guattari to political philosophy, ‘Concepts have a history…[which] 
therefore includes the variations they undergo in their migration from one problem to 
another.’184 Thus, there is no single and unchanging assemblage of the end of wars but rather 
an ongoing development of it. Understanding the history of the cinematic aspect of this 
                                                          
182 Jeanine Basinger, The World War II Combat Film: Anatomy of a Genre (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), 7. 
183 Tzvetan Todorov and Richard M. Berrong, ‘The Origin of Genres’, New Literary History 8, no. 1 (1976): 
161, https://doi.org/10.2307/468619. 
184 Patton, Deleuze and the Political. 
65 
 
assemblage is the purpose of this chapter. 
 
Furthermore, as well as being able to trace the historical processes that allow for the 
contemporary emergence of conditions of success, understanding how the action genre itself 
has developed helps us appreciate the genre more both analytically and personally. Indeed, 
genre itself could be considered as an assemblage in its own right. While still an ‘individual 
singularity,’185 it nonetheless connects with other assemblages – assemblages of popular culture, 
of particular movies, of shots, techniques, styles, and narratives. As DeLanda notes, ‘Although 
each assemblage is a unique historical entity it always belongs to a population of more or less 
similar assemblages.’186 Thus to trace the evolution of the action genre as assemblage is to trace 
part of the evolution of the end of wars assemblage. Exploring the history, development, and 
assemblage of genre is not just an interesting detour – though hopefully it will also be that – 
but it serves an important purpose in the context of this thesis. It further strengthens the 
argument that the production of emergent properties through politico-interaction is not sui 
generis although what those emergent properties are have changed over time. It also helps us 
to understand the historical context in which contemporary cinema functions as popular culture 
and art form. Furthermore, arguing that politico-cultural interaction has a history supports the 
central point that contemporary cinema has a political effect. 
 
It is true that taking a large number of texts from the past eighty years of film to trace its history 
and current implications comes with issues such as diluting our understanding of how politics 
and film interact in the post-9/11 world as well as providing a tendency towards attempting to 
formulate general rules. In order to avoid this scenario, I am basing my selection of historical 
texts on the excellent filmography provided by Basinger in The World War II Combat Film. 
Rather than examining the vast number of combat films made between 1939 and the present 
day, I have chosen to focus on a small number of films that Basinger has identified as key texts 
in the genre’s development, as well as supplementing this with some of my own choices. 187 
What I hope to achieve is a close reading of cinematic and political texts that is constantly 
informed by their history. Inevitably I, as a socialised, historicised, and encultured person can 
never fully step outside my particular time and history to examine texts entirely objectively. 
Thus, some degree of synthesis between understanding historical texts as artefacts with 
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connections in their own rights and of their own time as well as part of the process of 
assemblage formation that has led to our current moment must be achieved. 
 
Having explored why a historical perspective is useful for my own research project and 
discussed the methodologies that will be used in such an approach, I will now explore the 
history of the action genre through a number of films. What follows is a discussion of five films 
that serve as useful mile markers in the evolution of films about war and mirror the progression 
of US military action over the past seventy years. They deal with World War Two, the Korean 
War, the Vietnam War, the later stages of the Cold War, and the liberal interventions in the 
post-Cold War era. As will be further demonstrated, in the current period of the War on Terror, 
the action movie has taken on the mantle of the combat film rather than films about the war 
itself. The films under study are as follows: for World War Two, Bataan (1943), for Korea 
Fixed Bayonets! (1951), for Vietnam, Full Metal Jacket (1987),188 for the late Cold War Red 
Dawn (1984)189 and for the post-Cold War, pre-War on Terror era we have Black Hawk Down 
(2001). What I hope to demonstrate is that historical politico-cultural interactions have shaped 
the modern political and cultural landscape and the interactions between them. Furthermore, by 
exploring the conventions and politics at work in Captain America: The First Avenger (2011) 
in the final section of the chapter I hope to explain and further justify my choice of using action 
films rather than war films for the contemporary chapters of my thesis. It is important to note 
here that this chapter is a contextual and historical one that has addressed questions of textual 
selection, traces the evolution of genre, justifies the selection of texts and does not necessarily 
engage with the films discussed here to map their contemporaneous connections to politics to 
understand the creation of the conditions of victory necessary for ongoing political violence 
and the end of conflicts. 
 
2.3 Bataan: The genesis of genre 
Bataan tells the last-stand story of a group of American soldiers ordered to hold a bridge in the 
Philippines against the Japanese in order to buy time for the retreat of US and allied forces. 
While many of the conventions that this film establishes such as ‘a mixed group of types, a 
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person in their midst who is not enthusiastic about the combat, a leader who dies, a hero out of 
necessity, death of valued members, and much more’ existed in various forms beforehand, 
Bataan is the first film to tie them together and essentially establishes the genre conventions of 
the combat film that then informs subsequent films that I work with through the rest of this 
thesis.190 As Basinger writes: 
 
Bataan is clearly the seminal film. It marks the point at which a film appears that contains the 
primary characteristics of the genre – a film totally set in the combat situation, with no escapes or 
releases of any sort.191 
 
Basinger further describes Bataan as ‘the definition [of the World War Two combat film] 
clarified, focused, and presented with passion.’192 Basinger presents us with a typology of the 
perfect Second World War combat film that includes certain primary elements, though she also 
takes care to say that such a perfect film does not exist. These central elements and genre 
conventions are an opening military reference; a military adviser; a dedication (often to the 
troops); a diverse group of men, led by a hero, who undertake an important military mission; 
one of the group will be an observer or commentator (a journalist, diary-keeper, letter writer, 
or narrator); the hero will have leadership thrust upon him through the death or incapacitation 
of his superior; there is a clear military objective; the narrative alternates between action and 
repose, or night and day, or safety and danger and so forth; the enemy is revealed; there is 
military iconography (uniforms, weapons, materiel, chains of command); conflict will break 
out within the group; rituals are enacted (holidays, funerals, mail calls); there is death; a 
climactic battle; resolution; and “The End”.193 Clearly Bataan is an interesting film in terms of 
the development of this long-lasting genre, but it is also interesting from the perspective of 
narrative. There are the obvious sections of the film that deal with the question of ‘why we 
fight,’ such as when Sgt Bill Dane (Robert Taylor) explains the objective and why it is 
necessary to the volunteers; the noble sacrifice of Lt Steve Bentley (George Murphy) who, 
being mortally wounded, flies a plane load of explosives into a bridge to thwart the Japanese; 
the conversion of the unwilling, unable, or cranky soldier into an efficient weapon of war such 
as Pvt Matthew Hardy (Philip Terry) who had enlisted as a non-combatant in the medical corps 
but in a state of delirium, he realises that he needs to embrace combat and begins throwing 
grenades at the Japanese who eventually kill him. 
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However Bataan, as the genesis point of the genre, also points towards deeper political 
problems and questions than these less subtle, more propagandist segments. The group 
dynamics of the characters in this film, and many others in the genre, suggest that the 
individualism of which the US is so proud must be subsumed within the group in the face of 
existential danger. As Basinger writes on this dynamic: 
 
These men obviously represent the American melting pot, but the representation is not a simple-
minded one. Our strength is our weakness and vice versa. We are a mongrel nation- ragtail, 
unprepared, disorganized, quarrelsome among ourselves, and with separate special interests, 
raised, as we are, to believe in the individual, not the group. At the same time, we bring different 
skills and abilities together for the common good, and from these separate needs and backgrounds 
we bring a feisty determination. No one leads us who is not strong, and our individualism is not 
set aside for any small cause. Once it is set aside, however, our group power is extreme.194  
 
It is only when the threat to the nation, or the group acting as a microcosm of it, is existential 
that we are willing to place our individualism within the context of the broader community. 
Rather than sacrificing individual freedom, we see that this aspect of exceptionalism finds its 
greatest articulation in the structure of a group. This is a similar trope to Spider-Man, discussed 
in the following chapter, where Spider-Man himself becomes more powerful when working 
with the support of New York. There also appears to be a strong didactic element to what we 
see in Bataan: what is shown on screen can be read as propagandist in nature. Given that Bataan 
was released as the Second World War was ongoing, it seems reasonable to infer that it 
articulates a particular propagandist vision of what the correct response is to a global conflict 
and national emergency. This is articulated through a letter writing scene where Sgt Dane 
dictates “we figure the men who died here may have done more than we’ll ever know to save 
this whole world…it don’t matter where a man dies, as long as he dies for freedom.”195 This is 
strengthened by the racial element of the conflict in the Pacific through racism towards the 
Japanese (”You better know that those no-tail baboons out there are itching [for us],” and the 
epithet “dirty dirty dirty dirty.”).196 This is a theme that can be tracked through other conflicts 
and films within the combat genre.197 However, in the post-9/11 cinematic landscape that the 
rest of this thesis works with, these motifs of overt didacticism largely do not appear in films 
that are set within the War on Terror, nor within the action genre. However, as this chapter 
demonstrates, the action film can be thought of as functioning in a similar way vis-a-vis the 
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War on Terror as combat films functioned in relation to the particular conflict they depict rather 
than films that are set in contemporary combat zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. That being 
said, the action genre that I engage with through the rest of the thesis does not necessarily have 
the same propagandist or racist nature to it, or at least it does not explicitly present us with one. 
Nonetheless, action movies can arguably trace their history to Bataan. But if they are not “pure” 
combat films, how do they function within the end of wars assemblage and what do the narrative 
and genre tropes that they exhibit work to do? As will be shown through the majority of this 
thesis, the contemporary heirs to the World War Two combat film work through affective 
encounters to allow for the emergence of conditions of success. While not necessarily 
employing the tropes of “why we fight,” the strengthening of an assemblage that allows such 
combat to take place is still there. Looking back at a historical film such as Bataan and the 
genre it created, then, allows us to pose more and different questions than if we took 
contemporary films at face value, without the benefit of their historical lineage. 
 
2.4 Fixed Bayonets!: Continuity and change 
Obviously, the next major war that the US experienced after World War Two was the Korean 
War. Coming hot on the heels of World War Two, it is not surprising that the film studios 
reworked the same plots, characters and settings, as well as imagery and tropes from their 
successful World War Two films. As Thomas Schatz notes, ‘the World War II combat film 
would remain a significant Hollywood genre for decades to come, utterly dominating war-film 
production through the Korean and Vietnam wars.’198 This is further reinforced by Monaco who 
uses the studio system of Hollywood’s Golden Age whereby studios were ‘operated as 
efficiently run factories’ to explain that they produced very few unique films but rather 
particular ‘types, patterns, conventions, and genres.’199 Films, then, were commodities to be 
sold rather than art to be created and, having invested thousands or millions of dollars in the 
production of many World War Two combat films that sold well, studios saw no need to change 
the production line to make something new and untested. There are only two major differences 
between a film such as Bataan, discussed above and Fixed Bayonets! which was described at 
the time as ‘the best war movie since Bataan.’200 One is that the Americans are fighting against 
Chinese Communists (interestingly, the North Koreans are either not a threat in Korean War 
films made during the conflict, or they are rapidly replaced by the Chinese who are presented 
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as more sinister and capable than their neighbours) rather than Japanese imperialists or German 
Nazis. The other is that the nature of leadership becomes an increasingly important narrative 
device in the development of both character and plot. Both these similarities and differences 
can tell us a lot about this phase in the development of the war film genre, and can also help us 
to further interrogate cultural artefacts that are more contemporary. 
 
Starting with the similarities between Korean War films and those of World War Two it is 
useful to bear in mind Basinger’s description of the Hollywood studio system as being a place 
of thrift, conservation, and recycling: 
 
Hollywood was, contrary to popular opinion, a frugal place. Plots and characters and events were 
re-used. Audiences presumably were glad enough to see old friends back on the screen doing the 
old familiar things…Useful things were – tough sergeants, raw recruits, old veterans, diary-
keeping writers, colourful immigrant types; mail calls, Christmas celebrations, barroom brawls; 
“dead men” crying out to be brought in, and, when rescued, dying anyway; brave men going up 
in planes to sacrifice themselves. The list is long, but the important thing is the context in which 
the conventions are used. From the most successful films, producers, writers, directors et al. took 
the most memorable parts and brought them forward for the new war.201 
 
While the quote above is referring to how the World War Two combat genre was forged from 
the films of World War I and the interwar years, it is interesting to note that, with a few 
exceptions (a diary-keeper, mail calls, Christmas, brawls, and aerial sacrifice), most of the 
tropes and devices that Basinger refers to here are also present in many films of the Korean era. 
We have a group of men ordered to perform a rear guard action while the regiment retreats 
across a bridge; the officer commanding the squad is killed early in the film leaving the Sergeant 
in command; the weather, elements, and terrain are as much of a problem as the enemy; and 
there are sacrifices and death – all of which are present in Bataan as well as many other World 
War Two films. We can first take from this that Hollywood does not like change, especially 
when it might lose money by potentially alienating audiences, and that genre is a living entity 
more prone to gradual evolution than radical shifts and departures. This gradual evolution of 
genre over time and its effect on the end of wars assemblage is further explored in chapter five 
through the inversion of Inglourious Basterds and Hancock as well as the pastiche of RED, The 
Expendables, and The A-Team. We can perhaps also infer from Fixed Bayonets! that the Korean 
War was largely seen by the Hollywood studios as a remake of World War Two rather than a 
sequel. By this I mean that the major plot elements, characters, narrative devices, tropes, and 
imagery are all largely the same but there are subtle variations in order to ‘update the franchise’ 
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of the World War Two film. These differences, rather than the similarities, tell us more about 
both the evolution of the genre and the slowly changing nature of warfare that will encroach 
upon Vietnam and beyond. Furthermore, as Geoff King notes, these similarities can explain 
aspects of contemporary action cinema as well. He suggests that more modern war films such 
as Saving Private Ryan repackage the spectacle of action movies in a more “serious or 
respectable” way, thus demonstrating that the overlap between action and war cinema, and the 
genre lineage of the films under discussion here leads towards the style of cinema that will be 
engaged with in the remainder of this thesis.202  
 
Despite the similarities between Fixed Bayonets! and Bataan it is clear from the outset that they 
do not deal with the same war. Other clues to the nature of the conflict being depicted are also 
peppered throughout the film such as the question ‘They told me this would be a police action,’ 
followed by the reply ‘Why didn’t they send the cops?’203 Furthermore, while films from Korea 
and World War Two share many of the same plot devices and narrative structure, one element 
of Fixed Bayonets! that is new for Korea is Corporal Denno’s (Richard Baseheart) absolute 
reluctance to lead. This reluctance to lead in wartime is also seen in Retreat, Hell! (1952) when 
the main character, Captain Paul Hansen (Richard Carlson) is reluctant to be in command of a 
company rather than a platoon. Furthermore, when he asks his commanding officer permission 
to visit his family at night he argues that: ‘I’m just a family man,’ to which the Lt. Colonel 
replies ‘You’re a marine, Captain Hansen, and don’t you forget it.’204 While command was 
often thrust on characters, mostly Sergeants, in World War Two films, it was taken stoically 
and even with a hint of pride and duty, rather than being something to avoid at all costs. Indeed 
in Bataan the Captain voluntarily delegates authority to Sgt Dane saying ‘Anytime you got an 
idea while we’re together on this job, give your orders to the men. You don’t have to waste time 
asking me first, trying to make me look good. And any time I give an order that sounds wrong 
to you, tell me why.’205 This motif of leadership as something to be avoided is developed clearly 
in Fixed Bayonets! with the opening dialogue dealing with the burdens of command: ‘It takes 
more than brains to be a general. You’ve got to have the guts to lead.’206 The platoon that is left 
behind on rear guard duty consists of Lieutenant Gibbs (Craig Hill), two Sergeants – Rock and 
Lonergan (Gene Evans and Michael O’Shea respectively), Corporal Denno, and various 
Privates.  
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It is clearly obvious from early on in the film that Cpl Denno is both unwilling to lead and that 
he is nevertheless going to have it thrust upon him.207 It is established that, while he can attack 
a group, he finds it difficult to kill an individual; that he went to officer school but flunked out 
due to a training accident where he accidentally sent men to their death; and that there are only 
three people of higher rank in the platoon. As Sgt Rock says ‘It would only take three bullets 
to make him leader.’ Within twenty minutes of the opening credits, the Lieutenant is killed and 
mourned with what will become a sort of mantra for the platoon: ‘Strip him of anything we can 
use, roll him in a blanket, bury him, and mark him.’ Sgt Rock’s words are replayed to again 
drive home the unwillingness of Cpl Denno to lead. Denno’s desire to avoid leadership at all 
costs continues when Sgt Lonergan is trapped and wounded in the minefield. Denno volunteers 
to get the Sergeant, ostensibly to retrieve the map of the minefield, but in reality to avoid only 
having one man above him in the chain of command. While Denno rescues Lonergan, by the 
time he makes it out of the minefield the Sergeant is already dead. Shortly after this, Sergeant 
Rock is killed by a ricocheting bullet, leaving Denno in command. Although still unsure of his 
capabilities as a leader, Denno assumes command and enforces discipline through threatening 
another soldier who wishes to desert the position. Eventually, through an attack on a tank and 
Denno’s successful killing of an individual, he becomes accepted by the men and by himself as 
being capable to lead. Returning to the regiment after a successful rear guard action, we hear 
Sgt Rock’s voice over the platoon wading across the river: ‘Ain’t nobody goes out looking for 
responsibility, sometimes you get it whether you’re looking for it or not.’ 
 
We can learn several things from this narrative structure of the unwilling leader. Basinger 
describes Cpl Denno as ‘the cowardly corporal’ who redeems himself by rescuing Lonergan.208 
However, I would argue firstly that Denno redeems himself not through that rescue, but only 
when he is able to kill the individual Chinese soldier and that rather than Denno being the 
cowardly character, he functions politically as an avatar for a popular American uncertainty 
about using its power to reengage with world affairs after the brutality of World War Two. As 
Binns argues, Korean War movies are ‘imbued with the same sense of unease, confusion, and 
frustration’ that permeated American society.209 While it is clear that Denno is brave and smart 
– risking his life for Lonergan and explaining situations to comrades – it is his own confidence 
in his abilities as a leader that is in question. We can also see a similar popular unwillingness 
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to engage in military action and allow it to affect domestic life at the beginning of Retreat, Hell! 
when Captain Hansen takes his family to training camp with him and protests at his enforced 
separation from them during training. This uncertainty about, and discomfort with, military 
action and leadership is reinforced by the lack of a ‘why we fight’ didactic element in either of 
these two major Korean War films: there is no reference to defending democracy, or why we’re 
better than the ‘Reds’, or why they are brutal and cowardly while we are virtuous and brave. 
All of these themes presage what is going to happen in the next major instalment of the war 
film and of American overseas intervention: Vietnam. By realising that films do not exist in a 
temporal vacuum and are strongly influenced by previous developments in cinematic and genre 
history, we can begin to see how major themes are developed, what references filmmakers use 
and why, and understand that what may seem radical in a film such as Full Metal Jacket, 
discussed below, is actually the result of a gradual development over the course of many years. 
Similarly, it may help to explain or place in context the contemporary movies that are analysed 
in later chapters that may appear radical but fall short of their critical potentials. I am not, 
however, suggesting that it is necessary to understand or be aware of the particular genre, 
artistic, and economic history of every film in order to interrogate how it functions within the 
end of wars assemblage. Rather, I am suggesting that an understanding of the processes that led 
to contemporary cinema can help us explore artefacts for a much fuller appreciation of what 
political possibilities they may allow for. 
 
2.5 Full Metal Jacket: The inversion of genre 
Moving on to the next major phase in the development of the war film, we can begin to see 
what role the Vietnam War played in the development of the genre, and what questions can be 
posed about contemporary cinema through a reading of one of the classic Vietnam films, 
Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket. Although Basinger does not deal with many Vietnam 
films in her book, the genre link between World War Two and Vietnam is clearly established 
by Doherty both in terms of the cinema they produced and the wars and those who fought them:  
 
The blood ties between the traditional combat film and its Vietnam descendent cut deeper than 
the usual anxiety of generic influence…A true son of Hollywood and television, the Vietnam 
soldier was weaned on mass-mediated fantasies of World War II combat. Never far from his 
consciousness are films like The Sands of Iwo Jima (1949), Halls of Montezuma (1950), and To 
Hell and Back (1955).’210  
 
Full Metal Jacket conforms to several of the conventions of the combat film outlined above in 
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the discussion of Bataan. These include opening with the oblique military reference of the 
recruits having their heads shaved while “Hello Vietnam” by Johnny Wright plays; the mixed 
group of recruits from various areas and ethnic backgrounds; there is a commentator in the 
group in the figure of Pvt Joker (Matthew Modine) who occasionally acts as a narrator; Sgt 
“Cowboy” Evans (Arliss Howard) has command of the platoon thrust upon him by the deaths 
of his two superiors; the film is replete with military iconography specific to the conflict 
including the near constant buzz of helicopters; once the platoon realise they are lost, Sgt 
“Animal Mother” (Adam Baldwin) challenges Cowboy’s command thus adhering to the intra-
group conflict trope; there is much death and destruction; and a climactic battle. 
 
However, Full Metal Jacket also begins to invert and subvert several of the key conventions of 
the combat genre.211 For instance, rather than embarking on an important military mission, Joker 
joins the combat to get a story for the military newspaper Stars and Stripes. Furthermore, rather 
than concluding with a definitive resolution and grand epiphany about the point of conflict, 
Joker’s final narration is “I am in a world of shit, yes, but I am alive and I am not afraid.” 
Doherty also makes the point that the drill instructor in boot camp, Gunnery Sergeant Hartman 
(R. Lee Erney) ‘is the most impersonal of cinematic DIs.’212 In portraying the drill instructor as 
such, ‘Kubrick departs radically from the Marine Corps indoctrination film of classical 
Hollywood, a form that consistently subordinated battlefield action to melodramatic revelation, 
that stripped away layers of military insulation to get to the warm human core beneath the 
officer corps.’213 Further undermining the central and respected character of the Sergeant is that 
for the training section of the film, there is very little dialogue or camaraderie among the 
recruits.214 The focus is on the training process as instilling an absolute acceptance of authority 
rather than developing a respect for one’s comrades or unit cohesion. Another example of this 
subversion of genre devices comes towards the end of the action. While a large part of the film 
presents a Lost Patrol (1934) style plot of a group of soldiers being isolated and wandering in 
hostile territory, it does not end with their eventual rescue or epiphany moment where they 
realise the necessity of combat and sacrifice themselves for a noble or higher cause. This is a 
staple plot device of the genre which often goes beyond the war itself, and Full Metal Jacket 
embraces it while excellently subverting it.215 The platoon has found a certain rationality in their 
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existence and a group mentality, but rather than being expressed through the last stand, it is 
instead expressed as: 
  
M-I-C-K-E-Y-M-O-U-S-E 
We went there and we worked hard and we’re in harmony, 
M-I-C-K-E-Y-M-O-U-S-E 
Mickey Mouse (Mickey Mouse), 
Forever led us home with our banner high (high high high), 
Boys and girls from far and near you’re welcome as can be, 
M-I-C-K-E-Y-M-O-U-S-E 
Who’s the leader of the club that’s made for you and me? 
M-I-C-K-E-Y-M-O-U-S-E 
Who is marching coast to coast and far across the sea? 
M-I-C-K-E-Y-M-O-U-S-E 
Mickey Mouse (Mickey Mouse), 
Forever led us home with his banner high (high high high), 
Come along and sing our song and join our family, 
M-I-C-K-E-Y-M-O-U-S-E 216 
 
Basinger argues that in early combat films, the armed forces are created as a substitute family, 
complete with their traditions, songs, jokes, and rules. Indeed, the training section ends with 
Hartman saying “Today you are no longer maggots. You are part of a brotherhood from now 
until the day that you die. Wherever you are, every marine is your brother…the Marine Corps 
lives forever and that means you live forever.”217 In the background, the Marine’s Hymn is 
heard. Not only is Hartman creating a substitute family, but also a substitute religion, especially 
considering his Christmas day remark that “God has a hard on for Marines.” However, at the 
conclusion of the film, rather than the characters revelling in their membership of the Marine 
Corps family and singing the ‘Halls of Montezuma’ they instead opt for the ‘Mickey Mouse 
March,’ itself replete with familial and quasi-militaristic language, and a rejoicing in merely 
being alive. This stands in stark contrast to John Wayne’s earlier Vietnam War film that had a 
much more positive view of the conflict, The Green Berets (1968), which opens and closes with 
“The Ballad of the Green Beret.” Kubrick’s subversive choices remain within the spirit of the 
genre conventions, if not the letter. The visual aspect of this final act also lends further power 
to the subversion of genre. The film is replete with such subversions of standard genre 
conventions, such as ‘falling in’ to get a, often motivational, talk from the Sergeant instead 
becoming a masochistic routine with Gunnery Sergeant Hartman which also functions to 
undermine the melting plot convention (‘I am hard but I am fair. There is no racial bigotry here. 
I do not look down on niggers, kikes, wops or greasers. Here you are all equally 
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worthless.’218).219  
 
A further visual difference between Full Metal Jacket and the previous two films is the sheer 
scale of the conflict. Until the final act of the film when the platoon is lost, the combat footage 
is always busy. There is the constant sound of helicopters overhead, shots with troops and tanks 
in the background, panning shots that highlight the scale of the American war effort. Rather 
than depicting a single platoon holding a strategic point, as Bataan and Fixed Bayonets! do, 
Full Metal Jacket attempts to engage in a depiction of the entire conflict. There is also Kubrick’s 
use of slow motion to highlight death and injury to main characters such as Cpl “Eightball” 
(Dorian Harewood). While the films discussed above had elements of mourning for the dead, 
the visual representation of their death is much less involved. Cinematic and political 
constructions and depictions of certain temporalities is a theme that will be returned to in much 
more depth in chapter six. 
 
This challenging of the norms of the genre forces the viewer to revisit and reinterpret the history 
of the war film. An audience more used to the films of John Ford, Howard Hawks and Raoul 
Walsh would find the instances of a sergeant and his men, or redemption found through conflict 
very familiar, but the visual and textual ways that these are portrayed would be quite 
challenging. Again, like the move from World War Two to Korea, we see that cinematic genre 
is ever-changing, but always in minor ways. Full Metal Jacket retains many elements of older 
war movies, but makes subtle changes in their use, emphasis, or visual style. Looking at a film 
such as Full Metal Jacket as part of the process that leads to the contemporary action movie 
accomplishes several things. It further increases our knowledge of where plot devices, tropes, 
and techniques come from, it helps us chart how their meanings have been subverted and 
changed over the years, and it poses questions that are relevant today such as what makes a film 
anti-war.220 Or indeed, what makes a film that is set in war a ‘war film’? Or what makes a film 
set during wartime relevant to the study of that war? Or, more specifically, how might an action 
movie draw on genre history in order to induce an affective encounter with the audience? These 
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are the films that I will engage with through the rest of the thesis, and the 1980s prove to be an 
important point in the moulding of the action genre out of the combat film of World War Two, 
Korea, and Vietnam and it is to this, again subtle and gentle, shift that we now turn. 
 
2.6 Red Dawn: Visual combat, narrative action 
Films that employ the tropes, narratives, and genre conventions of war films but are not set in 
warfare, or set in a war that is fantastical, futuristic or plain absurd became increasingly 
common in the late 1970s and 1980s through actors like Arnold Schwarzenegger (Commando 
(1985)), Sylvester Stallone (Rambo: First Blood (1982)),221 Jean Claude van Damme (Universal 
Soldier (1992)), and Bruce Willis (Die Hard (1988))222 as well as directors including James 
Cameron (Aliens (1986)) and Ridley Scott (The Terminator (1984)). As will be shown, this type 
of film incorporates aspects of the genre of the war film, and it is thus important and useful to 
include a transitionary example here. Red Dawn (1984), as well as being fantastically absurd, 
provides a useful segue between the pure combat film of World War Two, Korea, and Vietnam 
and the action films that have become more prominent over the past thirty years. Essentially, 
Red Dawn is visually combat but narratively action. It is set during an invasion of the mainland 
USA by Cuban and Soviet forces and features a group of high school kids who form a guerrilla 
resistance movement - the “Wolverines”. Thus, it functions as a combat film replete with 
military iconography, a definite enemy in the Soviets and Cubans who are organised along clear 
military lines, wear uniforms and so forth; there is a clear alternation between action and repose; 
and the combat takes places between two known enemies. However, in terms of narrative and 
style it also has aspects of the more abstracted action genre. By abstracted I mean that, unlike 
the previous films discussed above, Red Dawn is not set in a factual historical or ongoing 
conflict but in a radically alternative present. Red Dawn is an exemplary case-study of late Cold 
War tensions and fears under the administration of Ronald Reagan and one of the few, if not 
the only, films made during the Cold War that depicts direct, full, conventional warfare between 
the US and communists.223 Furthermore, the fact that Red Dawn was remade in 2012, featuring 
an even more implausible North Korean invasion of mainland America, suggests that the key 
themes of the original are still relevant today.224 
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Leaving the remake to one side, partly because it does not particularly pertain to the late Cold 
War era and partly because it does not fit into the chronological structure of this chapter, we 
can begin to examine the original Red Dawn both for its political value and for its status within 
the development of the genre. Red Dawn, much like Black Hawk Down that will be discussed 
below, acts as a bridge between the pure combat film of the 40s, 50s, 60s, and 70s and the more 
modern action films of the 80s, 90s, and early 21st century.225 It contains elements that are 
particular to both genres, as well as unique components that are specific to its own plot and 
narrative structure. Politically, as well as the obvious late-Cold War tensions that it deals with, 
questions of leadership, group dynamics, and civilian-military relationships are explored. 
Importantly, these dynamics that unfold within the plot of the film are not to be seen as a reading 
of the internal meaning of the artefact, but rather how the movie functions within, and itself 
shapes, the assemblage of genre. 
 
Beginning with the more formal aspects of the film, and how it relates to previous films in the 
war genre, we can see how the conventions of genre have been utilised. As Jeremy Arnold says 
in the updated filmography in the second edition of Basinger’s The World War II Combat Film: 
‘Combat conventions of group, hero, [and] objective are all present, melded to teen film 
issues.’226 We have the leader who has had responsibility foisted upon him by his father; the 
military iconography that one associates with conventional combat; a climactic battle with the 
Cubans; a dedication of sorts at the end of the film at “Partisan Rock;” there is an important 
military objective; and the mixed group of individuals. The mixed group however, is not the 
conventional melting pot idea where we have an immigrant, a kid from Brooklyn, a Irish-
American, a native American and so forth but rather that of ‘jocks’ and ‘nerds,’ as well as boys 
and girls, which more closely relates to the teen issues that are also developed, somewhat 
clumsily, in the film. Furthermore, like the films discussed above, the main action and plot 
elements are set up rapidly, within the first twenty minutes, allowing the majority of the film to 
take the form of short episodes of pure combat, interspersed with periods of rest. As Basinger 
notes, this is one of the key conventions of the war film genre: ‘As they go forward, the action 
unfolds. A series of episodes occur which alternate in uneven patterns the contrasting forces of 
night and day, action and repose, safety and danger, combat and noncombat, comedy and 
tragedy, dialogue and action.’227  
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Clearly, Red Dawn is situating itself within the tradition of the war film. This is further 
supported by a direct reference to The Longest Day (1962), an epic war film depicting the D-
Day landings. One of the code phrases that the Wolverines pick up on the radio is ‘John has a 
long moustache,’ the same code used in The Longest Day to signal the French resistance that 
D-Day was imminent. Furthermore the leadership of the group is given to Jed (Patrick Swayze) 
under dire circumstances, itself a convention of the combat genre, but what is interesting about 
this is that when the group have retreated to the hills some of them attempt to challenge Jed’s 
leadership by holding a vote on whether they should stay outside the town or return:  
 
ROBERT: As Calumet student body president, I forward the motion that we give ourselves 
up. 
DANNY:  I second that motion… 
JED: Sit down Danny, you’re not going anywhere, it’s too dangerous to go in to 
town.  
ROBERT: I say we vote on it.  
JED:  No.228 
 
Such intra-group conflict is itself part of the genre conventions as established by Basinger. We 
see it when command falls to Cpl Denno in Fixed Bayonets! Or to Pvt Cowboy in Full Metal 
Jacket above and indeed, in both instances, it is only resolved when violence is threatened or 
occurs. But the recourse to, and subsequent denial of, a democratic process is somewhat 
different. Much like the importance of the group over the individual as discussed with Bataan, 
this appears to be a form of pop culture securitisation: there is an existential danger to the group 
and therefore the normal laws and procedures of a democracy are suspended in favour of, in 
this case, a benign dictator in the person of Jed. Something that sets Red Dawn apart from other, 
more traditional, combat films is that the group are civilians, and mostly of high school age. 
However, they very quickly fashion themselves along military lines and, as the film progresses, 
their level of equipment, dress, and prowess become increasingly military – jeans are swapped 
for combat fatigues, tactics progress and communications are improved. This is an example of 
how the movie bridges the divide between previous combat films and the action genre. In 
Bataan and Fixed Bayonets! all the characters are in the military while the only non-military 
characters in Full Metal Jacket are a camera crew in military fatigues and Vietnamese sex 
workers and “half these whores are serving officers in the Viet Cong.”229 Nonetheless, the 
Wolverines do encounter military personnel, both Soviet/Cuban and American. An American 
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F-15 pilot is shot down near to them and quickly becomes assimilated in to the group. Rather 
than conflicting with the civilians/child-soldiers of the Wolverines, the Air Force officer Lt. 
Col. Andrew "Andy" Tanner (Powers Boothe) becomes almost like a surrogate father to them, 
helping them with tactics and training. Interestingly, this is an inversion of the normal 
convention of the genre. Instead of the officer being killed forcing a Sergeant to take command, 
an officer is literally parachuted in to become a joint-leader with Jed.  
 
What Red Dawn does within the history of the genre is to both reference and develop some of 
the key characteristics of both action and combat. For instance, although “home front” movies 
were common in World War Two, many combat films focused exclusively on the direct actions 
of the war and/or preparations and training for it. Furthermore, Red Dawn consciously places 
itself within a tradition of the combat film, but is also conscious that it is somewhat different. 
For example, when Tanner is found by the Wolverines, Toni (Jennifer Grey) asks him what the 
capital of Texas is, when Tanner answers Houston she says “wrong Commie, it’s Austin” to 
which he replies “you’ve seen too many movies.”230 Many World War Two combat films used 
the trope of asking pop culture or geography questions to suspected enemies and when the 
person knew who won the last World Series, for instance, they were accepted. Red Dawn 
therefore positions itself within the history of the combat genre, but does so through deliberate 
references to that lineage. What Red Dawn achieves more than anything within the history of 
the genre though, is begin to shift the focus of war films from one that is ‘totally set in the 
combat situation’ to one that is more aligned with our current conceptions of what an action 
movie is.231  
 
By largely removing the (US) military presence from the film, while still adhering to many of 
the conventions of the genre, it becomes easier for filmmakers to exploit these narratives, 
tropes, imagery, and language in settings other than an actual historical conflict. Red Dawn, 
through its narrative similarities to other teen movies of the 1980s, combines the combat visuals 
of a World War Two film with the love-interest, coming of age, and unlikely hero narratives of 
contemporaneous action cinema. While Red Dawn may draw cues from previous combat 
movies, it engages in exaggeration and visual hyperbole more closely affiliated to a blockbuster 
action movie. For instance, the scene with Soviet helicopter gunships attacking the Wolverines 
on horseback; the attack on the “re-education centre” where they destroy most of an airbase; 
ambushes of armoured columns; and the climactic battle where Jed and Matt Eckert (Patrick 
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Swayze and Charlie Sheen) wreak destruction on the forces occupying Calumet. The melding 
of combat film tropes, conventions, and visuals with the exaggeration and fantastical narratives 
of an action movie combine the two genres effectively. This link between combat and action is 
explored further below. If Red Dawn is a visual combat/narrative action movie then Black Hawk 
Down can be thought of as a visual action/narrative combat film. 
 
2.7 Black Hawk Down: Visual action, narrative combat 
At first glance, it would appear that Black Hawk Down is an entirely different sort of film to 
Red Dawn. Rather than being set in an entirely fictional and absurd conflict, it is rooted in 
reality. However, despite this, admittedly quite large, difference it shares a lot of characteristics 
with Red Dawn and demonstrates more fully the shift from war to action. Black Hawk Down 
is, on the surface, a pure war film: the setting is one of brutal urban combat; it combines both 
last stand and lost patrol elements; and the characters are marines, perhaps the most common 
branch of the armed forces to be depicted on film. Black Hawk Down, when taken as an entire 
unit however, challenges the traditional conception of the war genre. This challenge brings 
Black Hawk Down, despite its military and combat elements, closer than any other film 
discussed so far to a true action movie. It can be seen as the culmination of what Red Dawn, 
and other films such as the Rambo franchise, did when they began to blur the boundaries 
between war and action. As well as the obvious political sentiments that can be easily read into 
Black Hawk Down, this shift itself perhaps tells us something about both the post-Cold War 
landscape and the political situation after the imminent attacks of September 11th, 2001.232 
 
To take the form of the film, and its place within the genealogy of genre, before discussing its 
political implications it can be argued that Black Hawk Down is a film with one foot firmly in 
combat, and the other in action. As Arnold notes:  
 
The film begins firmly in the combat tradition, but as the mission descends into chaos, it cleverly 
deconstructs its own generic elements. For both the audience and the characters, the rules 
disappear. For instance, the iconography is unfamiliar; the enemy does not wear uniforms, but 
civilian clothes; women and children are combatants; the enemy is not a trained, organized force 
but a ruthless mob, etc.233 
 
The iconography that he refers to is part of the visual shift from action to combat, more fully 
developed in Captain America in the following section. Rather than having a well-defined and 
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clearly demarcated enemy as in all the previous film discussed here, even Red Dawn, the visual 
representation of the enemy does not fully conform to the convention of the revelation of an 
enemy presence. Rather, everyone is a potential enemy (“Bakara market is the Wild West. But 
be careful what you do shoot at. People live there”) although who is a civilian and who is a 
threat is left to the discretion of the Marines.234 That being said, the depiction of the enemy in 
Black Hawk Down does share some similarities with the Second World War and Korean films 
from earlier in the chapter. This is particularly the case when the second helicopter crashes and 
the wounded pilot is defending the site. We see hordes of Somalis rush at the Black Hawk and 
the pilot fends them off with a sub-machine gun. While the enemy does not wear uniforms and 
blends in with the civilian population, the depiction of them is as faceless as the Japanese charge 
in Bataan. However, Arnold’s point alludes to an interesting aspect of Black Hawk Down that 
is the major plot elements, characters, narrative structures and language all position it within 
the combat genre. However, the iconography and visuals of the film place it somewhere else.  
 
Rather than reading the meaning of the film and what it says about the 1993 intervention in 
Somalia or America’s role in the world, these elements and their impact on the genre will be 
the focus for this section. Doherty has also noticed these visual and iconographic differences 
between Black Hawk Down and traditional war film when he says that ‘the made-in-the-USA 
haute couture surely enlivens the dreary knock-offs designed by the locals.’235 While the 
traditional generic war film features the hardware of warfare and often demonstrates its 
operation, Ridley Scott makes moves to seemingly fetishize this apparatus to an extent not 
before seen. Rather than being purely the tools of a soldier, Scott elevates guns, ammunition, 
Humvees, and helicopters to the status of aesthetic icons. This is clearly demonstrated in a 
beautifully shot scene at the climactic point of the film. Such visual fetishization of military 
hardware is a convention that is much more closely related to action films than military ones. 
Therefore, Black Hawk Down can be read as a visual action film and a narrative war film. Such 
synthesis of the two genres is not particularly surprising given the clear connections of 
masculinity, technology, violence, sacrifice, and morality that are more fully explored in later 
chapters. 
 
Black Hawk Down is an intensely political film and can be read from many different 
perspectives. Doherty suggests that Black Hawk Down (and We Were Soldiers (2002)) is a film 
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that encourages an audience not to ask too many political questions:  
 
Being so locked and loaded onto the target of military brotherhood, neither picture brings into 
focus the Big Picture. Better not inquire too deeply into why American soldiers must be 
helicoptered into the killing fields of a sundrenched African desert or a Southeast Asian 
jungle…In the Somalia of Black Hawk Down and Vietnam of We Were Soldiers, American 
soldiers are creatures of Alfred Lord Tennyson, not Wilfred Owen: theirs not to reason why, theirs 
but to do and die.236 
 
Furthermore, following on from the shift seen in Red Dawn above from a conscript armed forces 
to a professional and voluntary one, the genre conventions that Black Hawk Down presents can 
also perhaps be read as depicting and participating in the changing nature of political violence. 
As wars become more technological and involve less and less boots on the ground, there is less 
need for the didactic “why we fight” or weapons instructions tropes that were common in World 
War Two and Korea. Supporting this, and despite their assertion that some people saw the film 
as ‘simply another form of Hollywood propaganda used to justify a new American imperialism 
and secure American interests and ambitions overseas’ Lisle and Pepper explore how the film 
‘animates, and is animated by, a variety of power formations that exceed the scope of the nation 
state and transform the conceptual and material terrain within which sovereignty now 
operates.’237 In addition to these readings, Black Hawk Down highlights several thematic 
elements of the end of wars assemblage that will be discussed in subsequent chapters. These 
include the exceptional nature of American political violence (”Behind a force of 20,000 U.S. 
Marines, food is delivered and order is restored.”238); technological superiority being predicated 
on the moral nature of the violence it inflicts and the character of the human who operates it; 
the use of cinematic technique to highlight particular temporalities; and the necessity of 
comradeship and sacrifice. Furthermore, while depicting the violence of Mogadishu in an often-
brutal fashion, Scott also uses colour to distance one from the background and highlight the 
combat itself. For instance, as the film opens we see the dead and dying filmed through a blue 
filter; when Sgt Shughart rings his wife (incidentally, the only female speaking role in the film, 
though it goes uncredited) before the mission, her home is vaguely coloured and washed out; a 
similar desaturated effect is used as a Somali walks past the convoy carrying a dead child in 
slow motion; meanwhile, scenes in Mogadishu are vibrant to the point of being over-saturated. 
The effect of this might be to draw our attention to particular aspects of the film, such as the 
human cost for Americans and Somalis, while visually highlighting the combat scenes and 
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increasing their importance. While the visual focus is given to combat, the techniques used to 
do this are not conventional within the combat genre. More usually, combat is left to speak for 
itself rather than being specifically highlighted through cinematic techniques. Another 
important aspect of the narrative arc and how it differs to previous combat films is the leadership 
roles that are discussed are not as ambiguous or challenging as those in Fixed Bayonets! or Red 
Dawn. 
 
Our introduction to one of the main characters, Sergeant Eversmann (Josh Hartnett), is that he 
‘likes the skinnies [the derogatory terms that the marines have from Somalis]’ and that he is an 
‘idealist.’ When challenged about whether or not he was trained to fight, Eversmann replies 
that he thinks he ‘was trained to make a difference.’ Eversmann can be read as the 
personification of the liberal interventionist programme that caused the mission in Somalia to 
take place. Even his name, although historically accurate, suggests that his views are common 
sense and shared by all. This notion that the military is there to ‘make a difference’ is echoed 
when one of the convoys is ordered to go back in to the city and a Private refuses to go back 
out. His Sergeant tells him that ‘everyone feels the same way you do. It’s what you do right 
now that makes a difference. It’s your call.’239 This, naturally, convinces the Private to go back 
in to the city with the convoy. In addition to being sure of the morality of the mission, 
Eversmann is sure about the command that is thrust upon him after his Lieutenant has an 
epileptic seizure and is removed from command: 
 
SIZEMORE:  I’m putting you in charge of his chalk, you got a problem with that?
 EVERSMANN: No, sir. 
SIZEMORE: It’s a big responsibility. Your men are gonna look to you to make the 
right decisions. Their lives depend on it.  
 EVERSMANN: … 
SIZEMORE:  Alright. 
EVERSMANN: Rangers lead the way sir. 
 
Given how characters have handled the responsibility of leadership in Fixed Bayonets! and Red 
Dawn, Sgt Eversmann is surprisingly calm and confident in his abilities to make the right 
decisions. Just as Eversmann appears to function as a personification of the morality of the 
mission, he also functions as an avatar for American confidence in its leadership, and a sense 
of American exceptionalism after the end of the Cold War, almost like an inverted-Denno. This 
is again a gradual evolution in genre conventions and one that Susan Jeffords links to the failure 
of the ‘hard-bodied’ Rambo-esque action hero of the Reagan era to live up to the American 
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hype around hyper-masculinised warfare.240 Instead of the ‘go it alone’ hero of Rambo or the 
Terminator, Sgt. Eversmann is more human and a character that one could conceivably relate 
to, despite the decline in military participation among an audience. In terms of narrative, and 
despite the evolution of the role of leadership since World War Two, Black Hawk Down is 
firmly rooted in the gradual evolution of the conventions of the combat movie. 
 
Clearly, Black Hawk Down straddles the combat and action genres. The over-saturated, 
highlighted visual aesthetics of military hardware; the challenges posed by non-conventional 
enemies; and the unquestioned way that the hero accepts his leadership all point towards both 
the combat and action genre. Despite this, Black Hawk Down is still a film firmly rooted in the 
war genre: it depicts a real life event, its plot follows the last stand and lost patrol formats, it 
features marines and thanks the military for their cooperation. Given that this move from war 
to action has been developing from at least the 1980s through Red Dawn, Rambo: First Blood, 
and Black Hawk Down with each step taking the genre further from war and closer to action, it 
seems logical that the next step is a film that is firmly rooted in the action genre, but with 
references to the war films that preceded it. Thus, the focus shifts from a war film with 
tendencies towards action to an action film with tendencies towards war. 
 
2.8 Captain America: The First Avenger: Action-combat 
Carter and Dodds state that while ‘there has been no shortage of “Hollywood product” that 
takes either the events of 9/11 or the subsequent war on terror as its starting point’ these films 
proved to be commercial and/or critical flops.241 This has also been echoed by Simon Philpott 
who suggests that this is to do with the reluctance of British and American audiences to bear 
witness to the war.242 Similarly, Susan Carruthers partly attributes the paucity of War on Terror 
themed cinema to the failure of the Iraq War to ‘puncture the surface of everyday life in the 
USA.’243 This points towards a definite shift away from films that portray actual combat that is 
representative of specific and ongoing wars and toward films that still depict combat and 
conflict, but within a setting that is more removed from reality. While audiences for films about 
the War on Terror declined, the appetite of moviegoers for violence, blood, and death was not 
going to be sated by buddy movies or romantic comedies. As such, films that dealt with conflict 
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and war were still popular, but the important difference between these films and war films was 
that the conflicts and wars portrayed were not based on possible reality. Superhero franchises 
like The Avengers, Batman, and Superman have been critical and commercial hits. The 
Transformers series has boomed. Die Hard and Mission: Impossible have been ‘re-booted’ to 
tap into the desire to see bloodshed without the associated aggravation that war films might 
entail. In the end, ‘violence sells and attracts audiences.’244 But the violence depicted in these 
action movies is somewhat more distant, slightly cleaner, more sanitised than realist depictions 
of the combat fronts of World War Two, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, the Cold War, or the War 
on Terror. As such, audiences can watch these, often grisly, films with a sense that the events 
portrayed will never happen as they are too fantastical, too incongruent, or (sometimes) just 
plain silly. Dodds has previously looked at In the Valley of Elah, Lions for Lambs, Rendition, 
and The Kingdom, all from 2007 and although these films are ‘explicit in their consideration of 
the war on terror as opposed to being allegorical’ they are nonetheless not the heirs to the 
combat films that Basinger has outlined, a point that Dodds acknowledges.245 Rather these films 
are either personal quest (In the Valley of Elah), political intrigue (Lions for Lambs and 
Rendition) or action-thriller (The Kingdom). Therefore the question of what the establishment, 
evolution, subversion, and appropriation of the genre conventions discussed above have led to 
remains open.  
 
For me, it appears clear that the action genre has proved to be the heir apparent to the genre 
heritage of the combat movie. Such a cinematic shift from specific ‘war’ to general ‘action’ 
both mirrors and affects political space. This will be a view that is much more fully explored in 
later chapters, however it is perhaps useful to presage such a discussion by bringing up a brief 
point on contemporary political terminology that reflects the shift from war to action. While the 
War on Terror was declared as such, it was also qualified as not ‘like the war against Iraq a 
decade ago…[or] like the air war above Kosovo.’246 More direct was the start of the Iraq War, 
originally described merely as ‘military operations to disarm Iraq.’247 Further, the NATO 
airstrikes on Libya in 2011 were officially described as a ‘military 
action/effort/mission/involvement/operation/activity’ intentionally to avoid the term war, 
combat, or conflict.248 To paraphrase Basinger’s quote at the start of this chapter: did the change 
                                                          
244 Etienne Augé, ‘Hollywood Movies: Terrorism 101’, Cercles 5 (2002): 149. 
245 Dodds, ‘Hollywood and the Popular Geopolitics of the War on Terror’, 1626–27. 
246 George W. Bush, ‘President Bush Addresses the Nation’, The Washington Post, 20 November 2001, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html. 
247 George W. Bush, ‘President Bush Addresses the Nation’, The White House, 19 March 2003, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html. 
248 ‘United States Activities in Libya’, 15 June 2011, 
87 
 
from war to action come about because Presidents are adept politicians, or did it come from 
going to the movies? In order to explain why the action film is the heir to the combat genre, I 
will turn to a somewhat different film than the ones discussed earlier: Captain America: The 
First Avenger. Unlike most action films that function either as solely allegorical sites for the 
discussion of current or historical conflicts, attempt to ignore those conflicts, or are set against 
the backdrop of, for example, the War on Terror, Captain America begins in the historical 
reality of World War Two (although it does quickly move on and enter a fantasy realm) where 
Captain America (Chris Evans) begins his career as a poster boy for war bonds. These 
sequences even contain the lyrics ‘Who’ll hang a noose on the goose stepping goons from 
Berlin?’ and Captain America socking Hitler in the jaw.249 As such, Captain America is more 
firmly situated within the established canon of the war film that traces its own roots back to 
World War Two. To be sure, if we remove the supernatural from the film, it could almost play 
as a standard combat film that would be as familiar to audiences of the 1940s as the audiences 
of today. This is because Captain America contains a number of the genre conventions that 
made the combat film what it was: the true enemy (Hydra) is gradually revealed; military 
iconography specific to both World War Two and the Marvel universe; a climactic battle; a 
scrawny guy who has a leadership role thrust upon him; a noble sacrifice in a plane; and a 
diverse group of men, led by a (super)hero, who set out on an important military mission. In 
this group we have a strongman, a British officer (played in the David Niven style, complete 
with moustache), a Japanese-American, a French commando, and an African-American. 
Captain America himself is ‘just a kid from Brooklyn’, a place that, according to Basinger, is 
nearly a state unto itself in the canon of the combat film.250  
 
Clearly, Captain America is appropriating elements, tropes, and conventions from the long 
history of the war film, but equally clearly, it cannot be considered a war film at all because the 
hero has superpowers, the main villain has a red skull, the objective is to control an object from 
Norse mythology, and the technology belongs more in a science fiction film than anywhere 
else. Much more so than Red Dawn, Captain America is an action movie that draws on the 
cultural and genre heritage of the combat film while being something entirely different. In terms 
of genre conventions there is little internal group conflict and Captain America wishes for an 
expanded leadership role beyond being a poster boy. Furthermore, the combat depicted is 
unrealistic in both terms of technology used and how it is portrayed on screen. Captain America 
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has the exaggerated combat sequences of Red Dawn, but shot in a similar way to Black Hawk 
Down. The use of saturated and warm colours for instance, the visual focus given over to 
Captain America’s physical transformation; montage sequences which highlight through focus 
and slow motion the iconic shield. The focus on the film is less on the conflict between Hydra 
and the Americans and much more on the person of Captain America (albeit a personification 
of America). Furthermore in the action vein, Captain America has superhuman powers, the 
weapons of Hydra shoot blue energy blasts, their technology is far in advance of the World War 
Two era and so forth. But the film still retains a certain affinity to the combat genre that precedes 
it with the scenes featuring American troops being (broadly) historically accurate in terms of 
uniform, training, and materiel and, again, the setting is very clearly the 1940s. Additionally, 
the climactic battle is set aboard Hydra’s long range bomber plane and features a fight between 
Captain America and Hydra troops on kamikaze bombs with cities marked on them in a font 
and style of the era. Thus, Captain America more completely appropriates visual and narrative 
elements of the combat film in service of a modern, big budget, blockbuster action movie. 
Nonetheless, compared to what might be thought of as more ‘conventional’ war films that deal 
with the War on Terror such as Rendition (2007) or The Hurt Locker (2008), Captain America 
adheres to the tried and tested formula of the war film much more closely. Captain America is 
therefore a much more complicated film in terms of both its genre heritage and the political 
questions that can be posed from a close reading of it. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
Looking at the genesis, evolution, and adaptation of a genre can clearly enrich our experiences 
and analytical positions on modern cultural artefacts and the interactions that occur between 
them and politics. In a way, analysing films is much like enjoying them: it is not necessary to 
know about The Lost Patrol in order to interrogate Full Metal Jacket about its subversive 
message; or to be familiar with Bataan to analyse Captain America. But, through this 
knowledge of, and engagement with, cinematic history we are able to question in much more 
detail how, why and to what end directors, screenwriters, editors, and actors use genre 
conventions and what political questions can be posed, and possibly even answered. 
Furthermore, if we are aware of the historical conflicts that influenced current foreign policy 
decisions, why not also, as scholars of culture and politics, be aware of the historical films that 
influenced contemporary cinema? If we are able to progress in the field of Popular Culture and 
World Politics armed with an understanding of the histories, conventions, styles, and formulae 
of both sides of the name, then we can advance our understanding of cultural artefacts, political 
realities and the conditions of political possibility they produce.  
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This has been an admittedly brief gloss on the history, evolution, and current state of one 
cinematic genre, and much more work can be done to elicit the history of politico-cultural 
interaction as it relates to wars. Such a work would take at least an entire doctoral thesis to 
accomplish: one would need to look in more depth at economic factors, changes in personal 
style of major filmmakers and studios, shifting public attitudes to war and cinema, advancing 
technology, distribution networks and a host of other material and discursive factors over a 
substantial period of history. But it does demonstrate that an understanding of the history of 
what we study solidly grounds the arguments that we make temporally, it can provide a useful 
and powerful analytical insight into both popular culture and world politics, and it can help us 
establish some of the processes that contributed to contemporary interaction between these 
fields. However, it seems that this chapter has created more questions than it sought to answer: 
If Eisenhower was influenced by the movies to talk to his men, what effect does the evolution 
and present state of this key cinematic genre have on today’s politicians? Does the shift from 
war to action make it easier to justify military operations overseas and at home? How do 
changing political behaviours influence shifting genre conventions, or more interestingly, how 
does a changing genre influence a politics constantly in flux? Most importantly for the purposes 
of the remainder of this thesis is the question of how politics and culture interact in order to 
allow for the emergence of conditions of success from the end of wars assemblage? This chapter 
allows us to ground all these arguments within a historical framework and the argument 
presented here about the history of the genre will influence and inform my analysis of 
contemporary cinema that follows. 
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Chapter Three: Shock and Awe 
 
“With great power comes great responsibility” 
 Spider-Man (2002) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Building on the exploration of the history of the war film and how the genre has evolved from 
direct representations of historical conflict to a more action-oriented form of contemporary 
Hollywood blockbusters, it is necessary to now shift our attention towards the contemporary 
cultural and political space. The previous chapter made clear that an understanding of the 
cultural and political antecedents to contemporary politico-cultural interaction is both important 
and useful and will inform the rest of this thesis as well as situating it historically. However, in 
order to understand how the end of wars assemblage functions during the War on Terror, what 
forces shape it, and what emergent properties arise from these forces, it is necessary to look at 
more contemporary cinema. This chapter will analyse films and political speech from 2000 
until around the time of the Invasion of Iraq to explore how conditions of success emerged, 
were circulated, and legitimised in the early stages of the War on Terror. The two conditions of 
success identified from this time period and discussed herein are American exceptionalism and 
the use of technology. As outlined in the methodology section of chapter one, these conditions 
of success do not just appear during this time but have a much longer history in popular culture, 
cinema, politics, presidential rhetoric, and American warfare. While American exceptionalism 
is perhaps particularly resonant in the aftermath of 9/11 it is by no means confined to the specific 
period under discussion in this chapter but can be seen in previous and subsequent periods – in 
the battle at the end of War of the Worlds, the restitution of Hancock as a superhero, or the 
determination of Colter Stevens in Source Code. Similarly, the use of technology as a moral 
amplifier of violence has long roots in warfare including the Gulf War and can be seen 
cinematically in movies such as Edge of Tomorrow.251 
 
American exceptionalism, the grand monomyth of American identity and destiny, has a long 
history at least as far back as the seventeenth century. It has been deployed as a condition of 
success in the Westward expansion of the US, World War One and Two, the Cold War era, 
interventionism in the 1990s and throughout the War on Terror. In the period under discussion 
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here it emerges as a stabilising condition from the end of war assemblage that will influence 
the shape and properties of that assemblage throughout the conflict. The movies discussed in 
this chapter induce affective encounters in audiences that work to embed the idea that victory 
in armed conflict is ensured provided that violence is enacted in the name of values, beliefs, 
and morality. In other words, if ideas of American exceptionalism manifest themselves 
politically and culturally through violence, then ultimate success is guaranteed. Similarly, ideas 
of technological supremacy are articulated not in the context of overwhelming military might 
and force, but rather as an extension of these values, beliefs, and morals. Much like the atomic 
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not only awesome displays of power but were 
also seen as tools to achieve the moral ends of the US, technology in these movies is the tool 
that acts as an amplifier or force multiplier for these values to be defended and advanced 
successfully.252 Therefore, in this chapter I will argue that American exceptionalism and the 
moral use of advanced military technology emerge as vital conditions for success in the War 
on Terror from its early stages, through the Invasion of Iraq, and continue to be important as 
the War on Terror progresses. These conditions are not specific or unique to the time period 
under discussion here but have a history and future that is shaped by and in turn shapes the end 
of wars assemblage. This articulation takes place simultaneously in political and cultural 
artefacts and the affinities and intense connections that these share work to co-constitute these 
conditions through the end of wars assemblage to forge a consensus on what is deemed 
necessary to ultimately succeed in the War on Terror. 
 
The period from 2000 to 2003 was an important time for the development of contemporary 
cinema and a turbulent time in international politics. Cinematically, the early 2000s saw the rise 
of the superhero film starting from the (critically and commercially) successful film X-Men 
(2000) which has spawned entire cinematic universes based on the comics from the two major 
comic book publishers, Marvel and DC. These four years also saw the ongoing decline of the 
traditional war movie, as discussed in the previous chapter, with this genre being increasingly 
replaced by films that take more from action, such as Black Hawk Down (2001), than from the 
combat genre. Furthermore, there is a distinction between war movies made after the event, 
such as most Vietnam films, and those made while the conflicts were ongoing such as, for 
instance, The Hurt Locker (2008) or Zero Dark Thirty (2012). It may be the case that there 
needs to be a critical distance between conflict and cinema for successful war movies to be 
made about it. Political developments were obviously much more dramatic than those in the 
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cinematic space. The election of George W. Bush, the events of September 11th 2001, and the 
beginning of the War on Terror reshaped the American and international political landscape.253 
As such, this chapter will ascertain how the end of wars assemblage stabilised during this period 
and what conditions of success emerged from intense politico-cultural interaction. I will 
conduct a detailed analysis of some of the most popular and successful action films from 2000 
to 2003: X-Men (2000), Training Day (2001), Spider-Man (2002), and Tears of the Sun 
(2003).254 These four films will allow me to explore how American exceptionalism and 
technological morality were stabilised as emergent properties during these years. 
 
This chapter proceeds in three parts. Firstly, I introduce the four films being discussed and 
engage in a preliminary discussion of how they relate to one another, how they explore ideas 
of American exceptionalism and technology. Following this, I consider American 
exceptionalism through a brief literature review and draw out two strands that are particularly 
present in political and cultural artefacts of the time: a distrust for authority and governmental 
figures in particular and a strong sense of individualism. Relating these two strands of American 
exceptionalism to the films and politics of the early War on Terror, I argue that this valorises 
the human (in terms of agents of American violence) element of contemporary conflict. Thirdly, 
I argue that understandings of the role of technology in modern conflict tend not to take into 
account how technologised warfare is articulated in cinema and politics. Rather than being 
depicted as more important than the human, or taking the human element of conflict out of the 
equation, I show that cinematic depictions of technology work to again valorise the human, 
individual element of conflict and act as a moral amplifier for that political violence. In other 
words, when technology is deployed in the pursuit of moral (American) ends, it is successful 
while when it is used for immoral (non-American) ends it fails. Cinematic understandings of 
American exceptionalism and the role of technology, coupled with concurrent political 
articulations of values and morals are mutually reinforcing. The political and cultural saturation 
of such narratives, tropes, and affects allows for these conditions of success to emerge through 
the affective precognition of audiences that encounter them. Thus, they emerge as conditions 
of success from the end of wars assemblage and can be utilised as political tools to demonstrate 
that the war is progressing and will ultimately succeed.  
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3.2 The Films 
X-Men was a major cinematic hit for Marvel comics. With an estimated gross of over $157 
million, and an average score of 64/100 on metacritic.com, we can safely say that this was a 
critically and commercially successful film. X-Men was also the first of many hits for the 
cinema arm of Marvel comics. While Howard the Duck (1986) and Blade (1998) predate X-
Men, neither was particularly well received commercially or critically (although Blade has gone 
on to be something of a cult classic). After X-Men we can see an entire universe constructed 
around characters from the Marvel comic books. A total of forty-eight Marvel films have been 
released since 2000 with at least seven in development making it one of the most successful 
film franchises of all time.255 I argue that X-Men functions within the end of wars assemblage 
to allow conditions of success to emerge through the affective and discursive potentials it 
inculcates. Specifically, its focus on the troubles and discrimination facing mutants almost 
exclusively in the US, as well as how their superpowers can be used for good, allows audiences 
to encounter this as a cultural articulation of American exceptionalism and the use of power for 
good in the world. Furthermore, the focus on the individuals that comprise the X-Men and the 
Brotherhood of Mutants serves to strengthen the pre-eminent myth of American exceptionalism 
that emerges from the assemblage as an important condition of success in the War on Terror. 
Furthermore, the debates around the role and utility of technology within X-Men that focus on 
technologies as a tool that amplify inherent values and talents rather than as a panacea will be 
elaborated on. 
 
September 11th had a profound effect on Hollywood in a number of ways. Films that were 
already in production and slated for release after 9/11 were altered to remove images of the 
World Trade Centre. As Stephen Prince argues, ‘imagery of the World Trade Center became 
taboo’ as studios feared that such pictures would wrench audiences out of the imaginary story 
of the movie.256 For example, the original trailer for Spider-Man had to be axed because it 
prominently featured the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre.257 The release of other films 
such as Behind Enemy Lines, were rushed forward in order ‘to take advantage of a surge of 
American nationalism in wake of the 11 September (‘9/11’) attacks and the US-led retaliatory 
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attack against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.’258 A further effect was that, shortly after 9/11, 
the White House attempted to influence the way that terrorism, America, and American foreign 
policy were portrayed on screen in ways that would discredit the former and promote the latter. 
Despite the claim that ‘the industry viewed 9/11 as a kind of box office poison,’ the attempt by 
the White House to influence the medium is a stark reminder that many politicians clearly see 
the political value, importance, and influence of popular culture.259 For instance, Karl Rove 
attempted to enlist Hollywood to help construct a narrative for the War on Terror in the so-
called Beverley Hills Summit in November 2001.260 
 
Training Day is a very different film to X-Men. Although it contains scenes of violence and 
action it is difficult to place it firmly in the action genre as it also draws on the tradition of the 
cop film. However, links can be made between Training Day and Francis Ford Coppola’s 
Apocalypse Now (1979).261 Both represent a descent into a jungle (urban jungle in the case of 
Training Day) and both are concerned with morality, authority, and conflict. As such, Training 
Day contains elements that can be analysed within the action genre and how this style of movies 
works within the assemblage. The unilateral use of force in this film is dealt with in an 
interesting way. When used for immoral purposes it is doomed to failure but when it is used for 
moral aims it is successful. For instance, when Harris uses his position as a detective to extort 
money, murder people, and exploit those less fortunate he is ultimately defeated. But when 
Hoyt faces off against Harris at the climax of the movie, he is successful and Harris is killed. 
Both men use unilateral force, Hoyt does not report to Harris to internal affairs for instance, yet 
the two men have radically different outcomes. This again shows how cinematic depictions of 
technology focus on their role as moral amplifiers. The relationship between morality and 
conceptions of American exceptionalism is also explored. Essentially however, the film deals 
with the use and abuse of institutional power, concepts of masculinity, and a conflict between 
idealism and realism. The main protagonists are Hoyt (Ethan Hawke), an idealistic rookie who 
says that he wants to be a narcotics officer because he wants to ‘serve my community by ridding 
it of dangerous drugs,’ and Harris (Denzel Washington), a highly corrupt veteran police officer 
who feels he can ‘do what the fuck we want to do.’262 The interactions between Harris and Hoyt 
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speak to two main strands of American exceptionalism to be discussed below: one being a 
distrust of figures of authority and the political classes and the other being the triumph of 
individualism. 
 
Spider-Man brings us back to the Marvel universe, and given the setting (New York), and the 
time (2002), it is well situated to shape the end of wars assemblage. Spider-Man continues the 
popular and successful series of Marvel comic-book adaptions, with Spider-Man in its own 
right being the 9th most commercially successful film franchise of all time.263 The plot is a 
familiar one, as well as being about an extraordinary superhero, it is also, ‘like any story worth 
telling…all about a girl.’264 Much like Red Dawn, discussed in chapter two, despite the 
familiarity of the plot – part superhero, part teenage drama – Spider-Man allows for two 
important and interesting political connections: one is the people, location, and time-period of 
New York post-9/11 where we can see ideas of populism and individualism interacting, as well 
as providing a congruence between the cultural space of film and the political space of support 
for troops. The other important aspect is the role, uses, and dangers of technology in a conflict 
setting which mirrors what will be discussed in relation to X-Men which is that technology can 
be seen as enhancing one’s own moral code. Victory is not gained through technological 
superiority alone, but by using technology for moral purposes. 
 
Tears of the Sun was not as critically or commercially well received as the other three films 
under discussion here. It has received a score of 48/100 from film critics on metacritic.com, 
while users have rated it as 6.6/10.265 Despite this, Tears of the Sun deploys tropes from the 
early war films that were discussed in the previous chapter as well as elements of the modern 
action movie again signalling the confluence of the two. Bruce Willis in the lead role also 
confirms its standing as a solid action movie. Indeed, Roger Ebert has described it as ‘a film 
constructed out of rain, cinematography and the face of Bruce Willis.’266 Much like Training 
Day, also directed by Antoine Fuqua, Tears of the Sun has a similar feel to Apocalypse Now 
(or, more accurately perhaps, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness) and engages in comparable 
racialized discourses, this time with Nigerian refugees. As well as employing the tension of war 
films and the spectacular explosions of action movies, Tears of the Sun speaks to American 
exceptionalism. A Navy SEAL unit tasked with extracting ‘critical personalities’ from Nigeria 
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during a civil war is ordered to leave behind ‘native personnel’ but Lieutenant A.K. Waters 
(Bruce Willis), after a bout of conscience, decides to help try to save them instead. The 
encounter induced by the film becomes apparent towards the end in an extended conversation 
between the Lieutenant on the ground and the Captain of the aircraft carrier as well as in the 
climactic battle scene.267 The potential of this sequence to induce an encounter, in part because 
of the dialogue that precedes it and in part because of the overwhelming nature of the visuals, 
sounds, and movement on the screen is quite powerful and can be seen as helping to create 
emergent properties of the assemblage. When read in the context of technology and American 
exceptionalism, and alongside political rhetoric from the same time period, an effect of this 
intensity is to link these tropes with victory in the mind of an audience. The use of explosions, 
guns, air strikes, and other such tropes of the action genre work to assert American military 
dominance, exceptionalism, and altruism and clearly connect them with victory. Protevi argues 
that there should be an emphasis in this type of research on ‘unconscious affective evaluations 
that precede and color representations and the calculations performed thereupon.’268 In the 
climactic battle sequence of Tears of the Sun audiences witness US military might deployed in 
the service of exceptional and moral ends. The sound and the fury of this sequence with the 
explosions, loud noises, quick edits, and camera movements work to pre-cognitively prime 
audiences to relate such visualities to exceptionalism and victory. Thus, when exceptionalism 
is politically deployed in the context of the War on Terror, and especially when it is 
accompanied by visuals of air strikes and special forces and so on, audiences can automatically 
relate the affects they experienced in the cinema to the affects they experienced watching the 
news. As such, we can talk of American exceptionalism and technology emerging as conditions 
of success from the complex interactions between audiences, politics, and cinema. In many 
ways, Tears of the Sun feels like Black Hawk Down with a happy ending. The importance of 
the individual, as well as support for troops, distrust for people in positions of power, and the 
necessity of equality of opportunity are all strong themes in this film and all are related closely 
to the various manifestations of American exceptionalism. What will be discussed most in 
relation to Tears of the Sun, however, is the how advanced technology is deployed. Once again 
we see how it is cinematically deployed as a moral amplifier. The Navy SEALs use technology 
to save refugees while their pursuers use it for killing. Tears of the Sun also provides a graphic 
account of how technology can amplify immoral values and behaviours. 
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3.3 American Exceptionalism 
Looking at how American exceptionalism emerged during these years as a condition of success 
highlights the importance of understanding politico-cultural interaction. Conceptualising this 
interaction as the end of wars assemblage helps us understand how American exceptionalism 
became embedded in political rhetoric and action during the War on Terror. Asserting that the 
US has a special destiny and place among the nations in cultural artefacts, as will be discussed 
in this section, supports political discourses that function in a similar way. The resonance 
between cinematic and political discussions of American exceptionalism work to generate 
emergent properties from the assemblage that can then be deployed as conditions of success in 
the War on Terror. Through its depiction of American political power and violence in ways that 
are positive and allow for an affective encounter between audience and cinema, contemporary 
Hollywood action cinema works to co-constitute these discourses, possibilities, and practices. 
 
American exceptionalism is somewhat of an amorphous and contested concept. Like many 
concepts that deal with nationhood, it means many things to many people and can come in many 
guises: economic, military, political, and religious (or combinations thereof) depending on a 
particular individual’s perspective. Nonetheless, what is common to these differing conceptions 
of what makes America ‘exceptional’ is that it is a shining example to the world of how to 
function in various aspects of nationhood. Robert Patman describes it as ‘an informal ideology 
that endows Americans with a pervasive faith in the uniqueness, immutability and superiority 
of the country’s founding liberal principles, and also with the conviction that the USA has a 
special destiny among nations.’269 Seymour Martin Lipset identifies five key words that are the 
key to American exceptionalism: ‘liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-
faire.’270 It has also been thought of as the neo-conservative support of rampant global 
liberalism, though whether this is something that is uniquely American is a somewhat 
unresolved issue.271 While there are many facets to American exceptionalism, in the films 
discussed here two strands are highlighted more than others: a distrust of the government and 
people in positions of power and the importance of the individual. 
 
The distrust of, and scepticism towards, government and individuals with power is a strong 
feature of American political life. Lipset argues that that this derives from the American 
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Revolution and ‘has been institutionalized in the unique division of powers that distinguishes 
the United States from parliamentary regimes.’272 Not only is distrust part of a popular American 
psyche, but is constitutionally provided for by the series of checks and balances that make up 
the separation of government powers. Indeed, the Constitution itself is seen as ‘an exceptional 
document’ in its own right.273 Lipset goes on to argue that while ‘Americans are the most 
antistatist (Whig) population among the democratic nations,’ they ‘now favour a lot more 
government than [Thomas Jefferson] did.’274 However, the current strand of American distrust 
of government is still strong, as evidenced by the highly successful cultural artefacts discussed 
in this chapter which play to this aspect of American exceptionalism. 
 
While there may be more support for a larger government than there was in the 18th century, 
the American citizenry ‘is increasingly distrustful of its political leaders and institutions.’275 
Lipset argues that confidence in the institutions of US government has been in steady decline 
since the 1960s, driven then by anti-Vietnam sentiment, the civil rights movements, and other 
social problems. The US not living up to its democratic and egalitarian principles are seen as 
the root causes of discontent.276 It can also be argued that such cynicism towards figures of 
authority is presaged in combat films with Korean War movies such as Fixed Bayonets! Such 
films present ‘stories which frequently question military leadership and which often represent 
weak, frightened, or unreliable people in command of troops.’277 A separate but related factor 
that Lipset claims increased distrust in, and scepticism towards, governmental institutions is the 
rise of television coverage of scandals and wars, which dates again from Vietnam: ‘The impact 
of the prolonged war on American opinion was to a considerable extent a function of pictorial 
reportage.’278 Taking this further, Paul Virilio has argued that television, rather than being just 
a means of pictorial reportage, is in and of itself, a weapon: 
 
How can we fail to recognize, after a month of standoff, that the true intervention force in the 
Gulf is television? And more precisely, CNN, the Atlanta network. Saddam Hussein, and 
George Bush, certainly, but also Ted Turner, the owner of Cable News Network. Henceforth, 
diplomacy is effective only through interposed images.279 
 
Just as CNN was an intervention force in the Gulf War, cinema is also part of the force of 
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intervention and occupation in the War on Terror through its effects within the end of wars 
assemblage, though perhaps more subtly than the nose mounted television cameras of the 
“smart bombs” and “surgical strikes” of the Gulf. In their discussion of ‘in/visible war,’ Simons 
and Lucaites argue that ‘the US has become assimilated to a war culture that is no longer 
recognisable as such,’ as imagery of actual war has been displaced from the public’s 
consciousness through film, video games, and television.280 Cinema then, along with other 
cultural media, becomes the dominant paradigm through which audiences experience war. 
Distrust of governmental institutions is clearly a strong, if somewhat paradoxical, element of 
American exceptionalism. It is driven by the constitutional underpinning of those very 
institutions as well as an increase in visual media as communication and co-productive of 
political realities. If the visual nature of warfare, either as reportage, weaponry, or affect helps 
to contribute to a sense of American exceptionalism, then cinema, with its often visceral 
depictions of the failings of authority figures, is an excellent site to critically engage with its 
implications. 
 
Individualism is also constitutionally enshrined, and much more obviously than a distrust of 
authority and centralised government. The Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the 
constitution, ‘not only guaranteed important civil and human rights by law…a culture of rights 
prevailed…and the scope of those rights expanded steadily.’281 Individualism is deeply 
embedded in American culture and society where ‘the ultimate source of action, meaning, and 
responsibility is the individual.’282 This is exemplified by Hollywood cinema and the star culture 
where one actor plays a lead role and the majority of screen time is given over to their face and 
words. This is perhaps more influential in the action genre dominated as it is by male actors 
such as Schwarzenegger, Willis, Stallone, Statham, and van Damme who make the key 
decisions and responsibility ultimately lies on their shoulders. Obviously not all films follow 
this convention and many action and war films incorporate a group of people who are 
geographically, racially, and educationally distinct. This tension, explored as well in chapter 
two through Korean War films, between individual and community points towards the paradox 
in this strand of American exceptionalism where ‘the achievements of individualism are 
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dependent on community participation, and that community, in turn, can be enriched through 
individual expression.’283 Individualism as American exceptionalism therefore, should not be 
treated as a simple triumph of discrete and isolated characters, but rather how their own 
personalities and traits are presented and find their fullest potential in the context of a larger 
community. This strand of exceptionalism is also a common trope and motif in political 
discourse, with President Bush asserting in April 2003 that ‘This country believes that freedom 
is God’s gift to every individual on the face of the Earth.’284 The importance of the American 
soldier not just as a heroic individual, but as a person within and with the support of a broader 
community is also prominent, for instance when President Bush announces a website that the 
Department of Defense has set up to allow people to support the troops within their own 
community, saying that ‘In this time of testing, our troops can know: The American people are 
behind you.’285 The paradox of individualism and distrust of authority are important sites of 
political and cultural simultaneity, connection, and emergence. 
 
American exceptionalism, as stated above, can come in many guises and can be manifested 
visually as well as linguistically. Manifestations of such exceptionalism are spread throughout 
the cinematic landscape, especially in the films that were made after the events of September 
11th 2001, as discussed below. However, imagery and narratives of American exceptionalism 
in popular culture are not new. Godfrey Hodgson suggests that popular music from the 1920s, 
30s, and 40s as well as classic Hollywood cinema ‘endowed the nation and the world with its 
rich treasury of “standards,” many of them as explicitly patriotic as Irving Berlin’s beloved 
“God Bless America”,’ and ‘have as a constant, uplifting theme the “only in America” saga of 
immigrant success.’286 Popular culture, and film in particular, is a suitable site to analyse how 
American exceptionalism emerged as am early condition of success in the War on Terror. 
 
3.3.1 X-Men 
Jason Dittmer argues that superhero films experienced a boom after 9/11 because they 
‘articulate a particularly American geopolitical vision and sense of self, which is often 
shorthanded as American exceptionalism.’287 Although X-Men was released in July of 2000, 
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ideas of American exceptionalism are still prominent within this film and, as discussed above, 
ideas of American exceptionalism have a long history. Superheroes in general (and 
supervillains of course) gain their strength and power in various ways such as being an alien 
(Superman and Thor), money (Iron Man and Batman), a freak accident (Spider-man and the 
Hulk), or experiments (Captain America and Wolverine (his claws at least)). But the ‘mutants,’ 
superheroes in all but name, in X-Men gain their powers through naturally occurring processes. 
As Professor X (Patrick Stewart) says in the introduction to the film: 
 
Mutation: it is the key to our evolution. It has enabled us to evolve from a single celled organism 
to the dominant species on the planet. This process is slow, normally taking thousands and 
thousands of years. But every few hundred millennia, evolution leaps forward.288 
 
Although the opening scene takes place in Poland in 1944, a point to which I will return in a 
moment, the rest of the film takes place in the US with no reference to mutants in other 
countries.289 Therefore, it can be argued that the natural mutation that creates the X-Men is 
something that is, if not peculiar to America, then at least the US is where is finds its greatest 
expression. Similarly, American exceptionalism preaches that while democracy, liberty, and 
capitalism are present in the rest of the world, it is in the US where they achieve their highest 
potential. Professor X’s ‘School for Gifted Youngsters’ is presumably the only school for 
mutants in the world as well as being the base for the X-Men’s military machinery, such as the 
Blackbird (itself heavily modelled on the SR-71 Blackbird spy plane of the US Air Force) and 
is located in a fictional town in upstate New York. Although the opening narration that 
discussed leaps in evolution would refer to a world-wide anthropocentric phenomenon, the 
focus is clearly the US. Even when Rogue (Anna Paquin) runs away from home after 
discovering her mutation and has a chance encounter with Wolverine (Hugh Jackman) in 
‘Northern Alberta, Canada’ the X-Men intervene in order to return them to the base in the 
United States. Thus the central geopolitical and personal location for mutants and mutation is 
in the US.  
 
It can be argued that this is an unimportant point as many films follow this US-centric approach 
because of the dominance of Hollywood in international cinema and the importance of the 
domestic box office to profit margins: aliens contact the US (Close Encounters of the Third 
Kind (1977)), disaster strikes the Eastern Seaboard (The Day After Tomorrow (2004)), zombies 
                                                          
288 Bryan Singer, X-Men (Twentieth Century-Fox, 2000). 
289 I should mention that while Wolverine is Canadian, he appears to be the only non-American and also spends 
the majority of the film in the US. 
102 
 
roam across the mid-West (Dawn of the Dead (1978)), and so forth. However, to dismiss this 
would be to ignore a key component of Hollywood cinema which is precisely its very 
American-centric approach. Giving the US such a central role in story, imagery, and narrative 
creates a popular cultural worldview in which the US is the central actor and where important 
events happen, often with massive, unforeseen and sometimes catastrophic consequences in 
other parts of the world. It also reinforces American exceptionalism as a condition of success 
within the end of wars assemblage that is itself centred on America. This US-centrism in 
Hollywood cinema is a central way through which ideas of American exceptionalism are 
constructed and propagated. Even the opening scene, taking place in a concentration camp in 
Nazi-occupied Poland, helps to cement the centrality of the US to global affairs. Hodgson 
suggests that the Holocaust was an important event for conceptions of American exceptionalism 
from the 1960s onward: ‘the Holocaust became for many Americans, Gentiles as well as Jews, 
a powerful myth of redemption, in which the United States was cast as the redeemer.’290 The 
story of Magneto (Ian McKellan) becomes then what Hodgson identified as the ‘only in 
America’ plot of classic Hollywood cinema. 
 
X-Men also contains within it elements that strengthen the strand of American exceptionalism 
that deals with a distrust of authority figures as well as a celebration of individualism. For 
example, although Wolverine’s mutation allowed him to heal and regenerate, it was the military 
(admittedly the Canadian military) that implanted his ‘adamantium’ skeleton giving him his 
iconic claws. Furthermore, the most prominent politician in the film is Senator Robert Kelly 
(Bruce Davison) who is portrayed in an almost entirely negative light, and given a particularly 
gruesome death. These two elements in the movie might appear to function as a critique of 
American power and policy however, as discussed above, it is more appropriate to regard them 
as aspects of American exceptionalism. It is perhaps useful here to mention part of the 
discussion in chapter one reiterate that this thesis is not about the internal meaning of a text but 
rather about what encounters the movie can induce. These encounters are formed through the 
dialogue and imagery of the movie as well the effects that pivotal scenes produce. As Lundborg 
and Vaughan-Williams argue, ‘language and materiality are inextricably inseparable.’291 If we 
look at the scenes where Wolverine’s claws are implanted and Senator Kelly’s imprisonment 
and death for instance, we can see that they can work as moments of intensity within the film. 
In the case of Wolverine’s claws, these scenes are indistinct flashbacks with a limited colour 
palette but high saturation. The camera movements are jerky and uncertain while the people 
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performing the procedure are clad in ominous gas masks. The dominant sound is that of Logan 
crying in pain as he is submerged in a tank of liquid and there are shadowy figures who are seen 
discussing the operation. Clearly, this is designed to produce a particular affect in audiences 
that links the violation of individuality with figures of authority who are interfering with his 
body. It is notable that these have both been identified as important aspects of American 
exceptionalism.  
 
The scene with Senator Kelly after he acquires his mutant abilities are also deeply affective 
moments in the movie. In order to escape from the Brotherhood of Mutants’ camp, Kelly uses 
his abilities to squeeze through the metal bars of his cell.292 There is a distinct discomfort in 
watching a person’s head stretch in such a way and the director, Bryan Singer, capitalises on 
this with the use of a close-up as he is experimenting. The gruesome nature of Kelly’s mutations 
are also seen in the subsequent scene where he emerges on a beach. Finally, in the scene where 
Senator Kelly dies by dissolving into water we see Storm (Halle Berry) repulsed by the process 
and the actual death is vividly and macabrely portrayed. As with Wolverine’s flashbacks, these 
scenes are powerful moments in the movie and serve to highlight the loss of personhood that 
Kelly has underwent. While Wolverine’s was because of the military and Kelly’s because of 
Magneto, the disturbing nature of these sequences serves to reinforce individualism.  
 
The affective connection between loss of identity and grisly visuals thus allows this strand of 
American exceptionalism to become embedded as important at a pre-cognitive level in 
audiences. Within the end of wars assemblage, this affective and pre-cognitive connection 
between the denial of individuality (and thus American exceptionalism) and morbid images 
means that exceptionalism becomes more effective as a political tool. In other words, when 
exceptionalism is deployed as a reason why wars will be successful, that is as a condition of 
success, this affective moment is re-triggered in audiences thus strengthening the particular 
claim to truth that is being articulated. While popular culture, much less X-Men, is certainly not 
the only factor that goes into such a claim being accepted, ‘assemblages represent complex 
ecologies of subjectivity in which the subject emerges as a consequence of the distinct 
articulation of a number of heterogeneous elements,’ of which popular culture and these scenes 
are part.293 
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3.3.2 Training Day 
Incidents of abuse of power by Harris, and Hoyt’s discomfort with it, are prominently featured 
in Training Day. Falsifying warrants, stealing money, brutality, extra-judicial murders, 
corruption, and connivance with drug barons are just a small selection of the darker side of 
Harris’s career. This is despite Harris’s assertion that the Los Angeles Police Department no 
longer engages in ‘that old school, hard charging, beat up everything that moves, Rodney King 
shit.’294 Such blatant abuse of power by a figure of authority and a police officer can also induce 
an affective encounter between the movie and audience. Despite historical and ongoing 
corruption and brutality in American police forces, Dittmer notes that the hegemonic depiction 
of the police in American popular culture is as ‘a protective force whom you would ask for help 
in any situation,’ despite the experiences of many African-Americans and with a few exceptions 
such as Training Day.295 Given that such depictions are hegemonic, what we see in Training 
Day is a darker side to the police and authority figures in the US. As such, Harris’s role and 
Hoyt’s rejection of it could serve to affect audiences in such a way as to associate the 
individualism, or the going-against-the-flow nature of Hoyt with the “true” image of the police 
that has been established by popular culture as public servants and defenders. In other words, 
there is a disjuncture between the audience’s expectations of a police officer and the on-screen 
portrayal that is generative of an affective encounter. The force of individualism that Hoyt 
embodies can also be read as a motif of American exceptionalism: the brave individual standing 
up to corruption and evil in society, no matter the odds or danger. Again, this affect is 
encouraged by the way in which the characters, mostly Harris, are depicted. Just after our first 
introduction to Harris, it is clear that he is an unconventional police officer, jaywalking across 
the road to his car which Hoyt notices is not from the motor pool. Rather, it is a lowrider 
Chevrolet Monte Carlo, complete with hydraulics. While it may appear that Harris is being set 
up as a “loose cannon who gets results” style of police officer, it becomes increasingly clear 
that he is engaged in far more dishonest practices.  
 
Much of the first act is conversation between Harris and Hoyt in the car. Here we see a friction 
between the idealistic, and naïve, Hoyt and the hardened, cynical, and violent Harris. Both 
outlooks embody what Gearóid Ó Tuathail has called the Jacksonian geopolitical culture in 
which ‘solutions are simple and direct,’296 and one might need to take masculinised unilateral 
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action in order to ‘get the job done.’297 After Hoyt intervenes to stop a rape despite being high 
on PCP and Harris’s reservations, the following dialogue takes place: 
  
HARRIS: To protect the sheep you gotta catch the wolf, and it takes a wolf to catch a 
wolf, you understand? 
   … 
No matter what I say, you did you the right thing… I noticed that you applied 
that, eh, that choke hold though, huh? I thought that was a no-no procedure boy. 
HOYT:  I was getting my ass kicked 
HARRIS: And you did what you had to do, right? You did what you had to do. That’s 
what a wolf does.298 
 
Here we can see a certain strand of American exceptionalism which emphasises a unilateral 
approach using maximum force in order to do the right thing. Harris’s corrupt and duplicitous 
nature is revealed to the audience over the course of the second act, and the climax of this is the 
murder of Roger (Scott Glenn), a former criminal supposedly under Harris’s protection. Harris 
tells Hoyt to shoot Roger, and although Hoyt initially treats it as a joke, Harris murders him. 
The closing of the blinds in the house, the close up of Harris’s face and the then muzzle of the 
shotgun as it fires is still, despite his previous misdeeds, a shocking moment. The slow death 
of Roger, coupled with Harris telling him to breathe so the blood fills his lungs, is a moving 
and disturbing sequence. Much like the implantation of Wolverine’s claws and Senator Kelly’s 
death discussed above, one of the effects of these sequences is to establish a link between the 
violation of certain aspects of American exceptionalism (particularly individualism and distrust 
of authority) with negative affects at a pre-cognitive level. As Protevi notes, situations when 
we are thrown “off-kilter” cannot be understood, but only felt and they point towards ‘a 
differential field beyond normal sense-making…In other words, an intensive encounter.’299 
Thus, when these conditions are deployed as political tools used to justify the claim of victory 
in a war, audiences can draw on their repertoire or reservoir of cultural imagery in order to link 
the positive aspects of American exceptionalism with success and victory. Brian Massumi 
argues that thinking-perceiving bodies, in our case the audience, interact with other bodies and 
their affects, in our case the movie, and then ‘translate them into a form that is functional for it 
(qualities it can recall)…From there it enters new circuits of causality.’300 Thus we can argue 
that the encounter induced by these scenes in Training Day and their connection to the 
individualism and distrust of authority that contribute to the emergence of American 
exceptionalism as a condition of success in the War on Terror. The final denouement of the 
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movie also presents an opportunity for affective moments to be created by Fuqua and 
connections to American exceptionalism to be forged. 
 
Hoyt’s eventual success in stopping the malevolent Harris serves a similar purpose to the X-
Men triumphing over the Brotherhood of Mutants which is to strengthen the connection 
between the narratives and affects of these movies with the idealised concept of American 
exceptionalism. The consequence of this is that when American exceptionalism is deployed as 
a political trope to justify the use and success of American political violence, the claims is 
strengthened by the affective encounters that audiences who confront both cinema and politics 
have been exposed to and have, to paraphrase Massumi, transformed into something that is 
useful for understanding contemporary conflicts and their endings. So when President Bush 
stated that ‘in order to overcome evil, the great goodness of America must come forth and 
shine,’ audiences can parse this through the cultural affects that relate to this idea of American 
goodness that they have encountered.301 The effect of this is to strengthen the claim that through 
this goodness, and therefore exceptionalism, American victory will be ensured. American 
exceptionalism can thus be seen as an emergent characteristic of the end of wars assemblage. 
While this victory claim is not reducible to X-Men or Training Day, they do form part of the 
complex web of causality that grants such a claim additional force.  
 
As well as inducing affective encounters that contribute to the emergence of American 
exceptionalism as a condition of success, Training Day also has an implicit racial politics that 
underlies the distinction between Harris’s and Hoyt’s means-ends relationship. Jared Sexton 
captures this well when he writes that Harris 
 
veritably embodies the dark side of contemporary urban law enforcement, cast as an 
unscrupulous rogue cop whose singular ferociousness and ultimately incompetent scheming 
seems to absorb the corruption of the entire Los Angeles Police Department, highlighting and 
absolving a racist city power structure in one breathtaking gesture.302 
 
Although Training Day was not released in response to the events of September 11th 2001, it 
can still illuminate tensions and distinctions at the heart of the conception and deployment of 
American exceptionalism. While American exceptionalism is considered to be defined by 
ideals such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, Sexton addresses the racial realities that 
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underpin this idea.  
 
3.3.3 Spider-Man 
While the setting of Spider-Man in New York is in line with the comic book canon, and the 
filming commenced prior to the events of September 11th 2001, the location is still charged with 
political meaning, especially after the attacks on the Twin Towers. As mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, the original trailer had to be pulled because of the prominent depiction of the World 
Trade Centre even though apparently ‘many audiences cheered when they saw the towers; it 
was a reminder that history couldn’t be neatly wiped off the screen.’303 Bearing in mind the 
precaution about reading the events of September 11th into films that may not have included 
references to it deliberately, it is still interesting to see how New York and New Yorkers are 
depicted in the film. During one of the climactic scenes, when the Green Goblin (Willem Dafoe) 
forces Spider-Man (Toby Maguire) to choose between the love of his life and a cable car full 
of children, the citizens of New York come to his rescue by throwing garbage and tools at the 
villain saying ‘I got a little something for you. Leave Spiderman alone, you’d pick on a guy 
trying to save a bunch of kids? You mess with Spidey you mess with New York. You mess 
with one of us; you mess with all of us.’304 In terms of Lipset’s conception of American 
exceptionalism, this scene ties in with an idea of both populism and individualism. Spider-Man 
is an individual, although one who is endowed with superhuman powers and clearly appeals to 
the people of New York in the guise of the classic ‘friendly neighbourhood Spider-Man.’ 
Furthermore, given the political salience of the moment this film was released as well as its 
setting, this scene serves to induce an affective encounter between audiences and the movie 
which allows for American exceptionalism to emerge and be deployed as a condition of success 
within the War on Terror. Spider-Man therefore becomes part of the cultural milieu in which 
this condition functions and in light of which it is articulated. 
 
As discussed above, this section in Spider-Man engages in the paradox of individualism where 
the individual is seen to achieve their greatest potential when acting as part of a collective. The 
previous chapter discussed how World War II films such as Bataan contained the message that 
when the nation as in existential danger, the individual must be subsumed within the collective. 
However, this American style of subsuming individuality is based on an individual’s particular 
characteristics, so we see a team that is built based on geographic origin, ethnicity, skills, and 
weaknesses and so forth. Although Spider-Man does not contain elements of a group coming 
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together, the section with the cable car and the New Yorkers includes the theme of individuals 
banding together to protect a hero and confront an enemy. This section also places the hero 
within a socialising context. Rather than carrying the burden of saving New York solely on his 
own shoulders, Spider-Man draws support from ordinary people in order to resolve the conflict 
with the Green Goblin. Similarities to discourses surrounding the support networks of soldiers 
is clear such as Obama’s speech at Fort Bragg marking the end of the Iraq War: ‘let us give a 
heartfelt round of applause for every military family that has carried that load over the last nine 
years. You too have the thanks of a grateful nation.’305 It is not only the powerful individual 
who will secure victory in the War on Terror, but the community that that individual is part of, 
the support they receive, and the morals and responsibilities that they stand for. Thus, it is not 
necessarily the individual that matters, but the community that the individual represents. 
Success and victory in both cinema and politics, therefore, are not just about the force of a 
single person, but how that person is the embodiment of a community and the virtues that they 
possess. While Dittmer argues that the superhero ‘always refrains from integration with the 
political community in which the hero has just intervened,’ this sequence on the bridge in 
Spider-Man suggests that this ‘friendly neighbourhood’ superhero is doing something different 
namely expressing the morality of the political community and doing so with the physical and 
moral support of it.306 Successes are constructed as due to individuals who express the perceived 
values of a community while failures are constructed as due to lone individuals with no support. 
As the success of Spider-Man is predicated on him embodying American exceptionalism, the 
emergence of this as a condition of success from the assemblage becomes clearer. 
 
The relationship between the individual and the community is further explored in Spider-Man 
through the character of Norman Osborn/the Green Goblin. Norman Osborn is the CEO of a 
large company OSCORP which, among other things, produces material and technology for the 
military. After OSCORP is visited by a delegation of high-ranking US military personnel and 
the board of directors who threaten to transfer funding to a competing company, Osborn is 
forced to take their experimental research in to his own hands and, after trialling a new drug on 
himself, creates the alter-ego of the Green Goblin. While the generals and board of directors 
are not cast entirely in a positive light it is clear that Osborn creates and is consumed by the evil 
of the Green Goblin on his own initiative. Much like the prisoner abuse at Bagram Air Base in 
Afghanistan was not reflective of the values of America, or the actions of Harris delegitimises 
the police force, Norman Osborn is simply a “bad apple” who goes rogue. Rather than 
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functioning as an implicit critique of American power and exceptionalism (not to mention 
neoliberal capitalism), we can see how these figures are eventually absolved of their pressure 
and complicity in the creation of the Green Goblin, thus reinforcing the idea that success is 
brought about through an individual embedded in a community and failure is the responsibility 
of the aberrant individual. The conflict is then resolved by a single heroic or exceptional 
individual working within a community: Spider-Man. While the previous two films induced 
affects that can be construed as negative associations with the violation of aspects of American 
exceptionalism, in Spider-Man we see positive associations of individuality and community. 
However, all three films function to induce encounters between the movie and the audience that 
strengthens association between American exceptionalism and victory at a pre-cognitive level. 
This allows for it to emerge as a condition of success from the end of wars assemblage. The 
political effect of this is that when the concept is deployed to justify violence or make a claim 
about victory, affect has, in Connolly’s words, a critical role in the ‘consolidation of culturally 
imbued habits and regularities.’307 Individuality, community, and exceptionalism do not stand 
as discrete conditions or concepts though. They are aided, strengthened, and multiplied by a 
myriad of other factors and questions of the relationship of exceptionalism and power hinge on 
technology and its relationship to values, morals, and American exceptionalism itself. 
 
3.4 Technology  
As the use of technology also emerges as a condition of success from the assemblage during 
these years it is fruitful to begin our analysis with a discussion of the apparent disjuncture 
between academic, cinematic, and political understandings of technology. What we see is 
disconnect between how academic understandings and politico-cultural articulations engage 
with technology and warfare. Cristina Masters argues that the contemporary mode of warfare 
has changed hardware, software, and wetware from the physical body; the habits, skills, and 
discipline; and the mind and hormones of the individual solider respectively to a situation where 
‘the hardware has now come to represent the whole range of advanced high-tech weapons, the 
software represents information and communication technologies and the wetware represents 
the embodied human soldier and, significantly, the weakest link in the triad.’308 This builds upon 
Donna Haraway’s theorisation of cyborgs as ‘a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and 
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organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.’309 This denigration of the 
human element in favour of the mechanical/technological took place during and after the Gulf 
War. Before this, ‘it was soldiers who ultimately won wars in the eyes of the American body 
politic.’310 What we see after the Gulf War is that ‘the body of the soldier is no longer 
representative of American identity, technology has instead become the productive site of 
identity and the nexus of power and knowledge within American techno-scientific 
discourses.’311 Virilio traces the ‘disintegration of the warrior’s personality’ back even further 
through Vietnam and towards World War II.312 Writing in reference to a US Air Force pilot 
who flew in Vietnam, Virilio says that ‘Tied to his machine, imprisoned in the closed circuits 
of electronics, the war pilot is no more than a motor-handicapped person temporarily suffering 
from a kind of possession analogous to the hallucinatory states of primitive warfare.’313 It should 
also be noted that the role of modern technology in warfare is not new. Ernst Jünger, along 
similar lines to Virilio, suggests in a 1930 article on war photography during World War I that  
 
A war that is distinguished by the high level of technical precision required to wage it, is bound 
to leave behind documents more numerous and varied than battles waged in earlier times, less 
present to consciousness. It is the same intelligence, whose weapons of annihilation can locate 
the enemy to the exact second and meter, that labors to preserve the great historical event in fine 
detail.314 
 
Despite Virilio’s more historical approach to this in War and Cinema, and Jünger’s account of 
photography in World War I, the Gulf War does seem to be a dividing point where military 
technology finally surpassed the human. However, in the opening phases of the Iraq War in 
2003, Vice President Dick Cheney suggests that the development of military technology has 
increased even further in the intervening twelve years saying that ‘Having been involved in 
planning and waging the Persian Gulf War in 1991 as Secretary of Defense, I think I can say 
with some authority that this campaign has displayed vastly improved capabilities, far better 
than we did a dozen years ago,’ listing advancements in laser guided weaponry, real-time 
imaging, the B-2 stealth bomber and other technological marvels.315 
 
Shapiro, echoing Baudrillard, says that for the advanced militaries the Gulf War marked the 
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time when war became not a ‘violent engagement between antagonistic bodies,’ but rather ‘a 
clinical slaughter in which one side’s technological superiority insulates its warriors from the 
traditional vulnerabilities of direct combat.’316 Furthermore, American success in the Gulf ‘did 
not make the same “mistake” of constructing American identity embodied and represented in 
the white male human body.’317 From this it can be argued that the Revolution in Military 
Affairs post-Gulf War sees the machine as displacing the human, as being valorised over the 
human, and as a more important subject in politico-cultural discourses than the human. 
However, Haraway suggests that taking responsibility ‘for the social relations of science and 
technology means refusing an anti-science metaphysics [and] a demonology of technology.’318 
While the films discussed below do stand in opposition to academic discussions of the 
subsumption of the human into the machine by valorising the human element over the 
technological, none of them refuse the role and power of technology. Cinematic treatments of 
technology are not, on the whole, a form of Neo-Luddism. In a film such as RoboCop (1987), 
where the cyborg is an ‘illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism,’319 
Murphy (Paul Weller) can be seen as illegitimate precisely because it is total subsumption of 
the human into the machine. Indeed, other less intrusive forms of technology (such as the anti-
tank gun used to destroy the military robot guarding OCP headquarters) are actively celebrated 
in the movie. In films then, what we see in films is the use of technology as a moral amplifier. 
 
To take the RoboCop example further in this regard Murphy, as a character with strong morals 
of law enforcement, uses his technological advantages to trap and then kill Dick Jones (Ronny 
Cox) while Jones is himself the victim of the technology that he uses for immoral ends, namely 
taking over OCP and replacing the Detroit police department with his own robot.320 Rather than 
being the weakest link in the chain of contemporary cyborg-warfare, the human body of the 
soldier is cinematically inscribed with all the power, tenacity, and determination that soldiers 
are thought to represent. This is visually evidenced when RoboCop/Murphy removes his helmet 
to reveal his face. Furthermore, rather than being subsumed within the technology that makes 
modern warfare destructive, pervasive, and fast, the human body in these films becomes the 
master of technology and it is used to amplify their own intrinsic moral code. So we see Lt. 
Waters in Tears of the Sun use satellites to stay ahead of the chasing Nigerian soldiers; Spider-
Man use his powers for good given the ringing of his Uncle Ben’s dying words in his ears; and 
                                                          
316 Shapiro, Studies in Trans-Disciplinary Method, 142. 
317 Masters, ‘Bodies of Technology: Cyborg Soldiers and Militarized Masculinities’, 120. 
318 Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, 181. 
319 Haraway, 151. 
320 Paul Verhoeven, RoboCop (Orion Pictures, 1987). 
112 
 
the X-Men use their Blackbird and spandex suits to save world leaders from being mutated. On 
the villainous side of these conflicts the chasing Nigerian soldiers are attacked by their own 
technology; the Green Goblin’s suit and enhancements intensify Norman Osborn’s greed and 
lust for power; and Magneto’s machine leads to his incarceration within his plastic prison. This 
cinematic motif of human mastery over technology and its value as co-productive of particular 
moral subjectivities is strongly echoed by President Bush when talking about the early progress 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom. While, as mentioned above, Vice President Cheney places a focus 
on the technological advances since the first Gulf War as major difference between the two 
conflicts, President Bush goes further saying that ‘By a combination of creative strategies and 
advanced technology, we are redefining war on our terms.’ Importantly though, President Bush 
also makes the link between this technological superiority and the moral code of America 
abundantly clear, arguing that it is used to protect the lives of American soldiers and innocent 
civilians, that ‘we can target a regime, not a nation.’ The precedence of morality over 
technology is further highlighted when, just after discussing technology, President Bush says,  
 
In any conflict, however, this nation’s greatest single asset is the kind of men and women who 
put on the uniform of the United States. The methods of war have changed, but the need for 
courage has not…The character of our military reflects the character of our country…we value 
the lives and liberty of the Iraqi people.321 
 
This clear connection between the cinematic treatment of technology and its value as an force 
multiplier of moral violence and the political discourses surrounding the changing technology 
of actual war serves to highlight how popular culture, and the action genre in particular work 
to produce emergent properties of the assemblage that can then be deployed politically. Both 
cinematic and political discussions of technology in warfare suggest that while we are using 
awesome power, we are doing so for a just end, for protection of innocents, and for the moral 
cause of the fight. 
 
It is also important to bear in mind the close linkage between military and cinematic 
technologies. What Jünger interestingly hints at above is that it is the same technology that is 
used to locate and destroy the enemy that is also used to document and represent it. Virilio’s 
concern with ‘the osmosis between industrialized warfare and cinema’ is also relevant here.322 
Because ‘cinema became associated with battle in the same way that telescopic sights were 
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attached to rifles or the cine-machine-gun to aerial warfare,’323 ‘war has made an essential 
contribution to the rise of projection equipment.’324 James der Derian also discusses this link 
between the military and entertainment industries and expands the idea to become what he calls 
MIME-NET (the military-industrial-media-entertainment network) which ‘represents a 
convergence of the means by which we distinguish the original and the new, the real from the 
reproduction.’325 Once we begin to understand that actual violence and cultural portrayals of it 
are intrinsically linked then film becomes an increasingly important site where the political 
meaning of technologized warfare and its role as condition of success are created and 
circulated.326 By understanding how technology is depicted in contemporary cinema, how it is 
used to induce cinematic encounters and embed the idea that it is a force multiplier for moral 
ends, we can then reach conclusions about the role it plays as a condition of success in the end 
of wars assemblage. By engaging with how technological militarism is depicted in cultural 
artefacts, we can elucidate what potential this has in the political sphere. How does technology 
and specifically military technology in cinema induce affective responses in audiences and how 
might these responses function politically through the end of wars assemblage? What forces 
does it exert on claims to victory that are politically articulated? And what conditions of 
political possibility does it allow for? 
 
3.4.1 Tears of the Sun 
Jeanine Basinger notes that in World War II combat films, technology played not just an 
important cinematic role, but an important didactic one too as ‘military iconography is seen, 
and its usage is demonstrated for and taught to civilians.’327 It is clear that in modern action 
films, military hardware is not paraded so that civilians can learn how to use it. Partly this is 
due to the professional and voluntary nature of the modern US military as opposed to the 
conscript armies of World War II, itself linked to the character of the military as President Bush 
often makes clear when he remarks on people who voluntarily re-enlisted to serve in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.328 It is also partly because modern military hardware has become so 
complex that it would be impossible to demonstrate how to use it in a film.329 Nonetheless, 
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depictions of technology and military hardware form a key element of the visual landscape of 
contemporary popular cinema. Tears of the Sun presents us with depictions of modern special 
operations warfare, a liberal interventionist agenda, and most importantly for this section 
affective depictions of technology as co-productive of subjectivity. 
 
When the Navy SEAL team is inserted into Nigeria in order to recover “critical personalities” 
from the midst of an ongoing civil war, the team at first appear to rely on their own skills as 
special operations forces: stealth, professionalism, and a dedication to the mission. It quickly 
becomes apparent, however, that they have the full spectrum of communication and intelligence 
apparatus at their disposal. This stands in contrast to the last stand format that was favoured 
during World War II and Korea through films such as Bataan and Fixed Bayonets! that were 
discussed in the previous chapter and present us with a group of soldiers almost entirely cut-off 
from the larger army. Such communications equipment embody what Haraway calls ‘a cyborg 
orgy, coded by C3I, command-control-communication-intelligence.’330 The constant link to the 
Captain of the aircraft carrier where the team is based makes for the central plot of the film 
where the value of human life is valued by the Lieutenant and not (initially) by the Captain (‘I 
can’t under good conscience do that [finish the mission as planned] without escorting these 
people to safety’331). What their technology allows the Special Forces to achieve is to complete 
the mission and bring the refugees to safety thereby successfully using technology to amplify 
their moral behaviour.  
 
The Navy SEALs use their technological advantage to protect their own comrades and the 
innocent civilians they are rescuing, the same use that President Bush highlights in his speech 
of 16th April 2003 mentioned above. However, the pursuing Nigerian soldiers also have 
technology (albeit much less advanced that that of the Navy SEALs) at their disposal as one 
member of the refugees is carrying a radio which relays the position of the group to the soldiers. 
However, in much the same way as the spy satellite amplifies the moral abilities of Lt Waters 
allowing him to rescue all the refugees, this radio amplifies the immoral character of the spy 
and the pursuing soldiers. When discovered by the Navy SEALs, the spy is shot, mortally 
wounded and then left to bleed out. When the Nigerian soldiers find his body with the radio 
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around his neck, one of them lifts the radio and sets off a booby trap bomb killing numerous 
soldiers. The death of the spy is a moving sequence, in a similar vein to the murder of Roger in 
Training Day, partly because he is spying to save his family and because the SEALs decide to 
let him bleed to death. Furthermore, the use of the radio to effect an ambush on the pursuing 
soldiers comes as a shock as not only is it loud and sudden, but also marks the first time that 
the Navy SEALs are able to strike back against their pursuers. The encounter here serves to 
connect technology and its moral use with victory. The cinematic use of technology as a way 
to amplify the moral or immoral values, beliefs, and motives of characters stands in contrast to 
the theorisation of modern warfare where the human is the weakest link in the chain and where 
technology is valorised over innate human abilities. While Tears of the Sun does present ‘the 
twenty-first century land soldier [as] outfitted with technology that in essence replaces his 
“senses” through technological prostheses that replicate biological sense while circumventing 
human biological limitations’ the submission of the biological to the technological does not 
take account of the moral dimension of cinematic conflict.332  
 
The movie reaches its climax as the Navy SEALs and refugees near the Cameroonian border. 
The final battle sequence harks back to the last stand format of the World War II combat movie 
where waves of barely humanised enemy troops rush at the retreating forces who try to hold 
them long enough for the rear-guard action to succeed. Not only does this illustrate ‘the classic 
pattern of “last stand” American heroism,’ and allow for the use of pyrotechnics, aircraft, noise, 
and death it also allows for audiences to connect technology with victory at an affective level.333 
As Deleuze notes, genre movies present ‘not only action-images, but also an almost pure 
perception-image; it is a drama of the visible and of the invisible as much as an epic of action.’334 
Thus, the subjective perception-image of this climactic battle scene that is encountered by an 
active audience serves to viscerally connect technology, victory, and the moral character of 
American political violence to one another at a pre-cognitive level. These affective encounters 
are induced by the sonic, visual, and physical aspects of the movie, and this sequence in 
particular, rather than the dialogue that accompanies it. The noise of a plane launching from an 
aircraft carrier, the sight of explosions, blood, and sweat, and the physical sensation of awe at 
overwhelming military might used in the service of seemingly moral ends. 
 
The relationship between technology, the moral character of American political violence, the 
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human figure of the soldier, and claims towards victory were clearly articulated during 
President Bush’s surprise visit to troops in Baghdad on Thanksgiving 2003. Here, President 
Bush focused on the human soldiers that ‘liberated’ Iraq and the moral codes and values that 
they fought for rather than the techniques of shock and awe which by implication then become 
a tool for amplifying that ‘just cause.’335 The moral character of American political violence, 
then, is co-produced by the people that enact it and the technology that allows them to act in 
certain ways. This is explicitly linked to victory when President Bush concluded that 
 
if force becomes necessary to disarm Iraq and enforce the will of the United Nations, if force 
becomes necessary to secure our country and to keep the peace, America will act deliberately, 
America will act decisively, and America will act victoriously with the world's greatest 
military.336 
 
With the link between moral violence, technology, and victory already embedded in the minds 
of audiences through the affects they encounter in movies such as Tears of the Sun, claims that 
link victory with these factors is thus more easily accepted. Technology as a condition of 
success is a powerful political tool. Much like how tropes of American exceptionalism were 
entrenched in audiences through the affects they confront in movies making victory claims that 
rely on the concept more appealing, technology and morality function in similar ways. It is 
through the end of wars assemblage that these affects combine with political statements to allow 
conditions of success to emerge and be operationalised politically. The link between 
technology, biology, and morality is also explored in Spider-Man through the Green Goblin, 
the product of human augmentation experiments for the military and Spider-Man, the result of 
genetic experiments on spiders. 
 
3.4.2 Spider-Man 
As discussed in the section on American exceptionalism, the character of Norman Osborn 
becomes the Green Goblin by trialling a new strength enhancing drug on himself because the 
military threatened to give his funding to a competitor and Peter Parker becomes Spider-Man 
because a genetically engineered spider bites him. Both therefore, can be seen as products of 
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America’s scientific, research, and industrial sectors. However, the way they use their power 
and technology that is available to them is strikingly different. What is interesting about 
Norman Osborn/the Green Goblin is that they are two distinct characters inhabiting one body. 
Norman Osborn, despite being the wealthy owner of a massive corporation and driven by 
ambition, is still an agreeable man. He treats Peter like family, wants to help him in a career, 
and gives him advice. However, as the Green Goblin, a product of a militarised technology, he 
is evil. One could argue that the technology that created him is thus co-productive of his 
subjectivity. The Green Goblin brings Norman what he has always wanted, ‘power beyond your 
wildest dreams.’337 Peter Parker, either in his own character or that of Spider-Man, always 
remembers that ‘with great power comes great responsibility.’ Despite the differences in 
outcome that Norman Osborn/the Green Goblin and Peter Parker/Spider-Man receive from their 
technologically endowed enhancements, there is a similarity in that the technology enhances 
their inherent moral code. While Osborn is an affable character, there is an underlying character 
trait that drives him forward for profit as evidenced by his willingness to test his products on 
himself to secure funding for his corporation. Peter Parker however, is driven by the last words 
of his uncle Ben that are repeated throughout the film.338 Clearly, the differing outcomes in the 
use of technology by these two characters are due to their moral code. Once again, we can see 
technology working to co-produce particular moral subjectivities in cinema rather than anything 
that consumes or subverts the human element. Although Osborn becomes increasingly 
enmeshed with the Green Goblin, the scene where the two are talking to each other in the mirror 
suggests that it is a voluntary submission of the human within the alter-ego rather than the 
human element becoming consumed by the technology. 
 
While it could be argued that Bruce Wayne/Batman and Tony Stark/Iron Man also do not keep 
their identities distinct and one blurs into the other, the reasons for them gaining their 
technological superiority is clearly explained in moral terms: Bruce Wayne became Batman 
because of the murder of his parents and Tony Stark became Iron Man in order to escape 
imprisonment by Afghan fighters.339 Furthermore, Batman relies less on technology than on his 
own innate skills as a fighter and detective and Iron Man, because he built the suits, is able to 
exert total mastery over them.340 Much like how politicians discuss the relationship between 
technology and soldiers, it appears that technology is not cinematically depicted as corrupt in 
and of itself, and neither is technology the defining characteristic of cinematic warfare but what 
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matters is exerting mastery over it and using it to amplify one’s own moral values, behaviours, 
and codes. As Dittmer argues in relation to Iron Man (2008), ‘Rather than resting on divine 
intervention, the United States is portrayed as unique through its moral use of technological 
superiority.’341 President Bush echoes this when he stated that ‘This great, powerful nation is 
motivated not by power for power’s sake, but because of our values.’342  
 
As well as parallels with American exceptionalism as discussed above with regards to X-Men 
and Training Day, what can be read into this, as well as into Spider-Man, is that it is not the 
technological superiority that brings a country victory, but using it as a tool to amplify one’s 
own moral code. This is further reinforced when we analyse President Bush’s statements around 
technology potentially falling into the hands of perceived enemies. Indeed, this was the key 
justification for the Iraq War in 2003, with President Bush saying in his 2002 State of the Union 
address that the US will work to ‘deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, 
technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction,’ and in October 
2002 saying that Saddam Hussein ‘would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to 
terrorists.’343 Clearly, the possibility of advanced military technology falling into the “wrong” 
(immoral) hands was constructed as an existential threat to the US and global security while, as 
discussed above, the moral use of advanced military technology was used to protect lives in the 
ensuing war. The affective potential that these cultural narratives of technology can have on an 
audience, especially when understood in the context of ongoing political discourse, is to 
associate the successes of militarised technology with the successes of a strong moral code and 
“American values.” If America is succeeding in the War on Terror because of its advanced 
military technology, this must be because of the righteous character of that violence. Therefore, 
if claims to the moral character of the war (constructed through the use of American 
exceptionalism) are accepted then the use of advanced military technology must also be 
accepted. The affective association between American exceptionalism, technologized warfare, 
and success can then be seen as an emergent property of the assemblage that allows for the 
solidification of exceptionalism and technology as conditions of success. By making these 
political claims, audiences can draw on the cultural milieu that creates and circulates affective 
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responses to the concepts that are deployed when conflicts conclude.  
 
3.4.2 X-Men 
X-Men explores similar technological issues as Spider-Man concerning the morality of using 
technology and, to a lesser extent, the relationship between technology and man. Wolverine 
provides an interesting counter-point to the Green Goblin for the latter. One might ask why the 
two turned out differently despite both being the product of militarised technological 
experiments. There are two possible explanations to this: one is that Logan/Wolverine was 
subjected to the experiment while Norman Osborn consented, and indeed insisted, and the other 
is that Logan is a moral character while Osborn is immoral. While this relies rather heavily on 
the comic book distinction between hero and villain which comes with its own problems of 
over-simplifying complex moral dilemmas, it is exactly this over-simplification of complex 
moral problems surrounding the use of technology in warfare that gives this condition its 
affective power within the assemblage to construct technology in the role as neutral moral 
amplifier. It is also interesting to note that Norman Osborn, when not the Green Goblin, is a 
pleasant man while Logan, when not Wolverine, is somewhat hostile. However, affability and 
unfriendliness are personality traits and not the moral attributes given to these characters. 
Indeed, Osborn’s friendliness and Logan’s antagonism mask their true identity in traditional 
comic book fashion.  
 
The central depiction of technology in X-Men, however, is Magneto’s device that forces 
mutations on normal people. Magneto is pushing for a radically egalitarian overhaul of the 
international system where ‘the worlds powerful will be just like us.’344 As well as being an 
inversion of post-Gulf War modern warfare ‘in which one side’s technological superiority 
insulates its warriors from the traditional vulnerabilities of direct combat,’345 by directly 
attacking the world leaders who hold the fate of all humanity in their hands, this event ties 
together the two strands of this chapter. While Magneto’s aim of forcing equality on the world 
can be seen as a progressive ideal, it comes into conflict with egalitarianism being equality of 
opportunity rather than of outcome in discourses of American exceptionalism.346 Therefore, if 
we take the argument given above that technology functions cinematically as a neutral device 
that co-produces particular moral subjectivities, then Magneto is condemned to fail from the 
start. In other words, technology and, by extension, the political violence it allows for is only 
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successful when used for moral ends. Therefore, if technology is successful it must have been 
used for moral ends. You cannot be successful in the deployment of technological political 
violence without a good morality. President Bush also makes this link between failure and 
immorality when he asserts that:  
  
these terrorists will fail. They will fail, because the Iraqi people will not accept a return to 
tyranny. They will fail because of the resolve of America and our allies will not be shaken. And 
they will fail because of the courageous men and women like you who are standing in their 
way…by acting in the best traditions of duty and honor, you’re making our country and your 
Commander-in-Chief very proud.347 
 
Thus the success of technological political violence is linked to morality but also to the 
exceptional character of America as discussed in the previous section. Not only will America 
succeed and prevail in the War on Terror because it is fighting the good fight against evil, as 
President Bush might formulate it, but also because it is fighting for those ideals that make 
America exceptional in the first place. The corollary of this is that the terrorists will fail because 
they do not share these values, they are not exceptional, and they are opposed to the perceived 
moral character of American violence. Thus, technology is not just another interesting 
connection or parallel between popular culture and world politics, but it is a fundamental 
condition of success that is necessary to present the War on Terror as a conflict in which 
America’s victory is assured and inevitable. The encounters that are induced by the movies 
under discussion in this chapter, and the contemporaneous deployment of the concept of 
American exceptionalism and moral use of technology, can be conceptualised as emergent 
properties of the end of wars assemblage. Their emergent effect is to legitimise the claim that 
conflicts in the War on Terror will be, or are being, won. These effects are not reducible to the 
components of the assemblage, but work through an affective register to make these claims 
possible.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has built on the previous two to further support the central argument of this thesis 
- that popular culture and politics are mutually imbricated with one another in the process of 
creating and legitimising the conditions necessary for success in the War on Terror. How the 
end of wars assemblage is stabilised during these years and how particular conditions of success 
emerge, are the questions under analysis. The four films discussed in this chapter, alongside the 
political speeches that have been analysed make it clear that two of the key conditions of success 
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in the War on Terror are the values that are encapsulated in American exceptionalism and the 
moral righteousness that comes from the use of advanced military technology to uphold and 
defend these values. The end of wars assemblage through which these disparate artefacts can 
be said to function, is the model through which we can conceptualise the intensity of connection 
between culture and politics and argue that both work together and through each other to create 
these particular conditions of success. What we have seen is that these movies can induce 
affective encounters between the screen and the audience that allow the moral use of 
technologized violence and concepts of American exceptionalism to become embedded at a 
pre-cognitive level. Conceptualising these as ‘basins of attraction,’ in Protevi’s terms means 
that when politicians deploy the same or similar tropes, narratives, and language to justify 
victory in wars, this claim is more persuasive to the audience that confronts both politics and 
popular culture.  
 
American exceptionalism and the role of technology have long been key themes in both cinema 
and politics and clear linkages have been identified between these two areas throughout this 
chapter. Concepts of American exceptionalism such as a distrust of government and figures of 
authority, the importance of individualism and individualism exercised within a community, an 
equality of opportunity and a belief in the very exceptional nature of the US itself are clearly 
articulated in political discourse. Similarly, these motifs can be identified in popular cultural 
narratives. Not only does the concurrence of these motifs in politics and culture serve to 
reinforce them, but the ways in which they are portrayed in cinematic artefacts allows for 
affective encounters to be stimulated in audiences that makes the claim to victory that relies on 
these motifs more powerful. While identifying causal links between popular culture and politics 
is both fruitless and largely pointless given the non-linear causality outlined in chapter one, it 
is clear that the simultaneous nature of these motifs, tropes, and narratives serves to strengthen 
their importance when it comes to making a claim about the victorious nature of ambiguous 
wars. Values, morals, beliefs, and the exceptional nature of the superhero and American 
political violence are all key to the success of both the characters in the films and are constructed 
as being key to eventual American victory in the War on Terror. This can also be seen in how 
technology is portrayed in both politics and popular culture. What is clear is that technology is 
depicted as co-productive of moral subjectivities. Cinematic depictions of technology therefore 
stand in opposition to theorisations of techno-scientific warfare post-Gulf War where the human 
is subsumed by the technology and is the weakest link in technological warfare.  
 
Furthermore, for technology, militarised or otherwise, to be successfully used it has to be 
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deployed by a person that has a strong moral code and uses it for exclusively moral purposes 
be that the rescue of Nigerian refugees, the defeat of a rampant capitalist in the form of the 
Green Goblin, or the salvation of an idealised American ideology. Likewise, in political speech, 
such as that used by President Bush on his Thanksgiving trip to Baghdad in 2003, the emphasis 
on the individual soldiers and their networks of support gives prominence to the human, rather 
than technological, aspect of contemporary warfare. In addition to technology being usable only 
for a moral end and by moral actors, culturally we can see that it can also be successfully 
deployed if in defence of dominant ideology. When all that remains, as in the case of Magneto’s 
Brotherhood of Mutants, ‘was the possibility of using an aggressor’s own technology of 
domination against itself’ then failure is guaranteed. Once again, this resonates with political 
discourse about how American force of arms succeeds not because it is vastly superior, but 
because it is used in defence of the ideological goals of the US. American exceptionalism and 
technology are not only embedded in cultural and political space in their own right, but are also 
deeply embedded with one another. The mutually constitutive nature of American 
exceptionalism and technology - as well as the mutually constitutive nature of popular culture 
and world politics is the core problematic of this thesis. This chapter has demonstrated that, 
through the affective encounter between audiences, cinema, and politics, American 
exceptionalism and the moral use of technology emerge as conditions of success.  
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Chapter Four: Surges and Endings 
 
“Haven’t you heard Mr Beckett? The world is coming to an end.” 
Pacific Rim (2013) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Following on from chapter three that explored how American exceptionalism and technology 
emerged as important conditions of success in the War on Terror between 2000 and 2003, this 
chapter will look at further stabilising processes in the end of wars assemblage between 2004 
and 2007. This time period covers the increase in violence in Iraq until the ‘troop surge’ of 2007 
as well as George W. Bush’s re-election and second term. Just as the previous chapter explored 
how American exceptionalism and the use of technology emerged as conditions of success 
through cinematic encounters, this chapter explores how sacrifice and the built environment 
emerged from post-apocalyptic cinema. As this thesis is about the end of war, it seems fitting 
that one of the themes under discussion is the Apocalypse. This will allow me to touch upon 
several key factors politically, culturally, and academically such as the role of sacrifice, the 
centrality of the built environment to sacrifice and victory, and the prominence of apocalyptic, 
post-apocalyptic, and dystopian visions in popular culture. These themes will contribute to our 
understanding of how cinematic encounters and the end of wars assemblage allow for 
conditions of success to emerge during the War on Terror. A good way to discuss these endings 
is through a discussion of The Ultimate End.  
 
The chapter analyses War of the Worlds (2005), Children of Men (2006) and I am Legend 
(2007) and will progress by a review of the literature on apocalyptic imagery in contemporary 
culture and why it is a useful site of analysis. This will allow for an analysis of how sacrifice 
emerges from the end of wars assemblage as a condition of success. Secondly, I will discuss 
how the urban landscape plays a prominent role in contemporary conflict and film and how this 
can contribute to urbanity as a condition of success emerging from the assemblage. Finally, the 
conclusion then brings these strands together in a detailed analysis of cultural and political 
artefacts in order to elucidate how cultural depictions of The End resonate with political 
discussions on the ending of wars. The argument of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, the themes 
of sacrifice and redemption in both politics and popular culture are deeply woven together. 
Sacrifice and redemption obviously have a long history in Western culture, politics and 
warfighting dating from at least Pericles reminding Athenians that ‘this is the city for which 
these men fought and died. They were nobly determined that she should not be lost: and all of 
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us who survive should be willing to suffer for her.’348 The connection between sacrifice, 
redemption, and Judeo-Christian belief systems further strengthens their ability to emerge as 
conditions of success in the War on Terror. This theme of salvation through redemption works 
to strengthen the political claim that if we make sacrifices in Iraq that redemption, or victory, 
is assured. The second aspect of this chapter’s argument, echoing Pericles, is that the central 
cultural and political location of the redemption through sacrifice narrative is in the urban built 
environment - be that the post-apocalyptic landscape of New York in I am Legend or the actual 
city of Baghdad. These conditions are not the only ones to emerge either during this period or 
the entire course of the War on Terror, but rather emerge from the particular texts selected for 
inclusion here.  For example, the city or built environment has been the central location of 
cinematic and political violence since at least Vietnam and probably before and is therefore not 
confined to this particular moment in the War on Terror. As Stephen Graham argues, ‘cities, 
warfare, and organized political violence have always been mutual constructions.’349 In this 
thesis we have already seen it in Spider-Man and will see it again in Hancock and Source Code. 
That being said, these movies do resonate particularly well with the time period under 
discussion. The increase in US fatalities in the Iraqi insurgency and the focus of the surge on 
urban environments – particularly Baghdad – contributes to the intensity of the cinematic 
encounter and therefore stabilises both their emergence and the assemblage as a whole. The 
connection between the cinematic and the political that this chapter seeks to analyse is that 
audiences can, through affective encounters, be pre-cognitively primed to associate certain 
patterns of thought with one another. Thus, if common cinematic visuals and tropes (in this 
chapter, sacrifice and urbanity) are connected to victory in the cultural realm, then audiences 
can more easily associate sacrifice and urbanity with victory in the political sphere. Affective 
encounters, mediated through the end of wars assemblage, allow for political articulations of 
victory that use these conditions to become more readily legitimised and accepted in audiences 
through the circulation of visuality, meaning, and affect. In other words, by pre-priming 
audiences to cinematically associate sacrifice and urbanity with victory, the sacrifices of 
American troops in Baghdad has a greater persuasive power. Therefore, we can say that 
sacrifice and urbanity emerge as conditions of success from the end of wars assemblage through 
cultural encounters. 
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4.2 The Apocalypse and Sacrifice 
4.2.1 Apocalyptic, post-apocalyptic, dystopian  
Film can be thought of as ‘the best medium for presenting the fantastic visions and imagery that 
often accompany the apocalyptic genre.’350 This is because, not only do computer generated 
images, surround sound, a darkened theatre, and a large screen make the apocalyptic vision 
highly affective (and often highly profitable) for movie studios but also because film has 
‘replaced the novel in art’s traditional function of illustrating the characteristics of the society 
in which it is produced.’351 But what makes a film apocalyptic? What is the difference between 
an apocalyptic film and a post-apocalyptic film? Or between a dystopian film and a (post-) 
apocalyptic one? Where do the films that are under discussion here fit in to such a 
categorisation? To answer these questions, it is useful to break down categorisations of what 
might be termed ‘apocalyptic film’ into three oppositions: religious v. secular apocalypticism; 
apocalyptic v. post-apocalyptic; and (post-) apocalyptic v. dystopian. I am not suggesting that 
these are simple binary opposites, but they provide a useful way to not only analyse the films 
under discussion in this chapter. The purpose of breaking down the ‘apocalyptic film’ into 
various categories is to allow for a closer analysis of what affective potentials the films have, 
how they might be productive of encounters, how they contribute to the end of wars assemblage, 
and what sort of politics they allow for. James Combs has argued that ‘establishing anything 
definite and worthwhile about the “politics of the movies” is indeed like nailing the proverbial 
jelly to the wall.’352 This is true, and part of the argument of this thesis is that it is not the internal 
meaning of a text that is important, but what it connects with, what affects it produces, and what 
politics these affects create the conditions of possibility for. While we are in the process of 
breaking ‘apocalyptic’ down into various categories we should be aware that,  
  
The notion of “apocalypse” has been bastardized and appropriated across many fields in 
contemporary Western thought, especially in popular culture during the latter half of this [20th] 
century. It is a term used indiscriminately to connote and conflate, among others, notions of 
“anarchy,” “chaos,” “entropy,” “nihilism,” “catastrophe,” and “doomsday,” yet by removal 
from its original mytho-religious association it assumes a randomly clichéd definition.353 
 
While this is important to remember when discussing the apocalyptic, Broderick makes no 
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attempt to create a typology of what does define the apocalypse. What is important to bear in 
mind here is that cultural portrayals of the apocalyptic are, like the genre that was discussed in 
chapter two, ever changing.  
 
It can be argued that all texts are in some sense apocalyptic as ‘the classic narrative structure, 
rising action > climax > denouement, seems to have been modeled [sic] on the apocalypse.’354 
Indeed, Teresa Heffernan goes further to suggest that all ‘end-driven narratives…have been 
inspired by the Genesis to Revelation model.’355 But the very notion of apocalypticism is, at its 
core, a religious idea. According to Conrad Ostwalt,  
 
The essential element that technically makes a drama an apocalyptic one is that the dualism, the 
visions, the symbols, and even the end are controlled by a divine power, not by fate, by human 
intervention, or by accident but by design – the end is controlled by divine prerogative that 
thwarts the nihilistic and fatalist visions.356 
 
It is interesting and important that the etymology of ‘apocalypse’ comes from the Greek 
ἀποκάλυψις meaning to un-cover. In Judeo-Christian thought, this is interpreted as the un-
covering of a divine will and the intercession of divinity and divine power into a battle between 
elements that are essentially good and evil. Thus for a film to be apocalyptic in the strict Judeo-
Christian sense, it must include a revealing or unveiling of a divine power. As such, none of the 
films to be discussed here are in this sense strictly apocalyptic. There are certainly films that fit 
this category however. The Left Behind series of books have been adapted into three films (Left 
Behind (2000), Left Behind: Tribulation Force (2002), and Left Behind: World and War (2006)) 
and would most certainly be classified as apocalyptic in the traditional sense. Despite the 
success of the books on which these movies are based, they were critical and commercial 
disasters, hence their exclusion from this research.357 While their failure may be due to 
incredibly low production values, poor scriptwriting, and mediocre-at-best acting, it may also 
be because they did not satisfy audience demand for either large scale destruction or the success 
of human agency.358 
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It is this latter point of the success of human agency that Ostwalt identifies as one of the main 
characteristics of the ‘secular apocalypse’ film. For Ostwalt, The secular apocalypse differs 
from the traditional in four main ways: first, while it borrows imagery such as war and 
cataclysmic events from the traditional apocalypse, the supernatural element of the unveiling 
of divine will and power is missing; second, secular apocalypse films ‘often contemporize evil 
through the genre of science fiction so that the sources of potential destruction are ones familiar 
to contemporary audiences’ and ‘evil’ – be that nuclear war, disease, climate change, aliens, or 
natural disaster – not God, is the harbinger of destruction; third, the end of civilisation and/or 
humanity is avoided through a hero which is ‘a complete reversal of the traditional apocalyptic 
drama’s fatalistic acceptance of the end by supernatural causation’; fourth, ‘the secular 
apocalypse is also a humanistic or anthropocentric apocalypse. God has been replaced by 
human effort.’ The classification therefore does not rely on the means of the end (nuclear 
weapons, climate change, asteroids, disease etc.) but rather on the secularisation of the 
apocalypse: ‘the traditional apocalypse retains an “unveiling” of divine agency while the secular 
apocalypse replaces that with an “uncovering” of human ascendancy and heroism.’359 
 
The first difference that Ostwalt highlights is important to bear in mind when reading the films 
under discussion here. Although Children of Men and I am Legend draw on religious imagery 
such as the birth of a saviour who must go into exile and a hero who must sacrifice himself to 
save the rest of humanity, they are not religious apocalypse films. As Ostwalt says, ‘Just 
because a film has a sacrificial character this does not necessarily make that character a Christ-
figure, and just because a film has an end-of-the-world scenario this does not make that film an 
apocalyptic film.’360 Nonetheless, these films can still usefully be thought of as apocalyptic 
scenarios, albeit not in a theological sense with the intercession of a divine will. While this 
argument about the strict definition of the apocalypse may seem to be tangential to this chapter, 
it is important to place these films within a religious framework as films ‘may project a world-
view which functions much like a religion in our culture’ and ‘can be considered both forms of 
viable religion, and ideology.’361 But if a film does not need to conform to the religious idea of 
revelation, what then makes it apocalyptic? And, rather more importantly for our purposes here, 
how does this style of film influence the end of wars assemblage? Similar to what was argued 
in the previous chapter, what will be shown here is that the movies under discussion in this 
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chapter work to pre-cognitively embed sacrifice and urbanity as conditions of success that can 
then be politically deployed and popularly accepted and legitimised.  
 
It appears as if the movie Armageddon (1998) has replaced the biblical battle site Armageddon 
in the popular consciousness of what constitutes the apocalyptic scenario. As such, any film 
that deals with situations where the entire planet, all of humankind, or even a civilisation is 
existentially threatened can be categorised as apocalyptic. What is interesting to note about this 
secular recalibration of the sub-genre is that since the 1970s, disaster films have been based 
largely not on external threats such as alien invasions or divine providence, but rather based on 
the idea that ‘the socio-logic inherent in the development of the system itself will lead to a 
catastrophe that is internally-induced.’362 Furthermore, the iconography and imagery that is 
taken from the Judeo-Christian canon will be interesting given the aforementioned links 
between the presidency of George W. Bush and the evangelical Christian movement in the 
United States. As Connolly states, ‘no political economy or religious practice is self 
contained.’363 While the years under discussion here perhaps had a greater prevalence of post-
apocalyptic movies, it is clear that they are in conversation not just with simultaneous political 
rhetoric, but also the well-established evangelism of the Bush administration. This discussion 
about the differences between the religious and secular apocalypses raises the further interesting 
question of where the break between the apocalyptic and the post-apocalyptic takes place. 
 
This question of (post-) apocalypticism may seem an easy question to answer: apocalyptic 
cultural artefacts deal with the approach to The End and its destruction or avoidance while post-
apocalyptic artefacts are to do with life after the cataclysmic event. Some works such as Nevil 
Shute’s 1957 novel On the Beach or Cormac McCarthy’s 2006 novel The Road clearly fit the 
bill of being post-apocalyptic as neither depict the events of the (near) destruction of mankind, 
are set entirely after the cataclysmic event, and do not offer us much hope for our salvation 
either. Indeed, in The Road, the events that led to the end of life as we know it are deliberately 
left vague.364 But where does a film like I am Legend or Children of Men fit into this category? 
Both take place after a cataclysmic event – a plague that kills or mutates most of the species 
and a sudden end to reproduction – but these films, while set entirely after their respective 
apocalyptic events (with the exception of flashbacks), present a narrative that offers audiences 
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some degree of hope that we will, as a species, survive.  
 
But post-apocalypticism is inherently oxymoronic: ‘Before the beginning and after the end, 
there can only be nothing. At the beginning, something begins; and at the ending, it ends.’365 
The challenging nature of classifying anything as post-apocalyptic also leads me to reiterate 
that ‘genre is alive,’ and as such can be a slippery thing to define.366 If Combs, quoted above, 
thinks that political readings of films are difficult, he should try genre definition! Yet despite 
the difficulties in coming to terms with what exactly constitutes a post-apocalyptic scenario, 
and bearing in mind Broderick’s caution above, we can perhaps agree on a working definition 
that it refers to events that take place after a cataclysmic event. This is still not entirely clear cut 
though. Are the Left Behind films apocalyptic or post-apocalyptic? It depends on what you take 
by the cataclysmic event in these films: it could be the rapture, it could be the creation of the 
Global Community under Nicolae Carpathia (Gordon Currie); or it could be the Tribulation and 
second coming. Likewise with Children of Men: it depicts the ongoing struggles during the 
catastrophe of reproduction. Is the impossibility of reproduction the apocalyptic event, thus 
making the film post-apocalyptic? Does it depict the slow decline of humanity, making it 
apocalyptic, or does the end of the film show us that the apocalypse has been averted, making 
the film neither apocalyptic nor post-apocalyptic? Do the scenes at Bexhill refugee camp and 
totalitarian-style advertisements in the film suggest a more dystopian theme?  
 
Despite these concerns, it is evident that ‘the visions of the End that Frank Kermode analysed 
in terms of a sense of an ending have increasingly given way to visions of after the end, and the 
apocalyptic sensibilities both of religion and of modernism have shifted toward a sense of post-
apocalypse.’367 Berger identifies this shift towards post-apocalypticism in Reagan who ‘saw the 
Cold War, and the apocalypse, as already over,’ because ‘once the prophetic words have been 
uttered, the event may as well have occurred, for it must occur. In the mind of the believer, it 
has occurred.’368 Following on from the religious-secular ideas of the apocalypse and questions 
about where the post- in post-apocalypse begins, the usage of parenthesised prefix (post-) in 
(post-) apocalyptic here can be taken as having a double meaning. It refers first to the 
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chronological setting of the film as after an apocalyptic or cataclysmic event, but it can also 
refer to the film depicting a secular rather than a religious apocalypse.  
 
Following on from the concerns around what makes a film apocalyptic if it does not depict the 
end of humanity and the intervention of a divine will, we can also ask the question of what 
makes a film like Children of Men apocalyptic and not dystopian. These two genres of film and 
literature are not mutually exclusive and one can, and often does, contain elements of the other. 
Lyman Tower Sargent and Darko Suvin define dystopias in terms of authorial intention and 
audience reception. That is, a dystopia is a society that is created by an author who intends it to 
be read as somewhere that politics, society, and inter-personal relations are not as perfect as 
they are in the society of the reader.369 Tom Moylan points out that this then ‘leaves the 
judgment of utopian or dystopian quality up to a reader or critic who undoubtedly works from 
a particular standpoint (with particular affiliations and principles) in order to decide whether a 
given fictive society is worse or better than the author’s or the reader/critic’s.’370 Given that, as 
discussed in chapter one, authorial intentionality is impossible to ascribe, especially in film, and 
this thesis deals less with audience reception and more with the affects that active audiences 
can encounter in film, this is a potentially problematic definition. As dystopia is a subjective 
judgement for a reader/viewer to decide, then the films under study can be seen as dystopian. 
Political, social, economic, and cultural institutions are less ideal than those in our society 
(however poor those might be) and inter-personal relationships are more difficult and of lower 
quality. However, categorising the films under discussion here simply as dystopias somewhat 
undermines their eschatological themes and motifs.  
 
In addition to the explanations of apocalypse given above, Frederic Jameson claims that an 
apocalyptic drama ‘includes both catastrophe and fulfilment, the end of the world and the 
inauguration of the reign of Christ on earth, Utopia and the extinction of the human race all at 
once.’371 While it is clear, following Ostwalt’s comment about Christ figures above, that the 
first child born to the human species in 18 years (in Children of Men) is not necessarily the 
saviour, it is still clear that although these three films follow some of the logics, imagery, and 
themes of dystopias such as presenting a society that is much less ideal than ours (because of 
no reproduction, species-threatening plague, or alien invasion) they fall into the (post-) 
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apocalyptic category. As authorial intentionality is invariably impossible to ascertain in films, 
especially given the large number of people that contribute to a film (directors, scriptwriters, 
actors, producers, studios, editors, and so forth), and audience reception data being outside the 
scope of this thesis it is difficult to categorise these films purely as dystopias. Once again 
though, it should be noted that these films, like all cultural artefacts, blur boundary lines 
between genres taking in Action Thrillers, Science Fiction, Apocalyptic, Dystopian, and 
Western themes to name a few. And while trying to avoid a reductionist pigeon-holing of films 
into a particular form, it is clear that they follow the themes and imagery of a secular apocalypse 
that celebrates the triumph of humanity.  
 
Taking all the above points in to account, we can establish that the (post-) apocalyptic film is 
one where the majority of the action takes place after a cataclysmic event of some kind; it 
depicts the triumph of humanity over adversity through luck, ingenuity, or determination and 
in so doing, eliminates the religious elements of apocalypticism (though it may draw imagery 
from the religious); and it presents a world that is much less ideal than the one we currently live 
in, although this is an effect, rather than a cause, of the apocalyptic event. Clearly therefore War 
of the Worlds, Children of Men, and I am Legend fit this definition of (post-) apocalyptic movie. 
Having established some of the genre conventions of a (post-) apocalyptic movie, explained 
what makes these three films fit with one another besides being contemporary, and explored 
the nature of The End in more detail, it is necessary to ascertain how exactly these films function 
within the end of wars assemblage and how they allow sacrifice and urbanity to emerge as 
conditions of success. The following analysis will examine how the (post-) apocalyptic setting 
of these films allows for sacrifice and redemption to be constructed as a condition of success 
and how the location of that sacrifice in the built environment mirrors the geographic situation 
of the War on Terror. These themes will allow an exploration of several politically salient points 
including the political and conflictual aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the presidency of 
George W. Bush, and how the ending of conflict is presented.  
 
4.2.2 Post-apocalypticism in cinema 
To begin with, we can talk about the religiosity of the films and how this contributes to the 
emergence of sacrifice as a condition of success. Although Ostwalt’s comments about reading 
too much in to Christ-like figures is noted several times above, it has to be acknowledged that 
these films do attempt to present a degree of salvation, though secular and anthropocentric, in 
the terms and imagery associated with the Christian eschatological tradition. Children of Men 
is the clearest example of this. Kee (Clare-Hope Ashitey), the first pregnant woman on Earth 
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for 18 years is an illegal immigrant (a ‘fugee’) and it is intended by others that her pregnancy 
will be used by a political group (‘The Fishes,’ their name perhaps being an allusion to the 
Christian ichthys symbol) in order to rally support for a revolution. Furthermore, the scene 
where her pregnancy is revealed is highly reminiscent of the nativity, taking place in a barn. 
This link appears to be deliberate as later, after they escape from The Fishes, Jasper (Michael 
Caine) talks about how Kee’s baby is ‘the miracle the whole world has been waiting for’ and 
Kee jokes that she is a virgin.372 Additionally, the escape from The Fishes, birth of the child in 
Bexhill refugee camp, and flight from both army and armed groups to The Human Project’s 
boat is a similar trajectory to the biblical massacre of the innocents and flight into Egypt. The 
strong influence of Judeo-Christian thought and imagery helps to cement this movie within the 
Genesis to Revelation model of apocalyptic culture.  
 
Cuarón’s use of Christian narratives and symbolism is clearly deliberate. The novel on which 
the movie is based, The Children of Men by P.D. James, deals explicitly with questions of 
religion; Cuarón has said that he did not want to ‘shy away from spiritual archetypes’; and the 
movie was even released on Christmas Day in America.373 The deliberate use of religious 
iconography, narratives, and symbolism immediately allows audiences to approach the movie 
with biblical stories in mind despite the lack of overt Christian symbols. As the central story of 
the New Testament is the sacrifice of a man to save humanity, the connection between sacrifice 
and some form of victory is established early on in the minds of audiences. The encounter that 
this induces has the effect of allowing audiences to fall into patterns of thought that associate 
sacrifice with redemption, even without the explicit religious iconography that is associated 
with this narrative. The implication of this is to induce in audiences a feeling that a sacrifice 
will inevitably be necessary to complete this journey and redeem humanity, much as the biblical 
journey is completed with Christ’s crucifixion. Through the narrative arc of a sacrifice by a 
non-religious character in service of quasi-religious ends the idea that victory can only come 
about through sacrifice is embedded.374 As we will see later in this chapter, the actual moment 
of sacrifice is also a powerful encounter. 
 
Similar Judeo-Christian eschatological themes can be seen in I am Legend where (in the 
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theatrical release) Robert Neville (Will Smith) must sacrifice himself to ensure the survival of 
mankind. Although less about a ‘second coming’ of a Christ-like saviour figure than Children 
of Men, the Christian narrative of a chosen person saving humanity from eternal damnation is 
clearly articulated. This can be seen when Neville encounters other survivors and insists that 
‘everybody is dead’ and when he tells the Darkseekers towards the end of the film that ‘I can 
save you. I can help you. You are sick and I can help you. I can fix this. I can save everybody. 
Let me save you’375 the notion of salvation is clear to be seen. However, in the alternative ending 
that is featured on the DVD version, Neville survives after understanding that the Darkseekers 
are capable of human emotion and empathy. The narrative of salvation through sacrifice (itself 
also related to the history of the genre as discussed in chapter two) is much less clear as it is left 
open ended whether the three reach the survivor’s colony or what the status of the ‘vaccine’ 
is.376 That this is omitted from the theatrical release might suggest the cultural power of such a 
conclusive narrative – that if we sacrifice we must prevail, or that success only comes through 
sacrifice – something that is prominent in political discourse at the time.377 The notion of 
salvation through sacrifice is not only closely linked to the Christian narrative of God’s sacrifice 
of his only son, but it also clearly related to common wartime narratives about the sacrifice of 
soldiers and victims. Of course, death and sacrifice are common in war and the necessity to 
emerge victorious despite them – or because of them – is common.378 Already in November 
2001, President Bush stated that ‘the American people understand that we’ve got a mighty 
struggle on our hands and there will be sacrifice. After all, some people made the greatest 
sacrifice possible on September the 11th, and that is those who took the airplane [United 93] 
down.’379 In a later speech in 2006 that attempts to refocus attention on Afghanistan, President 
Bush also says that ‘We live in freedom because of the courage of men like Matthew and Danny 
[two Navy SEALs killed in action in Afghanistan and awarded the Navy Cross]. And we will 
honor their sacrifice by completing the mission.’380 Not only will victory honour the sacrifices 
of those killed fighting the War on Terror, but sacrifice is here and in other speeches presented 
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as a necessary step towards victory. In other words, it is politically articulated as a condition of 
success that draws on cinematic, cultural, and religious tropes as well as a long history of 
sacrifice being crucial to victory in war. Both the cultural artefact of I am Legend and the 
rhetoric of President Bush articulate the importance of sacrifice for ultimate success. The effect 
of this is that when President Bush makes a claim that a mission will be completed because of 
the sacrifices of soldiers, he is drawing on a wellspring of cultural (and religious) ideas that 
relate sacrifice to redemption. Audiences that have been pre-primed through cultural narratives 
of sacrifice and redemption are perhaps more likely to accept this claim to truth. Much like how 
Children of Men foreshadows the inevitable sacrifice through its use of Judeo-Christian 
imagery, I am Legend cements the necessity of sacrifice through its climactic sequence. 
 
Echoes of such salvation through sacrifice, unambiguous endings, and an anthropocentric 
narrative that is nonetheless clearly influenced by the Judeo-Christian eschatological tradition 
can also be seen during the 2007 troop surge in Iraq. During this time, the condition of sacrifice 
is articulated as if we have sacrificed in Iraq and Afghanistan, then those sacrifices cannot have 
been in vain, therefore, we must and we will prevail. In other words, there is a clear connection 
made between sacrifice and the claim that we will win, we are winning, or we have won. 
President Bush, in his speech announcing the surge talks about how the country ‘mourns the 
loss of every fallen American – and we owe it to them to build a future worthy of their sacrifice,’ 
and that ‘the year ahead will demand more patience, sacrifice, and resolve.’381 This motif is of 
course common to wartime politics in general and President Bush’s speeches often make 
reference to it, such as in March 2006 when he says that 
 
you’re helping to change this part of the world, and change the world with your courage and 
your sacrifice. I assure you that this government will of yours will not blink, we will not yield. 
We’re on the right course, and the world is going to be a better place because of your service.382  
 
Or in April of the same year when he said that the American people ‘appreciate the fact that 
people are willing to make sacrifices,’ and that ‘failure in Iraq is not an option.’383 This 
continues through 2008 when he says that ‘we honor our American troops who have sacrificed 
so that Afghanistan never becomes a safe haven,’ and that ‘You’re making a sacrifice today so 
that future generations of Americans don’t have to worry about harm coming from a place like 
                                                          
381 Bush, ‘President’s Address to the Nation’. 
382 George W. Bush, ‘President Thanks U.S. and Coalition Troops in Afghanistan’, The White House, 1 March 
2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060301-3.html. 
383 George W. Bush, ‘President Meets with Governors Who Traveled to Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan’, The 
White House, 19 May 2006, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060419.html. 
135 
 
Afghanistan.’384 Accounts of salvation through sacrifice are deeply embedded in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, historical accounts of war, and manifest in many cultural artefacts (such as 
the World War II combat film) the concurrence of the political and the cultural, and the affect 
that influences audiences who encounter both culture and politics is what allows sacrifice to 
become such a powerful and persuasive political tool.  
 
Although sacrifice has been part of the religious, cultural, and conflictual landscape from 
antiquity the simultaneity between political and cultural articulations during this period allows 
for the affects generated by the films to be more intensive and therefore politically salient. As 
explored in chapter one, the affective encounter that exists between film and audiences and how 
this is strengthened by political speech is what allows for the end of wars assemblage to produce 
emergent properties such as conditions of victory for conflicts in the War on Terror. One such 
condition is that if sacrifices are made, victory will be ensured. This condition is explored in I 
am Legend and Children of Men in some detail and there are several sequences in these films 
that have strong affective qualities. The final scene of I am Legend, for instance, firmly 
establishes the redemption through sacrifice motif. This scene echoes the last stand narrative of 
combat and other action films as Neville, Anna (Alice Braga), and Ethan (Charlie Tahan) 
eventually retreat into the lab/basement of the house. Cinematically, the orchestral music serves 
to heighten the emotional content of the denouement while the sounds of violence are 
increasingly muted and the limited colour palette (mostly yellow and orange) focuses the 
audience’s attention on the impending sacrifice. Our last glimpse of Neville is charging into the 
leading Darkseeker before being engulfed in flames. The encounter induced by this sequence 
in audiences that face political actions combines with the concurrent political prominence of 
this theme. The effect of this is that both serve to construct, shape, circulate, and legitimise the 
idea that sacrifice is necessary for success.  
 
In Children of Men, we see similar cinematic techniques used to highlight the importance of 
sacrifice to redemption and success. During the battle in Bexhill refugee camp, discussed in 
more detail below, Theo, Kee, and her baby descend the stairs of a block of flats being stormed 
by troops. As the baby cries, the violence begins to slow and stop. There is limited coherent 
dialogue in this sequence; the music becomes increasingly choral; the sound of gunfire and 
fighting is muffled; and the sound of the baby’s cries are amplified. The affective power of this 
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moment is to establish the saviour narrative within the film as well as the importance of the 
sacrifices that have been made to get Kee this far. As they leave the block of flats surrounded 
by soldiers in awe, kneeling, and crossing themselves, the battle suddenly re-erupts and the 
reverie is broken. The final scene of the movie has Theo, Kee, and the baby in a rowing boat 
seemingly lost in the fog. Theo, who has been mortally wounded during the battle, slowly bleeds 
to death.385 Just as he collapses, the Tomorrow, the boat of The Human Project, emerges from 
the fog. The opacity granted by the fog, the image of a man dying to save a baby, the return of 
the choral music, and the promise of redemption by The Human Project are all powerful aspects 
of this final sequence. The calm that descends around Kee and her child, the sudden violence 
of the battle restarting, and the slow death of Theo in the boat all work to code sacrifice and 
redemption as basins of attraction within the assemblage. As Protevi remarks, ‘decisions are 
precisely the brain’s falling into one pattern or another, a falling that is modelled as settling into 
a basin of attraction that will constrain neural firing.’386 Or, as Connolly suggests, ‘the machine 
then foments new intensities of solidarity between these constituencies.’387 Therefore, the effect 
of the encounter that cinematic sacrifices allow for is to allow audiences to fall into these ‘basins 
of attraction’ such that they can readily associate sacrifice with victory. Therefore, when this 
claim is made politically, the encounter that creates this association is re-triggered in audiences, 
allowing this claim to truth to be more readily accepted. This conceptualisation also accepts 
that there is no linear cause and effect relationship between movie, political statement, and 
actualisation but does argue that they are interwoven in complex chains and webs of causality 
that make, in our case, certain political realities more likely to be legitimised. In addition to the 
synchronicity of affect between political speech and cinema on the topic of sacrifice and 
redemption, another striking resonance is the centrality of the urban landscape in these movies 
and in bringing security to Iraq. 
 
4.3 The City: destruction, salvation, victory 
One of the most prominent visual motifs of these three films is the destroyed, degraded, or 
decayed urban infrastructure that constitutes the background of many scenes and helps the 
viewer place the film as having taken place either during or after a cataclysmic event. One way 
of approaching these visuals is the label of ‘disaster porn.’ Although originally utilised to refer 
to news broadcasts of actual war, famine, and natural disasters, ‘one sees after September 11 
the expansion of disaster porn terminology to encompass not just news reports of actual 
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disasters, but the kind of fictional disaster films that had been uncritically consumed for 
decades.’388 These films can therefore be seen as disaster porn, albeit with varying degrees of 
intensity. The immediate aftermath of September 11th may have lessened the appetite for such 
destruction, something noted by both Recuber, who suggests that Americans were renting 
movies, just not disaster ones, and Cynthia Weber, who on the Saturday after the September 
11th attacks, ‘went to my neighbourhood cinema because I sought an escape from catastrophe 
and a return to calm. There I lost myself in an extravagant production in which – for a full two 
and a half hours – no one died.’389 The distance between 9/11 and the release of the films under 
discussion here may have been required for the public to regain their appetite for this style of 
film, and the types of disaster depicted (manmade virus, alien invasion, and ambiguous but 
possibly environmental issues) are far removed from the terrorist attacks of September 11th. 
Children of Men is perhaps the least stark example of disaster porn, but nonetheless the faded 
grandeur of Britain is clear: not only are the skies grey (something perhaps unsurprising in the 
UK), but so too is everything else. With the exception of the government Bentley and the Ark 
of the Arts, the film is largely devoid of colour and what colour there is is heavily desaturated. 
War of the Worlds presents us with an urban environment in the process of being destroyed by 
tripods that mercilessly and methodically raze tower blocks to the ground. In I am Legend we 
are shown a built environment that has not been destroyed but one that has been abandoned and 
left to decay: wild deer and lions in Times Square, New York avenues devoid of cars and life, 
Robert Neville playing golf on the wing of an A-12 reconnaissance aircraft on the deck of the 
USS Intrepid museum ship. 
 
What then, does the widespread destruction of the urban or, more generally, built environment 
tell us about how these films function within the assemblage and what conditions of success 
they allow for the emergence of? The fact that one of the main visual focuses of these films 
(especially I am Legend) is the urban environment raises questions about the specificity of urban 
violence and the destruction of urban or built environments. The invasion of Iraq, capture of 
Baghdad, and the perceived need for the surge of troops to reclaim lost urban territory is a 
simultaneous connection between the political realities of the War on Terror and the cultural 
depictions of destroyed urban environments. Both cinematic and political depictions of endings 
share an urban focus. Not only that, but the urban environment is the site of political and cultural 
sacrifice and therefore redemption and success. Martin Coward’s work on urbicide is a useful 
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way to approach the visuality of the destruction of built environments. In addition to Coward’s 
work on urbicide, it is useful to consider what Shapiro calls aesthetic subjects in relation to the 
cinematic depiction of urban ruin. Developing an association between urbicide, the aesthetic 
subject, and the visuality of urban destruction will allow us to approach these films in a way 
that can elucidate the particular encounters that allow for urbanity to emerge as an important 
condition of success from the end of wars assemblage. 
 
The link between Coward’s urbicide and Shapiro’s aesthetic subject are clear when we combine 
the two in order to understand politico-cultural interaction. While ‘urbicide, then, is a 
fundamentally political matter since it represents the violent foreclosure of the possibility of the 
political,’390 aesthetic subjects are ‘characters in texts whose movements and actions (both 
purposive and non-purposive) map and often alter experiential, politically relevant terrains.’391 
When those aesthetic subjects are mapped on to an urban (post-) apocalyptic cinematic terrain, 
strong connections can be made between these two concepts. Coward suggests that urbicide is 
needed as a distinct category of political violence that goes beyond how the destruction of 
buildings during conflict is normally seen. These normal understandings of the destruction of 
the built environment are military (including collateral damage), symbolic, and metaphorical.392 
Coward discusses how these three approaches fall short of understanding how the deliberate 
destruction of the built environment for its own sake functions as a separate category of political 
violence and says that ‘urbicide could be said to comprise the destruction of buildings qua the 
condition of possibility of a certain type of space (in principle, public space) that is itself 
productive of a variety of identities.’393 In other words, the built environment is not destroyed 
for its military, symbolic, or metaphorical meaning but rather it is destroyed to remove the 
possibility of specific identities being formed. Furthermore, and importantly for us – especially 
in relation to War of the Worlds – ‘urbicide is a viable concept for identifying a distinct form 
of political violence…regardless of whether such violence occurs in a city, town, village, or 
farm.’394 
 
Having established what urbicide is we must now ask the question of whether it is applicable 
to film. Coward does not mention film at all in Urbicide, but he does conclude that  
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The logic of urbicide, set out here, is thus not intended to comprise a universal, trans-historical 
ontological prescription. That said, I would argue that the relation between buildings and 
heterogeneity posited here applies globally to instances of widespread and deliberate destruction 
of cities in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.395 
 
By applying Shapiro’s concept of the aesthetic subject to Coward’s urbicide, we can more 
fruitfully utilise the latter to understand the particular affective potential of the narrative and 
visuality of the movies under discussion here. Understanding how aesthetic subjects move 
through and affect the urban environments of these films, and how the city is deployed in 
political discourse, we can map out what conditions of success the city, as site of sacrifice, 
allows for the emergence of. In this context, War of the Worlds provides us with perhaps the 
best visuals of urban destruction. The alien tripods are seen systematically destroying urban 
infrastructure through footage shown in a news van. Clearly, such destruction is a form of 
urbicide as it is wanton destruction that attacks everything regardless of military, symbolic, or 
metaphorical value. It is clear that the aliens wish to not only destroy humanity, but also remove 
any possibility of their specific identities or ideologies being formed. This is also reinforced 
sonically through the loud and fearsome noise that the tripods emit. Much like how the tripods 
are given prominence within an urban setting, so too is the urban setting of Baghdad in political 
discussions of the troop surge. In February 2007, President Bush places the central battlefield 
of the War on Terror in Baghdad saying, ‘I made Baghdad the top security priority. In other 
words, it’s important, in order to achieve our objective, that the capital city of this grand country 
be secure…In the end, I chose this course of action because it provides the best chance of 
success.’396 Success within the War on Terror then is geographically rooted in the city. If one is 
to succeed in the city, then the rest of the conflict is not in doubt. In War of the Worlds as the 
main characters re-enter the city we see the dying remains of the tripods and struggling ones 
being destroyed by troops firing javelin missiles. The centrality of the built environment not 
only to military strategy, but also to the eventual success of that strategy, is clear. Therefore 
securing the urban becomes a key political and cultural tool to achieve victory. 
 
Children of Men also provides us with an interesting view on the role of the urban environment 
in the (post-) apocalyptic setting of Britain.397 The opening sequence of the film places this 
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(post-) apocalyptic scenario firmly within an urban context. News commentary plays over a 
black screen discussing the ‘Siege of Seattle,’ the occupation of mosques by the army, a new 
Homeland Security Bill, the deportation of immigrants, and the death of the youngest person in 
the world. A long tracking shot of Theo leaving the café lingers on a London scene in 2027 
replete with car fumes, massive animated billboards, and piles of rubbish. Suddenly, the café 
that Theo emerged from is destroyed by a bomb. The sudden noise, the movement of the camera 
towards the café, and the brief glimpse of a wounded victim carrying her severed arm cuts 
quickly to a title screen. The effect of all this is to locate the film in time (a dystopian future) 
and in place (a depressing London) and to connect those two together thereby establishing the 
urban environment as central to the visuals, characters, plot and affective potentials of the 
movie. The penultimate scenes also take place in an urban environment, this time Bexhill 
refugee camp during an uprising. The movement of Kee, her baby, and Theo through this urban 
environment in the process of being destroyed by the ‘fascist pigs’ of the army, police, and 
border guards highlights the importance of the built environment to ideas of sacrifice, 
redemption, and political violence. Furthermore, even though London in 2027 is a depressing 
place, it has beauty within it such as the Ark of Arts at Battersea Power Station. Opening the 
film in such a place and concluding it in a radically different one highlights the characters 
movement through the landscape as well as the centrality of urbanity to the sacrifice and 
redemption model of the plot structure.  
 
The battle that dominates the ending of the film is striking for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
Cuarón uses exceptionally long shots, for instance when Theo, Kee, and the baby are moving 
out of the block of flats which help to emphasise both the quest-like structure of the film and 
visually highlight the built environment. Secondly, the battle scenes are surprisingly secondary 
to the central narrative of the film. Despite the lack of narrative dominance given over to the 
battle, Cuarón’s visual treatment of it forces us to see the destruction of the built environment 
as something that is central to the film. Rather than let it fade in to the background, it is 
important to be attentive to visual clues such as shot length and frame composition that a film 
can present a viewer with. Monaco describes the long tracking shot as ‘the cinematic equivalent 
of making love’ as it unites the filmmaker with their subject.398 While we may question his 
language here, Monaco’s point is that the tracking shot, such as those that Cuarón is noted for, 
has the effect of bringing a viewer more directly into a scene, acting in a similar fashion to a 
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first-person narrative in prose work. Thus, the effect of this technique is to highlight the 
aesthetic subject’s movement through the visuals of the movie. As they move through the urban 
landscape, the quest-like structure of the film becomes more prominent, and the location of the 
built environment becomes central to the narrative. While Theo’s death takes place in a rowing 
boat and not in the city, Bexhill is the location of his fatal wound. Thus, the built environment 
of Bexhill becomes central to the sacrifice and ultimate success of his mission. Sacrifice and 
urbanity thus become intricately woven together in the plot, visuals, and affects of the movie. 
Similarly and nearly simultaneously within the War on Terror the National Strategy for Victory 
in Iraq of 2005 highlights the centrality of urbanity to success when discussing the clear, hold, 
and build strategy:  
 
Significant progress has been made is wresting territory from enemy control. During much of 
2004, major parts of Iraq and important urban centers were no-go areas for Iraqi and Coalition 
forces. Fallujah, Najaf, and Samara were under enemy control. Today, these cities are under 
Iraqi government control, and the political process is taking hold.399 
 
Therefore, while sacrifice and urbanity have been important factors in military campaigns since 
well before the War on Terror, the intense encounters allowed for by simultaneous political and 
cultural artefacts allow these conditions to become embedded in audiences at a pre-cognitive 
level. The result of this is that both sacrifice and the built environment become necessary 
markers for victory within the War on Terror or, alternatively, allows them to emerge as 
conditions of success.  
 
Furthermore as the tracking shot is not a traditional technique for the action genre, defined as it 
is more by quick cuts and “shakycam” footage, this sequence serves to highlight the conflictual 
and destructive aspects of “real-world” conflict more clearly. While the conflict becomes 
background Coward, discussing the writing of Slavenka Drakulic, talks about how she suggests 
‘that it is “life” which is ephemeral and that the “world” must be understood as being constituted 
by that which was previously thought to be the mere background for activity: buildings.’400 
Shapiro’s aesthetic subject might also allow us to push this further and demonstrate how the 
effect of this destruction is not related to the psychological state of the protagonists or indeed 
the internal meaning of the film. Shapiro says that ‘It is aesthetic modes of apprehension, 
articulated in artistic texts – films and novels for example – that often provide the most effective 
analytic.’401 Shapiro’s aesthetic subject, as it is related to the urban landscape discussed above, 
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also relates to Coward’s take on anthropocentrism in discussions of conflict. As Coward notes, 
‘the various non-living entities that anthropocentric accounts see as simply the backdrop against 
which political community is enacted are, in fact, to be seen as constitutive factors. And hence, 
the destruction of such “material” must be an attack on that political community.’402 Therefore 
the literal background scenes of cinema, in this case the urban landscape and its destruction 
given prominence through the tracking shot, are an important site for the emergence of 
conditions of victory. As mentioned above the tracking shot, while visually pushing the conflict 
to the background, actually serves to highlight the importance of the urban setting of this 
climactic sequence through both the technique of the shot as well as the fact that it is unusual 
in the genre. Thus, it helps to forge connections between the cinematic artefact and the 
concurrent political events of the War on Terror, replete as it is with the destruction of the built 
environment so often pushed into the background but also critical to military success. 
 
It is obvious that the policy of the Iraq surge of 2007 was not urbicide in the sense of the 
deliberate and wholesale destruction of urban environments like those Coward discusses in 
relation to Bosnia and it should go without saying that the surge was not akin to the alien tripod 
invasion of War of the Worlds, the urban destruction wrought by the ‘Krippen virus’ in I am 
Legend, or the societal and urban collapse as a result of infertility as seen in Children of Men. 
However, the focus on the built environment is something that is common to both these 
situations. Announcing the surge in 2007, George W. Bush placed an emphasis on the built 
environment of Baghdad and the need to bring security and stability to ‘sectarian enclaves’ in 
that city.403 In order to bring this security to the city, Iraqi forces were tasked with ‘conducting 
patrols and setting up checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of Baghdad 
residents.’404 Considering that ‘eighty percent of Iraq’s sectarian violence occurs within 30 
miles of the capital,’ and that the goal of the surge in Iraq in 2007 was to ensure that ‘our 
enemies would [not] have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American 
people’ it is very clear that the military strategy of the surge was heavily focused on urban areas. 
Although the surge was not urbicide in the sense that Coward uses it, the focus on the built 
environment politically and militarily allowed the US government to claim that it is winning 
because of the emergence of urbanity as a conditions of success.  
 
Focusing on the urban landscape of Iraq was not just productive from a cost-benefit analysis or 
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rational choice perspective, it was productive because it tapped into the cultural milieu that 
positions that urban environment as central to victory.405 If audiences have become used to 
witnessing success take place in the built environment of New Jersey, Bexhill, and New York, 
then it becomes easier to argue that a focus on Baghdad and the Sunni triangle is necessary to 
victory in Iraq.406 By controlling that built environment in the context of Baghdad therefore, the 
US could move one step closer to a condition of victory - securing the major urban centres of 
population.407 Referring to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, President Bush says 
numerous times in December 2005 and January 2006 that ‘victory will be achieved when the 
terrorists and Saddamists can no longer threaten Iraq’s democracy, when the Iraqi security 
forces can provide for the safety of their own citizens, and when Iraq is not a safe haven for 
terrorists to plot new attacks against our nation.’408 Furthermore, the emphasis on the urban 
areas of the insurgency as the key points that needed to be secured resonates with the focus on 
the city that is clearly seen in these films. Not only is the site of sacrifice and therefore 
redemption the built environment, but the urbanity of a particular place is itself an important 
conditions of success. By positioning urbanity as crucial to success in the War on Terror, 
political leaders can exploit the already existing pre-cognitive connections that audiences have 
made between urbanity and victory. The cultural depictions of violence and victory taking place 
against the backdrop of the built environment works to cement the importance of this 
environment to political violence and victory.409 Just as exceptionalism and technology can be 
successfully politically deployed as conditions of success by drawing on already existing 
cultural depictions and the formation of pre-cognitive basins of attraction in audiences, so too 
can sacrifice and urbanity. 
 
Much like the resonance between film and politics with regards to religion, discussed above, 
and technology and American exceptionalism as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
connection that exists between the destruction of urban identity in cultural and political artefacts 
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is not a causal one. I am not suggesting that President Bush was encouraged to authorise the 
surge in Baghdad because he was worried that it might become like New York in I am Legend, 
New Jersey in War of the Worlds or Bexhill in Children of Men. Likewise I am not suggesting 
that these films were popular purely because they echoed a political or media driven narrative 
of Baghdad as a site of violence and destruction that was emerging from Iraq during these 
years.410 Rather what I am arguing is that the simultaneous expression of these conditions of 
urbanity and sacrifice form part of the complex web of connection and causality that allows for 
political claims of victory to be articulated and accepted. The effect of this concurrence and 
mutual reinforcement is to allow sacrifice and urbanity to emerge from the end of wars 
assemblage as conditions of success. These conditions clearly situate the site of sacrifice and 
success in the city and other built environments, thus co-constituting and legitimising political 
discourses of the importance of these urban environments to eventual victory in the War on 
Terror. These politico-cultural connections and the conditions of success that they allow for 
through the assemblage creates a powerful political force that works to articulate the political 
necessity of presenting both progress and inevitable conclusions in the War on Terror. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the eschatological nature of these three films produced 
cinematic encounters that allowed for sacrifice and urbanity to emerge as conditions of success 
in the end of wars assemblage. This is achieved through plot structure, imagery, language, and 
tropes of sacrifice begetting salvation and the cinematic and political location of this being the 
urban, built, environment. This can be shown to support the central argument of this thesis that 
cinema works through affect and encounters in order to form pre-cognitive basins of attraction 
that connect certain elements with victory. These conditions of success can then be politically 
deployed in order to make a claim to truth that a conflict has ended or will end. Drawing on and 
developing an understanding of what constitutes a (post-) apocalyptic film - and the shift from 
a strictly theological understanding of The End to a more anthropocentric one - it has been 
argued that one of the central aspects of this categorisation is the narrative of redemption 
through sacrifice. This is demonstrated clearly in the three films under discussion here, where 
the sacrifices of the main character or someone close to them has resulted in the successful 
conclusion of the particular conflict they are embroiled in. This is also demonstrated in 
President Bush’s speech announcing the surge in Iraq and the necessity of sacrifice to its 
success. Not only are these parallel narratives, but the encounter that is inculcated between 
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audiences and cinematic or political artefacts provides a way to theorise how the cultural 
connects with and influences the political. Through these encounters, the connections that are 
formed, and the machine of the assemblage, these parallel narratives forge links that 
territorialise the assemblage and allow for particular conditions of success to emerge. Namely, 
that the endings to conflicts in the War on Terror are guaranteed provided we sacrifice, and that 
we do so in urban environments. As has also been discussed, these conditions of success or 
emergent properties are not necessarily sui generis but, like American exceptionalism and 
technology, have a long history. While the periodization of this thesis may imply that sacrifice 
and urbanity only became central to the War on Terror from 2005 onwards, the case is that they 
were embedded from the attacks on New York and potentially even earlier given the history of 
warfare. 
 
These links are further territorialised through the particular geographies of sacrifice and 
redemption. As has been demonstrated, the key location for these losses is the urban, built, 
environment. Simultaneous cinematic and political depictions of this again works to allow for 
encounters between audiences, cinema, and politics that allows for the creation of conditions 
of success. As Ryan Bishop and Gregory Clancey state,  
 
The Modern City has begun to be subject to a new kind of catastrophic imaginary…the recent 
intensification and increase in Old Testament-scale images of urban destruction in the 
convergent realms of journalism, film, military action, telecommunications, government policy-
making, computer gaming, and the academic press show no sign of abating…the Postmodern 
City is now visualized more commonly than before as a site of violent, sudden death writ large 
and small, a new economy of images that makes the old (modern) one seem tinted and opaque.411 
 
What this highlights is that the two thematic strands of this chapter operate at this vital 
intersection of culture and politics. This chapter has demonstrated, through an engagement with 
the apocalypse, urbanity, and the connections that these form between culture and politics, that 
these two spheres are mutually imbricated in one another’s constitution and work to allow 
particular conditions of success to emerge and be politically articulated and operationalised. So 
far in this thesis I have articulated a theoretical understanding of how culture and politics 
interact through the end of wars assemblage; drawn a brief history of the genre of cinema being 
discussed; and demonstrated that American exceptionalism, technology, religion, and the city 
are key conditions of success that emerged from the end of wars assemblage from 2000 to 2007. 
In the following two chapters, I analyse whether this assemblage and the conditions of success 
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that have emerged from it so far are stable given a changing political and cultural landscape. 
The films discussed hereafter might, at first glance, seem to deterritorialise the assemblage, 
potentially causing it to change, evolve and produce new conditions of success. As will be 
shown though, this critical potential is fleeting and the assemblage, conditions of success, and 
the reality of the War on Terror remain largely intact. 
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Chapter Five: Hope and Change 
 
“You don’t start out a politician, you become one…I want to make a difference. If your little 
daughter thinks I’m a hero, I’m going to earn that”  
White House Down (2013) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The American presidential election of 2007/2008 and subsequent inauguration of President 
Obama in January 2009 had the potential to radically reshape the end of wars assemblage that 
has been established since 2001. Standing on a platform of hope and change, Obama’s stance 
against the Iraq War, against the needless sacrifice of American troops there, against the use of 
torture and Guantanamo Bay prison all had the possibility to undermine the political rhetoric of 
his predecessor and therefore the end of wars assemblage. Specifically, they could challenge 
the stability of conditions of success such as sacrifice and redemption, American 
exceptionalism, the use of technology, and the role of the built environment that have been 
shown to have emerged from the assemblage in previous chapters. Similarly, the films to be 
analysed in this chapter all exhibit critical potentials within the context of the action genre and 
have the possibility to culturally reshape these conditions as well. The purpose of this chapter, 
then, is to ascertain the stability of the assemblage as it has developed over time. While the 
processes of stabilisation and destabilisation of assemblages are simultaneous with one another, 
it is useful to analytically divide them for the purposes of clarity. Having assessed how the 
assemblage was stabilised and how conditions of success emerged, it is fruitful to explore how 
they are also subject to challenge and change. However, as will be shown throughout this 
chapter, these potentials for radically reshaping the conditions of victory in the War on Terror 
go unfulfilled. 
 
As we have moved through political time from World War Two to 9/11, on through the invasion 
of Iraq and the Surge that are discussed in the previous chapters to a different era of the War on 
Terror – one initially defined by the “hope and change” of the newly elected Obama 
administration, we have also moved through cinematic time. We have seen how the action film 
developed from combat films such as Bataan, Fixed Bayonets!, and Apocalypse Now; how these 
films have deployed narrative tropes including the formation of a group and the predominance 
of American violence; and we have also explored how these films shape and construct some 
key conditions of success embracing American exceptionalism, technology, sacrifice, and the 
role of the built environment in conflict. Chapters three and four analysed how exceptionalism, 
technology, sacrifice, and urbanity emerged from the end of wars assemblage as conditions of 
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success through cinematic encounters. While the assemblage is always in a process of change, 
and its emergent properties are not sui generis, identifying these four conditions of success 
allows us to now assess their resilience to change. This chapter builds on previous examples of 
how popular culture, and the action genre in particular, functions as a node in the end of wars 
assemblage that then works to articulate a sense of ending in the War on Terror. What makes 
the films discussed in this chapter highly interesting, compared to those discussed in previous 
chapters, is that at first glance they apparently produce alternative lines of flight within the 
assemblage that could work to destabilise it and therefore critique dominant understandings of 
how endings in armed conflict are arrived at. Combined with the simultaneous challenge of 
Obama’s rhetoric to the political side of the end of wars assemblage, these artefacts have the 
potential to disturb and destabilise the assemblage, possibly allowing for new basins of 
attraction to form. In Protevi’s terms, this confluence may shock the system to adopt new modes 
of behaviour.412 However I argue that despite their critical veneer these films and Obama’s 
policies work to support already established and emerged conditions of success necessary to 
make a political claim to truth about endings in the War on Terror.  
 
Here, I use Hancock (2008), Inglourious Basterds (2009), The A-Team (2010), RED (2010), 
and The Expendables (2010) in order to explore how seemingly critical mainstream cinema 
functions within the assemblage. As explained previously, this is in order to ascertain how 
potentially destabilising forces act on the assemblage as well as to more broadly ascertain the 
stability and resilience of it. I will argue, however, that these movies – while exhibiting critical 
potential – do not fulfil it but rather work to stabilise the assemblage and previously enumerated 
conditions of success. Not only because of the structure of their narratives, the tropes and 
imagery they deploy, or the formal cinematic techniques they utilise but precisely because they 
use these tools first in a manner to critique then in a manner to support. The double movement 
of critique then praise is a formidable combination that amplifies similar movements in the 
political rhetoric of President Obama. This chapter will argue that this ultimately strengthens 
the end of wars assemblage and the conditions of victory that are articulated through it. This 
argument is further reinforced by the changing nature of the War on Terror in the years covered 
by this chapter. Barack Obama’s election on a platform of change, pledges to end the War in 
Iraq, wind-down American involvement overseas, and a pivot to Asia followed by an 
intervention in the Libyan Civil War, an expanded drone programme, and practices of extra-
judicial killing serve to highlight how this political double movement works to strengthen rather 
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than weaken the end of wars assemblage. I will also show that through the inversion and 
restoration of genre tropes, and the use of pastiche these movies shape and reinforce the already 
established conditions of victory. This has the concomitant effect of strengthening the stability 
of the end of wars assemblage rather than weakening it.  
 
Before we can get to the analysis of these cultural artefacts413 it is necessary to lay out the route. 
This chapter proceeds in three major parts. Firstly, a brief elucidation on how genre functions 
within the end of wars assemblage is necessary to frame both this chapter and to add to the 
argument of the thesis more generally. Taking, as I do, films that can all be categorised as part 
of the broad genre of the action movie it is important to ascertain how genre generally and this 
genre in particular works within the context of the assemblage. This builds on the discussion in 
chapter two where I laid out a history of the genre from the World War Two combat film to the 
present day. While I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of these films within the 
assemblage, they do represent a significant challenge to, inversion and eventual reinforcement 
of numerous tropes within the action genre, and specific elements within the combat, superhero 
and spy sub-genres. While processes of destabilisation emerged from cinema and popular 
culture before the period under discussion here, I want to explore how the simultaneity of 
cultural and political destabilisations resonate with, and intensify the encounters induced by, 
each other.414 Secondly, I will discuss how these inversions of genre tropes wear the mask of a 
critique of dominant genre and political conventions through the equation of American political 
violence with that of the Nazis; the challenging of the superhero genre as constructive of the 
monomyth of American exceptionalism; and humour, pastiche, and hypertextuality. Finally, I 
argue that these inversions and potential lines of flight are ultimately unsuccessful in 
undermining the end of wars assemblage. Rather, the inversions are eventually abandoned in 
favour of dominant tropes presenting films that are somewhat conventional in their approach to 
genre. The effect of this is that any critical potential to undermine the end of wars assemblage 
is halted. 
 
As well as the changing nature of cultural artefacts and the action genre in these years, political 
changes are also apparent. The election of President Obama on the promise of change and the 
initial rejection then ultimate reinforcement of dominant understandings of political violence 
and endings in the War on Terror function in a similar way to cinematic genre. Both political 
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and cultural artefacts in these years have the potential to undermine and reshape the end of wars 
assemblage and the conditions of success that are its emergent properties. What will ultimately 
be demonstrated in this chapter is that these movies and political rhetoric work in similar ways 
to those in previous chapters in that they further strengthen claims of victory that are based on 
the concepts and categories outlined previously and particularly exceptionalism, urbanity, and 
sacrifice. The parallel nature of these movies’ potential to undermine tropes and conventions of 
the genre and Obama’s potential to undermine the conditions of success utilised under President 
Bush serve to highlight that a challenge to the structure of the end of wars assemblage is 
possible. As will be shown, this undermining followed by a reaffirmation of these motifs of 
genre and victory work together in order to not just re-establish the conditions of success 
articulated through the assemblage but actually give more power to them by subjecting them to 
a less than critical analysis, referred to in this chapter as a mask of critique. 
 
5.2 Changing genres 
Dodds suggests that not enough time has been given in political research on film ‘to the question 
of genre and even subgenre with regard to the manufacturing of geopolitical constructions and 
identity politics.’415 This section will engage with genre and how their evolution over time can 
change certain conditions of political possibility. Cinematic genres are necessarily fluid 
categories. As Moine points out, ‘film genres are always easier to recognize than to define, 
being often impure, because the mixing of genres invalidates any attempt to achieve a rigorous 
taxonomy.’416 Filmmakers have to alter, update, and renew genre conventions in order to 
maintain the relevance of a style of film in changing times. Political, social, and cultural changes 
have to be taken into account when working within the confines of a specific genre. While the 
history of the action film has been traced in chapter two through World War II, Korea, Vietnam, 
the Cold War, and into the War on Terror, this does not imply that the genre has remained static 
since 9/11. All genres of cinema, and indeed all styles of cultural production, are in a process 
of evolution, even the seemingly static, trope laden, conventional, and generic action movie. 
However, as Basinger makes clear, just because genre conventions change, this does not imply 
a teleological argument that cinema is moving towards an ultimate ideal form or even that these 
changes are progressive: 
 
By speaking of “evolution” of a genre I do not imply a sense of progression, a development 
toward a higher order. I mean only to suggest a state of change…Genres have to change to 
remain popular. At the same time, they have to stay the same to be genres.417 
                                                          
415 Dodds, ‘‘Have You Seen Any Good Films Lately?’, 480. 
416 Raphaëlle Moine, Cinema Genre, trans. Alistair Fox and Hilary Radner (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), xv. 
417 Basinger, The World War II Combat Film, 1986, 121. 
151 
 
 
In the end, the mainstream Hollywood cinema that is being discussed in this thesis is about 
making money which will always constrain the speed of change and the potential for critique. 
James Monaco makes the historic distinction between European cinema as art and American 
cinema as ‘movies: made for money, not aesthetics.’418 Raphaëlle Moine however suggests that 
the values inherent in the contrast between auteur and genre cinema can be reversed ‘with a 
highly inventive, spectacular, and entertaining genre cinema (that draw upon the brand image 
of American cinema) being contrasted with an off-putting, self-indulgent, soporific auteur 
cinema.’419 An example of this discussed here might be Inglourious Basterds and indeed 
Tarantino’s entire oeuvre. Directors and studios are understandably cautious about trying new 
things that may alienate an audience and affect their bottom line. As such, genre conventions 
in the big budget movies analysed here change very slowly. However, Monaco has claimed that 
‘Despite this unprecedented financial upheaval [in the late 80s and 90s that is dealt with in detail 
in his book], there has been no discernible change in the product that Hollywood 
manufactures.’420 I am inclined to disagree with this however. For example action movies have 
moved towards more realistic depictions of violence. If we compare the climactic gun battle in 
two Arnold Schwarzenegger films: Commando (1985) made at the height of his career as an 
action star and The Last Stand (2013) made after his post-gubernatorial return to film we can 
clearly see a marked difference in the nature of the violence. While in Commando, 
Schwarzenegger is topless and firing guns from the hip at hordes of bad guys with scant regard 
for aiming or ammunition, The Last Stand sees the actors use weapons in a much more 
professional and militarised fashion. This development towards realism in the genre as it has 
the potential effect to increase audience immersion in the action of the movie and thus to 
increase the power of affective encounters. If the violence depicted is more realistic, it is more 
likely that the fourth wall stays intact and the movie can affect audiences in deeper and more 
long-lasting ways.421 This is also related to a fetishization of violence and weapons that I 
discussed in chapter two with reference to Black Hawk Down (2001). While the convention of 
the climactic gun battle has remained, how it is shot has changed dramatically. What we can 
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see then is that while genres have to stay the same to be genres, they also change slowly over 
time to take into account shifting cultural norms. Not only this, but these changes can have an 
effect on audiences and the assemblages that these movies are part of.  
 
How these changes in genre influence the end of wars assemblage is an important question to 
ask. It is this challenging and remaking of genre within films that contributes to their relations 
of exteriority with other components of the assemblage. As Deleuze and Guattari note, ‘contrary 
to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the 
world, there is a parallel evolution of the book and the world.’422 Here, ‘book’ can easily be 
substituted for ‘film’ as an alternative cultural artefact laying clear the need for an 
understanding of how changes in cultural artefacts over time effect changes in the world of 
political reality. As the action genre is a component of the assemblage, tracing how the genre 
changes over time allows us to ascertain how the assemblage might change. Having traced how 
the end of wars assemblage was shaped in the aftermath of 9/11 and the start of the War on 
Terror, it is vital to understand whether and how it has remained stable in the ensuing years. 
The cumulative effects of changing culture and politics have the potential to reshape the 
assemblage and the previously enumerated conditions of success that are its emergent 
properties. What will be presented in the remainder of this chapter then is an exploration of how 
these films challenge but ultimately reassert important aspects of the genre, how this parallels 
with challenges to, and the reassertion of, the rhetoric of the Bush administration and the effect 
that this has on the stability and resilience of the end of wars assemblage. Inglourious Basterds 
perhaps provides the clearest example of how this selection of films invert, modify, and 
generally play around with genre conventions that we have come to associate with the action 
film, how we can map this evolution onto contemporaneous political discourse, and what effect 
this has on the assemblage. 
 
5.3 The mask of critique: undermining conditions of success 
The films discussed from these years all engage, to a degree, in certain forms of 
deterritorialisation of the end of wars assemblage. Artefacts with deterritorialising aspects can 
work to disrupt, destabilise, and critique an assemblage and the conditions it allows for. This is 
achieved by challenging the component organs upon which the assemblage is predicated. If the 
input (movies) to the machine-like assemblage alters, so too must the output (conditions of 
success). In this case, the end of wars assemblage and the conditions of victory that are its 
emergent properties are subjected to a false critique as the nature of genre and political rhetoric 
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changes. The effect of these changes on the assemblage is two-fold. Firstly, we find in these 
films the possibility of a critique to be articulated against dominant masculinised, historicised, 
exceptional, and moral narratives of American power and the implications that can have for the 
stability of an assemblage that works to construct endings. However, elements that exhibit 
critical potentials are not always continued throughout the movie or implications are not 
necessarily as critical as first suggested. Thus, the critical potential is not always fulfilled which 
is why I use the term mask of critique. Once the critical potentials of these movies have been 
explored it will be shown in section 5.4 that the critical potentials exhibited in these movies 
ultimately work not to subvert but to strengthen the end of wars assemblage and its previously 
established conditions of victory, and indeed have a more powerful effect given their mask of 
critique. 
 
5.3.1 Inglourious Basterds 
Examples of generic inversion and critical potential abound in the films under discussion here. 
Given that Inglourious Basterds is set during World War Two, it is useful to turn to Basinger 
once again for an idea of generic inversion as ‘turning the former beliefs and truths inside 
out.’423 In the first act, Inglourious Basterds does exactly this. Tarantino’s films are noted for 
their visceral and apparently acceptable depictions of violence. Examples include the ‘Stuck in 
the Middle with you’ scene in Reservoir Dogs (1992) where Mr Blonde (Michael Madsen) 
tortures a kidnapped policeman (Kirk Baltz) by, among other things, cutting off his ear. Or in 
Pulp Fiction (1994) when Maynard (Duane Whitaker) and Zed (Peter Greene) rape Marsellus 
Wallace (Ving Rhames) only to be killed by Butch (Bruce Willis) with a sword. Kill Bill vol. 1 
(2003) sees O-Ren Ishii (Lucy Liu) cutting off an associates head saying ‘The price you pay for 
bringing up either my Chinese or American heritage as a negative is, I collect your fucking 
head. Just like this fucker here.’ Finally in Inglourious Basterds Aldo (Brad Pitt) announces the 
killing of one of the captured soldiers saying ‘I’m calling the Bear Jew and he’s gonna take that 
big bat of his and he’s gonna beat your ass to death with it.’424 So we must understand the 
depictions of violence in these films within Tarantino’s well established style. This style is not 
without its critics however, Henry Giroux argues that 
 
Tarantino makes no attempts cinematically to rupture or contest the patterns of violence that his 
films produce or claim to represent. On the contrary, he empties violence of any critical social 
consequences, offering viewers only the immediacy of shock, humour, and irony as elements of 
                                                          
423 Basinger, The World War II Combat Film, 1986, 201. 
424 Quentin Tarantino, Reservoir Dogs (Miramax, 1992); Quentin Tarantino, Pulp Fiction (Miramax, 1994); 
Quentin Tarantino, Kill Bill: Vol. 1 (Miramax, 2003); Quentin Tarantino, Inglourious Basterds (Universal 
Pictures, 2009). 
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mediation. And none of these elements get beyond the seduction of voyeuristic gazing so as to 
demand critical involvement.425  
 
What makes the shock, humour and irony of the violence in Inglourious Basterds different is 
that it depicts this violence being carried out by American soldiers albeit for a just and moral 
cause rather than criminals, hitmen, and gangsters as in the films mentioned above. So while 
Inglourious Basterds does not present a challenge to the conventions of a Tarantino film, it does 
represent an inversion of the generic tropes of an action film, and certainly those of a World 
War Two combat film which Inglorious Basterds draws upon. World War Two combat films 
are invariably highly violent affairs, and sometimes this violence is carried out by characters 
not readily associated with American ideals, such as The Dirty Dozen (1967). However, 
Tarantino’s film, especially when read against his other outputs, presents this violence in a 
much more visceral manner. Following Giroux, the political ramifications of this might be to 
question Western moral superiority and ideas of American exceptionalism through its equating 
of American violence with Nazi violence.426   
 
Unlike films analysed in previous chapters such as Tears of the Sun Tarantino’s film appears to 
undermine the moral superiority of American military violence. An example of this is in the 
first scene in occupied France in Chapter Two of the film, we see a Nazi sergeant, decorated 
for bravery, respectfully refuse to betray his comrades only to be brutally beaten to death and 
scalped by Americans. Depicting the bludgeoning and scalping of soldiers, even Nazis, and 
talking about how ‘they ain’t got no humanity…they need to be destroyed’ certainly equates 
the violence meted out by Americans to that carried out by the Nazis.427 Ben Walters also reads 
this into the movie saying that ‘The Basterds are war criminals, explicitly denying Nazi’s 
humanity, targeting them for summary execution, and desecrating their corpses by scalping.’428 
Furthermore, Basinger’s quote above goes on to mention a specific example of inversion, ‘such 
as equating our side with the Nazis, making us their counterparts in evil.’429 While combat films 
made during and in the immediate aftermath of World War Two such as Bataan depict masses 
of barely humanised Japanese soldiers being butchered by Americans, these can be seen within 
                                                          
425 Henry A. Giroux, ‘Pulp Fiction and the Culture of Violence’, Harvard Educational Review 65, no. 2 (1995): 
308. 
426 Another important and novel aspect of Inglourious Basterds is that the American soldiers are exclusively 
Jewish. This adds another layer of complexity to the depictions of political violence. While not a movie 
exclusively about Jewish revenge on Nazis, it is neither a movie exclusively about violence that is solely 
American. 
427 Tarantino, Inglourious Basterds. 
428 Ben Walters, ‘Debating Inglourious Basterds’, Film Quarterly 63, no. 2 (2009): 21, 
https://doi.org/10.1525/fq.2009.63.2.19. 
429 Basinger, The World War II Combat Film, 1986, 201. 
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a historical context of ongoing total war. This is not to excuse their violence, racism, and 
processes of dehumanisation but rather to align Tarantino’s film with earlier racist and 
dehumanising depictions of World War Two which serves to highlight the inversion of genre 
that this film exhibits.  
 
What must be kept in mind for the analysis of Inglourious Basterds in this context is that the 
meaning of a film is less important than the affects it produces. Discussing the superhero genre, 
Dittmer argues that ‘a focus on the “meaning” (singular) of a superhero film essentializes the 
plurality of meanings that can be, and are, associated with a film at various points in its 
circulation.’430  In this vein, these scenes of violence can be read as well within Tarantino’s 
established style but this does not detract from the visceral, savage, and unvarnished nature of 
it as depicted. For instance, the close-up of one of the soldiers removing the scalp from a dead 
Nazi is, as an understatement, rather repulsive. The affective response that this gruesome 
violence can induce in an audience has the effect of further enhancing the comparison made 
between Americans and Nazis. Reading the film in this light allows for an argument that 
Inglourious Basterds has the potential to deterritorialise the end of wars assemblage by 
undermining the moral superiority of American political violence, thus also undermining a 
central condition of success that was discussed in chapter three. This inversion, or line of flight, 
was also present in some of the rhetoric of President Obama. 
 
Then-senator Obama, campaigning for the Presidency in 2007/2008 stood on a platform that 
represented a radical shift in foreign policy designed to restore America’s standing in the world. 
As he said just before the Iowa caucuses, ‘If you believe, we can end this war, close 
Guantanamo, restore our standing, renew our diplomacy, and once again respect the 
Constitution…That’s the future within our reach. That’s what hope is.’431 This would become 
a common refrain in his political speeches over the next eight years. In a major national security 
speech in May 2009, he clearly articulated that ‘Guantanamo set back the moral authority that 
is America’s strongest currency in the world…Indeed, the existence of Guantanamo likely 
created more terrorists around the world than it ever detained.’432 Even in his final State of the 
Union address he remarked that the prison is expensive, unnecessary, and ‘it only serves as a 
recruitment brochure for our enemies.’433  
                                                          
430 Dittmer, ‘American Exceptionalism, Visual Effects, and the Post-9/11 Cinematic Superhero Boom’, 118. 
431 Barack Obama, ‘Barack Obama: Remarks in Des Moines, Iowa: “Our Moment Is Now”’, The American 
Presidency Project, 27 October 2007, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77026. 
432 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President On National Security’, The White House, 21 May 2009, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09. 
433 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks of President Barack Obama – State of the Union Address As Delivered’, The White 
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President Obama’s frequent remarks on Guantanamo not only serve to distance himself 
politically from his predecessor, but they also invert the conventional understanding of the 
conditions of success as utilised by President Bush who in his 2002 State of the Union address 
says that ‘Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay.’434 
Rather than being a necessary condition for progress and success in the War on Terror, 
Guantanamo Bay becomes symbolic of America undermining the very values that it purports 
to fight for and the values that can be politically deployed as a condition of success. As President 
Obama continues in the same speech as above, ‘The American people…know that we need not 
sacrifice our security for our values, nor sacrifice our values for our security.’435 Obama here 
has engaged in a parallel move to what we have seen in Inglorious Basterds. He does not equate 
Americans with the terrorists in Guantanamo Bay as obviously as Inglorious Basterds makes 
such a comparison but he does question the moral superiority of a country with institutions like 
Guantanamo Bay. Both Obama’s depiction of Guantanamo Bay and Tarantino’s portrayal of 
American violence thus articulate critical and alternative lines of flight within the assemblage 
that have the potential to undermine American moral superiority questioning the existence of 
American exceptionalism and its role as a condition of success in the War on Terror. This has 
the potential to change the end of wars assemblage by making American exceptionalism as a 
condition of success less important or less politically useful. 
 
5.3.2 Hancock 
Let us now turn to Hancock and compare it to the genre conventions of a superhero action 
movie in order to ascertain where its critical potentials lie.436 Hancock presents a radical 
departure from the norms of a superhero movie – he’s drunk, he’s irresponsible, he’s 
destructive, and he has a questionable moral code. It is possible to read the character of Hancock 
as an avatar for America circa 2008: someone who has lost their way and engages in reckless 
violence with noble aims but disastrous consequences for the people affected. It is simplistic to 
                                                          
House, 13 January 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-
barack-obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-delivery-state-union-address. 
434 Bush, ‘President Delivers State of the Union Address’. 
435 Obama, ‘Remarks by the President On National Security’. 
436 Questions of which genre to categorise a movie in are complicated. While the superhero movie may be 
emerging as a distinct genre given the success of Marvel adaptations, I would argue that it can also be seen as 
part of the broader action genre. It has a focus on a lone (male) hero who overcomes adversity in order to enact 
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read Hancock merely as a mimetic representation of the foreign policy of the Bush 
administration and Dittmer argues that ‘the superhero genre as a whole resonates with the events 
of the past decade.’437 Because of this resonance, analysing a superhero movie that does things 
differently to others is useful in assessing the resilience of the assemblage to changing cultural 
artefacts, especially considering that American exceptionalism is inherently bound up with the 
superhero. Inspired by Shapiro’s concept of the aesthetic subject and how it relates to character, 
this analysis will focus on the character of Hancock and how he represents a challenge to the 
norm of a superhero. Tag Gallagher justifies such a focus on characters when he says that it is 
sometimes ‘more important than narrative, because cinema gives us direct and immediate 
experience of another person, and an event is more the personality of the doer than the deed 
that is done.’438 Shapiro’s concept of the aesthetic subject can be useful in understanding the 
impact of characters in films. The aesthetic subject is particularly useful in the context of this 
chapter as Shapiro argues that they mobilise thinking through genre and, rather than revealing 
the internal mind-set of the character, they can tell us something about the world, and their 
effect on it.439 Furthermore, Shapiro argues that there are ‘methodological advantages of turning 
to artistic texts whose characters serve as aesthetic subject, embodying feelings and actions that 
deliver the critical insights’ that are central to an analysis.440 Thus, an understanding of the 
character of Hancock can help us explore in more depth and detail the implications his actions 
have on the genre and therefore the effect that this inversion has on the creation and 
legitimisation of American exceptionalism as a condition of success in the War on Terror.  
 
Jewett and Lawrence identify the superhero as integral to the American monomyth and ‘part of 
a broad mythic stream that flows through superheroic comics, television programing, films, and 
video games’ that traces it routes through the myths of the founding of America.441 As explored 
in chapter three, part of that American monomyth is the idea that America is an exceptional 
country with a divine future and excellent morals and that this was one of the conditions of 
success to emerge from the end of wars assemblage early in the War on Terror. As avatars of 
that monomyth, superheroes should embody these exceptional ideals. Though not always 
respected (for example, Batman at the end of The Dark Knight (2008)), trusted (the Hulk in The 
Incredible Hulk (2008)), or even well liked (Iron Man), contemporary superheroes have often 
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been read in the role of a guardian of national freedoms and avatars of American 
exceptionalism.442 From the outset of Hancock though, it is clear that he does not conform to 
this genre type. However, by depicting Hancock as a reckless hero, the film challenges the 
notion of the superhero as always embodying these values of American exceptionalism and the 
film, at first glance, seems to present a serious challenge to this dominant trope. 
 
The film opens with a reasonably standard car chase where (presumably) criminals are being 
pursued by police while firing automatic weapons. The use of shaky-cam here contributes an 
element of direct cinema to the sequence, lending a sense of realism and immediacy to the 
proceedings. It is a quick way to encourage audiences to immerse themselves into the movie 
and implies a certain aspect of truth-telling to the narrative.443 Our first shot of Hancock himself 
is an interesting introduction to this seemingly new type of superhero. The very first glimpse 
we get of him is of his leg, which is obviously that of an African-American. Already, the film 
is challenging the conventions of the genre by portraying a superhero as non-white.444 As the 
camera pans up, we see a sleeping and unkempt man while the camera switches to an empty 
bourbon bottle rolling away. Again, this is not what is expected of the avatar of the grand 
American monomyth. As the shots flick between the car chase and Hancock sleeping, there is 
also a change in music. During the car chase the music is upbeat rock (almost reminiscent of 
the Dixie car movies of the 1970s) moving to orchestral while the early shots of Hancock are 
scored quietly with a blues guitar and drum.445 Not only is this quite humorous, it also serves to 
sonically highlight the contrast between expectations of the genre (exciting car chase and upbeat 
music) and the reality of this particular superhero (quiet, asleep, and African-American). 
Clearly hungover, a child tells him of the “bad guys” to which Hancock replies “What do you 
want, a cookie? Get out of my face.” The child calls him an asshole, as does a woman he 
attempts to harass. Again, the contrast between the ideal of a superhero as noble and aspirational 
is clearly challenged. All of this is most likely intentional as the bench on which Hancock is 
sleeping even has the word “dream” on it suggesting the connection between exceptionalism 
and the American dream. This further serves to contrast visually the American ideal of a 
superhero, and the reality of this one. As Hancock takes off, he destroys the bench in the process 
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– this destruction of property will be a recurring theme in the first act of the movie. Already 
within the first three minutes of the film then we see an undermining of the idea of the superhero 
as avatar of exceptional moral values. This challenge of American moral exceptionalism is 
portrayed in audio, visual, narrative, and racial terms. 
 
The first act of the film largely follows a similar logic. While Hancock performs noble deeds 
such as apprehending the criminals in the opening sequence or saving Ray (Jason Bateman) 
from a level crossing, the way in which he does it is different to the typical superhero that 
audiences are used to. For instance, he causes millions of dollars’ worth of damage to 
infrastructure and property in LA. When we compare the actions of Hancock to the more 
mainstream comic book superheroes such as Superman, Batman, Iron Man and so forth 
depicted in films released around the same time the differences are stark.446 Although 
destruction is wrought by the actions of all superheroes, the ways in which it is depicted in this 
movie are interesting.447 Firstly, there is a wantonness to the destruction in the first car chase 
sequence. Nearly hitting a plane, crashing through a freeway sign, destroying some police cars, 
and breaking up the tarmac before dropping the SUV he is carrying on top of a building. Not 
only does Hancock display little regard for the collateral damage he is causing, the music 
changes again to highlight this. Rather than upbeat rock, orchestral, or even quiet blues guitar, 
the music is Ludacris’s “Move Bitch.” The use of a hip-hop track here further serves to make 
Hancock into a (dangerous) Other, and highlights the wantonness of the destruction by playing 
to stereotypes of Africa-American males.448 Again, this presents an alternative line of flight to 
the idea of the superhero as avatar of American exceptionalism.  
 
Moreover, Hancock’s destruction of large parts of L.A. in the first act of the movie also 
undermines the centrality of the built environment as location of sacrifice that was previously 
identified as a condition of success in the end of wars assemblage. Rather than depicting the 
built environment as necessary for redemption following sacrifice as in I am Legend or Children 
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of Men, Hancock presents it as a nuisance, an undue cost, a hindrance, and less than worthless. 
As the news report after the initial scene states, ‘Hancock’s latest act of so-called heroics took 
a hefty financial toll. Initial damage estimates are said to top $9 million which, if accurate, 
represents a personal record.’ A police officer continues, ‘L.A. would be a lot better off if this 
guy would just leave and let us get on with our jobs.’ Furthermore, in chapter four we see the 
link between sacrifice and the built environment established as a condition of success. Hancock 
as a superhero, however, is also emblematic of American values, morals and exceptionalism. 
The fact that this urban destruction is wrought by that avatar, in that built environment of Los 
Angeles, breaks this link between urbanity and victory as the urban environment becomes the 
playground of a destructive power connected to exceptionalism and American values. Within 
the first ten minutes of the movie then, two central conditions of success in the War on Terror 
are undermined: American exceptionalism and the centrality of the built environment to 
redemption. The potential effect this has on the end of wars assemblage is to deterritorialise and 
change it into something different and new. This potential to deterritorialise the assemblage is 
further strengthened when we map the challenge that Hancock poses to the genre of the 
superhero movie onto the potential challenges that President Obama articulates to his 
predecessor’s legacy and conditions of victory in the War on Terror.  
 
During his first election campaign for President, Obama’s foreign policy platform was largely 
centred on removing American troops from Iraq. The Iraq War was depicted as a ‘misguided 
war,’ where ‘there is no military solution…and there never was.’449 In March 2008, Obama 
criticised and challenged the narrative of victory through sacrifice when he said that in the Iraq 
War 
 
Nearly four thousand Americans have given their lives. Thousands more have been wounded. 
Even under the best case scenarios, this war will cost American taxpayers well over a trillion 
dollars. And where are we for all of this sacrifice? We are less safe and less able to shape events 
abroad. We are divided at home, and our alliances around the world have been strained. The 
threats of a new century have roiled the waters of peace and stability, and yet America remains 
anchored in Iraq.450 
 
Then-Senator Obama also articulated a critique of a core condition for success in the Iraq War 
that was discussed in chapter four - sacrifice and the centrality of the built environment. Rather 
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than the sacrifice of American troops working to secure victory in the cities of Iraq and thus the 
broader War on Terror, Obama stated that the reduction in violence ‘has little to do with the 
surge - it’s because Sunni tribal leaders made a political decision to turn against al Qaeda in 
Iraq.’451 Going further, he said that ‘Rather than use our presence to make progress, the Iraqi 
government has put off taking responsibility…And our troop presence cannot be sustained.’452 
Much as Hancock’s destruction of L.A. in the opening act of the movie also serves to challenge 
the centrality of the built environment to redemption and the ideals of American exceptionalism, 
Obama’s rhetoric can function within the assemblage in similar ways. Obama says that even 
though sacrifices have been made (in urban environments), the US is actually less safe as a 
result. Much as Hancock’s destruction is a cost and hindrance to L.A., the sacrifice of troops 
and the cost to Iraq that comes with war is actually a cost and hindrance to ultimate success in 
the War on Terror. Furthermore, Obama’s claim that the US is divided at home and increasingly 
isolated internationally also challenges the idea of America as a “shining city on a hill” that is 
foundational of the American monomyth, mirroring Hancock’s challenging of this monomyth 
as well. The potential result of these cinematic and political artefacts is to produce encounters 
that ‘shock,’ in Protevi’s terms, the patterns of thought and basins of attraction that connect 
allow particular tropes to be connected to victory and politically utilised as such.453 It is not just 
that the political and cultural narratives and imagery undermine these conditions, but the effect 
that this has on the system of the assemblage to produce them in the first plane. There is a 
further critique that these movies potentially articulate against the conditions of victory allowed 
for by the end of wars assemblage through nostalgia and pastiche. 
 
5.3.3 RED, The Expendables, and The A-Team 
RED, The Expendables and The A-Team all trade on a certain degree of nostalgia or an 
appreciation of the past. The tagline of RED (standing for retired, extremely dangerous) is ‘Still 
armed. Still dangerous. Still got it.’ The Expendables features cameo appearances by Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and Bruce Willis that feature prominently in the trailer, as well as being 
directed by, written by and starring that hero of Reagan-era cinema, Sylvester Stallone. Finally, 
The A-Team rebooted a beloved 1980s television series and is replete with references to it: 
Hannibal’s cigar, catchphrases, B.A.’s iconic van, and musical cues from the original title 
sequence.454 However, I do not intend to lump together these films simply as nostalgia-fests, 
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although that is certainly a common theme, as these films also engage in critical practices that 
extend beyond their nostalgic value. Differences include RED being much more explicitly 
tongue-in-cheek than the genre norm while The Expendables is pitched as a straight-faced 
action film, and The A-Team falling somewhere in between.455 Other differences include the 
prominence given to the age of the protagonists: RED is based on the fact that the characters 
are retired while the other two only make occasional references to the age of either Barney Ross 
(Sylvester Stallone) or Hannibal Smith (Liam Neeson). Furthermore, while the plot structure of 
RED and The A-Team follow similar lines of betrayal and a high-level political or military plot, 
The Expendables opts for a ‘mercenaries as liberators’ narrative structure.456 Nonetheless, the 
similarities between the films either on plot, age of actors/characters, appeal to nostalgia, or 
flippancy allow them to be considered and analysed alongside one another. How then, do these 
films deploy tropes, narrative structures, and cinematic techniques that have the potential to 
reshape the end of wars assemblage and the conditions of success it allows for? This section 
will look at how they use pastiche and nostalgia to engage in a running critique of the action 
movie genre as it has been established since at least the 1970s. By laying bare the conventions 
of the genre through pastiche and nostalgia, these three movies can work to make the processes 
and conventions of the action genre more apparent. As action movies are a component of the 
end of wars assemblage challenging or laying bare their conventions, or allowing audiences to 
engage with them differently, could produce alternative encounters or lines of flight that shock 
the system of the assemblage, making it evolve or change. If the cultural elements of the 
assemblage change drastically within a short time frame, and this coincides with a changing 
political rhetoric, the stability of the assemblage and the emergence of previously enumerated 
conditions of success could be challenged.  
 
What is implicated in the self-conscious use of tongue-in-cheek humour and the self-referential 
nature of nostalgia in these films? As outlined above, nostalgia is central to the appeal of these 
films. These movies were pitched partly to an older audience who would remember films such 
as Die Hard or Rambo, as well as the more traditional 15-24 demographic that makes up more 
than a quarter of total movie admissions in the UK and that show a preference for the action 
genre. As such, the use of pastiche and genre placing is vitally important to the box-office 
success of these films as well as their value in understanding how they might undermine the 
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previously established emergent properties of the assemblage.457 Fredric Jameson notes that 
pastiche has eclipsed parody as the style of choice for the postmodern era. For Jameson, 
pastiche is  
 
Like parody, the imitation of a unique style, the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead 
language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody’s ulterior motive, without 
the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling that there exists something 
normal compared to which what is being imitated is rather comic. Pastiche is blank parody, 
parody that has lost its sense of humor.458 
 
If we read this through the three films under discussion here, it is clear that they are pastiches 
of the action movie genre.  
 
All genre films must engage in a degree of implicit referencing of older and more established 
films within the same genre in order to establish themselves as a certain type. As Moine states, 
‘a genre film is constructed out of a limited repertoire of techniques that can be viewed as 
common property.’459 Accordingly, conventions such as gun battles, explosions, hand-to-hand 
combat between protagonist and antagonist are utilised in these films extensively. However, 
the three films being looked at here do not just deploy the conventions of genre to establish 
themselves, but rather engage in a pastiche of them. The most obvious of these winks and nods 
is in The Expendables. The most blatantly nostalgic scene in this film is where Mr Church 
(Bruce Willis) offers a job to Barney Ross (Sylvester Stallone). The third man in the scene, to 
whom Church has also offered the job is, of course, Arnold Schwarzenegger. Much was made 
of his cameo appearance, and it features heavily in the trailer for the film despite his screen time 
being under two minutes. The reason for his appearance, according to Church, is that both 
Trench Mauser’s (Schwarzenegger) and Ross’s name came to the top of the list.460 The scene 
continues with the dialogue between Mauser and Ross. 
 
MAUSER:  You lost weight. 
ROSS:  Whatever weight I lost you found pal. 
CHURCH: You guys aren’t going to start sucking each other’s dicks are you? 
… 
MAUSER: I’m busy anyway, so give this job to my friend here. He loves playing in the 
jungle. 
... 
CHURCH: What’s his fucking problem? 
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ROSS:  He wants to be President.461 
 
There is a degree of humour here but, as pointed out by Jameson above, it does not have the 
ulterior motive of parody. There is a reference to Stallone’s Rambo franchise, 
Schwarzenegger’s political career, and Willis’s role (as a CIA agent) in RED. Furthermore, the 
framing of the scene enhances this point. Close ups serve to highlight the star of a film and 
place an undue emphasis on their face and the recognition of that face by an audience.462 The 
extreme close ups on Willis’s, Stallone’s and Schwarzenegger’s faces serves to heighten the 
importance of these three actors within the genre which highlights the nature of the pastiche by 
privileging the mask of the actor’s face within the shot. When the rarity of the extreme close up 
within the contemporary action genre is taken into account, the meaning behind these shots 
becomes clearer. Namely that it is a self-indulgent reference to the history of the genre (through 
the spaghetti Westerns of directors such as Sergio Leone) and that, because the shot allows for 
a more subjective viewing position, it further enhances the link between genre and actor, as 
well as highlighting the pastiche function of the scene.463 As Jameson notes, pastiche shares 
similar techniques and patterns to parody but without any ulterior motive. Nonetheless, this 
facade of critical engagement with genre conventions plays an important function within the 
assemblage. The encounter that is induced by a non-standard technique (the close-up) has the 
potential to alter the function of these movies, and thus the genre, within the assemblage. Such 
a disruption to patterns of thought and input could then allow the assemblage to produce new 
or different emergent properties. Furthermore, it could possibly decode the processes through 
which conditions of success are articulated, circulated, and legitimised. In other words, by going 
through the motions of critique by using pastiche, these movies can work to change the dynamic 
of the end of wars assemblage by presenting a different articulation of the action genre. These 
allows for the film to work through self-referentiality in order to both undermine and re-
establish the boundaries of genre, and therefore the boundaries of the political possibilities that 
it creates the conditions for.  
 
Obama’s election on the basis of hope and change, as mentioned above, served to potentially 
change the end of wars assemblage by challenging conditions of success on which victory in 
the War on Terror was predicated. Although President Obama argued that ‘there is a tendency 
in Washington to spend our time pointing fingers at one another,’ he was also acutely aware of 
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the history and pressures of his office saying in 2014 that ‘At least since George Washington 
served as Commander-in-Chief, there have been those who warned against foreign 
entanglements.’464 The self-awareness of continuity gives the impression of arguing for change 
which is something that is common to both the pastiche of these films and the rhetoric of 
President Obama. It enables ongoing continuity of foreign policy to be masked by an appeal to 
changing it, just as RED and The Expendables continue the genre of the action movie while 
challenging it by self-consciously making references to it. Thus, the challenging and subsequent 
reassertion of cinematic and political tropes function to decode the patterns of thought that 
constitute the assemblage. While Bonta and Protevi define decoding as ‘genetic drift or 
mutation allowing for differential production of traits in a population,’ it is not too much of a 
stretch to apply this phraseology to genre.465 Thus, by problematizing the action genre, these 
movies engage in processes of decoding the assemblage by changing the patterns and 
parameters that shape it. Although not a strong decoding force on the assemblage, combined 
with other pressures explored above in Hancock and Inglourious Basterds the cumulative effect 
on the stability of the end of wars assemblage could potentially be effective.  
 
The A-Team also plays heavily on nostalgia. As Jameson suggests, a film does not need to be 
set in the historical past in order to evoke nostalgia. He uses Star Wars (1977) and Body Heat 
(1981) as examples of films that do ‘not reinvent a picture of the past in its lived totality [but 
rather reinvent] the feel and shape of characteristic objects of an older period.’466 The A-Team 
is set in a contemporary time period: the characters are soldiers stationed, for a time, in Iraq 
under American occupation. Despite apparently striving to update the film and break with the 
television series of the 1980s, there are deliberate evocations of nostalgia through the use of 
objects, language, and tropes, especially in the opening sequence of the film. To take each 
character in turn during this first escape: Hannibal (Liam Neeson) lights a cigar and says ‘I love 
it when a plan comes together;’ Murdock (Sharlto Copley) is broken out of a mental institution 
and flies the crew in a helicopter across the Mexican border; B.A. (Quinton “Rampage” 
Jackson) shows off his knuckle tattoos of ‘pity’ and ‘fool’ while rescuing his iconic GMC van; 
and Face (Bradley Cooper) is about to be killed for sleeping with the wife of the antagonist.467 
The introduction is rife with these moments, and such nostalgic elements are present throughout 
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the film and include B.A.’s fear of flying and dislike of Murdock, their incarceration ‘for a 
crime they didn’t commit’, and even a cameo appearance from Dirk Benedict (Face from the 
original television series). 
 
As well as helping to cement the film as a pastiche, the deliberate use of nostalgia has an affect 
which could influence the end of wars assemblage. Much like the films discussed above, The 
A-Team lays bare some of the conventions of the action genre and deliberately uses nostalgia 
and pastiche as a way of critically engaging with them. It is important to note that ‘every code 
is affected by a margin of decoding,’ and there is no absolute link between decoding and 
deterritorialisation.468 However, in the case of the films under discussion here, exposing the 
structures through which affects and encounters are cinematically produced in audiences can 
serve to break the fourth wall and construct a more active audience that could reduce the power 
of these techniques in other movies. As such, this nostalgia and pastiche can undermine the 
stability of the genre by making its processes more apparent and thus has the potential to change 
the shape and nature of the conditions of success that are emergent properties of the end of wars 
assemblage.  
 
These processes can be productively linked to the presidential politics that the movies are 
contemporaneous with. For instance, President-elect Barack Obama’s victory speech in 2008 
opens with the argument that the US is not a collection of red states and blue states but the 
United States of America and that ‘change has come to America.’469 Using the tropes expected 
of a presidential victory speech - thanking his opponent, Senator John McCain, his family, allies 
on the campaign trail and so forth; invoking historical events; and looking forward to a new era 
of politics to mention a few - Obama utilises nostalgia that also works to decode some of the 
political practices and discourses that shaped the assemblage over the previous seven years. By 
arguing for a “new” type of politics but still self-consciously using nostalgic appeals, it could 
be argued that Obama’s rhetoric during these years functioned in a similar way to the movies 
discussed above. By laying bare the conventions of Presidential speech and bringing new 
rhetoric to bear on it, Obama’s speeches served to undermine the political components that are 
part of the end of wars assemblage. By changing this input, the stability of the assemblage might 
be challenged which could allow it to produce alternative conditions of success.  
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What has been demonstrated in the above section is that during the years 2007 to 2010 the end 
of wars assemblage was exposed to potentially critical, challenging, and changing aspects of 
politics and culture. Since 2001, the action cinematic and political rhetoric inputs of the 
assemblage had been reasonably stable and certain conditions of victory had been produced as 
emergent properties of that assemblage. The effect of the cultural and political artefacts in the 
years under discussion here had at least some potential to change the ways in which this 
assemblage functioned. Inglourious Basterds, through its partial equation of American violence 
with Nazi violence undermines American exceptionalism; Hancock’s challenging of the 
conventions of a superhero movie and the superhero’s positions as avatar of the American 
monomyth again challenges exceptionalism and his destructive nature questions the connection 
between sacrifice and redemption in urban landscapes; RED, The A-Team, and The Expendables 
utilised pastiche and nostalgia to lay bare the genre conventions that allow for encounters thus 
potentially destabilising the genre. As the action genre is an important component of the end of 
wars assemblage, destabilising the genre has the potential effect of destabilising the assemblage 
and its emergent properties. Furthermore, during these years the political rhetoric of Senator 
and President Obama also challenged the political foundations upon which the end of wars 
assemblage rested. This was through challenging the moral superiority of America with his 
references to Guantanamo Bay, arguing that the urban-centred surge in Iraq did not help, and 
questioning the value of American sacrifices. The political and cultural artefacts being 
discussed here thus had the potential articulate critical lines of flight to change the assemblage. 
Through directly challenging particular conditions of success or undermining the genre 
conventions as a whole, there was a possibility that the end of wars assemblage would change 
and evolve to take account of these new inputs. This could have altered the nature of existing 
conditions of success, – for examples by reframing American exceptionalism as more 
conditional – reduced the possibility of them surviving, or new ones could have emerged – such 
as success through extreme violence or success through heedless destruction. However, this 
radical challenge to the stability of the assemblage was not continued. These films and Obama’s 
political rhetoric and actions merely wore a mask of critique rather than having inherent critical 
tendencies. As will be shown in the following section, each of these artefacts reasserts dominant 
tropes, conventions, and styles of movies and politics.  
 
5.4 Behind the mask: the reassertion of conditions of success 
Having looked at how these five films have the potential to critically engage with, critique, 
destabilise, and potentially change the end of wars assemblage and the conditions of victory it 
produces as emergent properties we can now turn to the other side of the argument. This is, 
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namely, that while these movies have critical potential, they do not exploit it and eventually 
reassert the dominant tropes, conventions, narratives, imagery, and language that recodes and 
restabilises the assemblage thus allowing for already existing conditions of success to continue 
to emerge. Indeed, this reterritorialisation is all the stronger because of their potential for 
critique. As discussed above, these films wear only a mask of critique that has the effect of 
further strengthening the assemblage and the conditions of political possibility it allows for. 
 
5.4.1 Inglourious Basterds 
Having explored the potential for Inglourious Basterds to undermine the end of wars 
assemblage and its conditions of success through the encounter induced by equating American 
violence with Nazi violence we now turn to how the film does not continue with this critical 
potential. Rather, what we see in the movie is a reassertion of the moral superiority of American 
political violence and the importance of sacrifice and thus their stabilisation as conditions of 
success in the War on Terror. 
 
Inglourious Basterds is a particularly interesting film to analyse in the context of this thesis 
because of the centrality of cinema to the narrative and climactic sequence of the movie. In 
chapter three of the movie, “German night in Paris,” we are introduced to 
Emmanuelle/Shosanna (Mélanie Laurent) - a Jewish cinema proprietor in Paris under Nazi 
occupation. When we first meet Emmanuelle/Shosanna, she is changing the billboard 
advertising what is showing at her cinema. As she is doing this, a young German soldier, 
Frederick (Daniel Bruhl), approaches her and comments that she is showing a film by a German 
director to which she replies ‘I’m French, we respect directors in our country…even 
Germans.’470 While Frederick tries to engage Emmanuelle/Shosanna in a discussion about 
cinema, perhaps hoping to cross the divide between them and with obvious romantic overtones, 
Emmanuelle/Shosanna does not engage. The potential for cinema to be a unifying force here is 
thus undermined and, as we shall see, cinema becomes central to the war effort of the movie 
itself. Having had her cinema selected to host a screening of “Nation’s Pride,” a propaganda 
film about and starring Frederick (a noted German war hero) with guests including Joseph 
Goebbels, Hermann Goering, and Adolf Hitler, Emmanuelle/Shosanna decides to kill the top 
Nazis who will be attending by burning the theatre down, with them locked inside. Furthermore, 
with no access to explosives, she decides to use reels of film as the main combustible material 
saying ‘with the nitrate film collection we wouldn’t even need explosives.’471 Thus, film itself 
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becomes a physically key component of attacking and defeating the elites of Nazi Germany. 
Simultaneously, and unknown to Emmanuelle/Shosanna, the Allied soldiers from the first act 
of the film are also planning to attack and kill the upper echelons of Nazi Germany during the 
premiere at the cinema. 
 
The final climactic scene of the movie is, of course, typically Tarantino with the usual gratuitous 
violence, blood, gore, and all round mayhem. As the Germans arrive at the cinema for the 
screening, Tarantino uses subtitles to highlight the identity of some of the guests including 
Goering and Martin Bormann. This, in addition to the sporadic (an uncredited) use of Samuel 
L. Jackson as narrator, works to disrupt the narrative and the experience of the artefact in a 
similar way to the breaking up of the film into chapters, each split with an intertitle. It is 
interesting to briefly explore the effect this has. The use of a narrator, for instance, might be to 
create what Neupert calls a ‘discursive closure device’ to the narrative.472 Using the narrator to 
discuss certain points in a film, especially when used sparingly as Tarantino does here, helps to 
highlight those points as key moments. The subtitles can also work in a similar fashion - by 
breaking the fourth wall and reminding audiences that they are watching a movie, it helps to 
both highlight the importance of the climactic sequence and soften the blow of the gruesome 
violence that is to follow - to erect a barrier between the depiction of this cinematic violence 
and the realities of ongoing political violence. This means it stands in contrast to the scene of 
the soldiers scalping the dead Nazis in chapter one that was visceral, brutal, and deeply 
affecting. As such, this highlights and makes clear the distinction between cinematic violence 
(gruesome, gratuitous, and gory) with political violence (sanctioned, surgical, and sober). 
Chapter one of the movie used the close-up in order to equate American violence with Nazi 
violence. However, by the climax of the movie, the audience is reassured that American 
violence is moral and justified through the use of subtitles and narration. This sequence recodes 
the assemblage by asserting that American political violence is good, is moral, is sacrificial and 
is fundamentally connected to film. American morality and sacrifice are important conditions 
of success within the end of wars assemblage in previous years. By concluding the movie with 
a sequence that celebrates this exceptionalism and sacrifice, it works to legitimise these as 
conditions of success. Rather than allowing the end of wars assemblage to evolve in order to 
take account of new depictions of American violence and lack of moral superiority, it is allowed 
to continue producing these conditions as emergent properties. The centrality of film and 
cinematic techniques therefore allows for moral (Jewish-)American political violence to be 
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recoded into the assemblage.473  
 
This process of recoding American moral exceptionalism and sacrifice into the assemblage is 
also present in the political rhetoric of the Obama presidency. When Obama was in office, 
although certain aspects of the tactics of the War on Terror were altered in line with his rhetoric 
of change, the broad strategic thrust and conditions of success were largely maintained. For 
instance, the willing sacrifice of Omar Ulmer (Omar Doom), Donny Donowitz (Eli Roth), 
Marcel (Jacky Ido), and Shosanna in the theatre to kill Hitler and his top lieutenants is mirrored 
in Obama’s Nobel prize acceptance speech which recognised that ‘The service and sacrifice of 
our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea,’ 
and that ‘Peace entails sacrifice.’474 Or that ‘because of your service, because of your sacrifices, 
we’re making progress in Afghanistan.’475 The connection between Inglourious Basterds 
targeting the leadership of the Nazi regime and the foreign policy of President Obama focusing 
on so-called decapitation strikes is also notable. Announcing the death of Osama bin Laden, 
President Obama remarks that ‘shortly after taking office, I directed Leon Panetta…to make 
the killing or capture of bin Laden the top priority of our war against al Qaeda,’ and that ‘The 
death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s efforts to 
defeat al Qaeda.’476 Later in 2011, on the death of Muammar Qaddafi, President Obama notes 
that ‘We’ve taken out al Qaeda leaders, and we’re put them on the path to defeat…And now, 
working in Libya with friends and allies, we’ve demonstrated what collective action can achieve 
in the 21st century.’477 Having worked to undermine these particular conditions of success set 
out by his predecessor previously, President Obama is here reasserting them, just as Tarantino 
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is reasserting the valour and sacrifice of Jewish-American troops in the climactic sequence of 
Inglourious Basterds. The work of destabilising and then restabilising; of undermining and 
reasserting; of decoding and recoding happens in both political and cultural artefacts. The effect 
of this on the emergent properties of the assemblage – the conditions of success – is to stabilise 
their process of formation and contribute to their ongoing legitimisation.  
 
President Obama also engaged in the reaffirmation of the moral use of technology as a key 
condition for success in the War on Terror when discussing the US’s drone programme and its 
relationship to decapitation strikes in 2013. Saying that the administration has ‘relentlessly 
targeted al Qaeda’s leadership,’ so that ‘the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on 
the path to defeat,’ President Obama remarks that while the technology of drone strikes raises 
questions, ‘our actions have been effective…Simply put, these strikes have saved lives…So 
this is a just war, a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defence.’478 This focus 
on the moral use of technology, the responsibility that comes with it, and the targeting of key 
leadership figures leads to his final point on this topic which is that ‘this war, like all wars, must 
end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our democracy demands.’479 Obama assumed the 
presidency partly on the basis of his opposition to the Iraq War. However, while in office he 
does keep pushing for an end to that conflict, but utilises the same conditions of success as his 
predecessor. The cinematic and political decoding of the assemblage through the mask of 
critique that was articulated above allowed for a more effective subsequent recoding of these 
concepts back into it. Not only did this reassert, stabilise, and even strengthen the established 
conditions of victory necessary to bring the War on Terror to a close, but it also created political 
space to include weaponry that is even more advanced as well as a relentless targeting of 
leadership figures in al Qaeda. 
 
5.4.2 Hancock 
By critically engaging with dominant genre tropes and conventions about the role of a superhero 
as an avatar for American exceptionalism, Hancock the film and Hancock the character have 
the potential to articulate critical lines of flight that question the moral superiority and 
exceptional nature of American political violence established as conditions of success in the 
end of wars assemblage. However, as the film progresses, it becomes increasingly closer to a 
generic superhero movie through montage, imagery, and the development of Hancock as a 
character. Ultimately, this reasserts the traditional conventions of the genre, recodes and 
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reterritorialises the assemblage, and strengthens the conditions of success, especially 
exceptionalism, that have heretofore been culturally and politically established. 
 
After a particularly destructive episode in the movie, the ‘Bono of PR’ Ray suggests that 
Hancock spend some time in prison (after seeing a report on cable news saying ‘you may be a 
superhero, but let me tell you this: you’re not nearly as strong as the U.S. constitution. Bank on 
it buddy!’480) in order to make people realise how much Los Angeles needs him. During his 
incarceration, Ray works with Hancock to make him accept his situation and his role in society: 
‘you’re a hero Hancock…Trust me, trust this plan, trust the process. Just stay in here. When 
they call, a hero is what we’re going to give them.’481 In addition to making Hancock trust the 
system (of incarceration, of control, of heroism, of public relations) Ray coaches him in the 
genre conventions of a superhero: landing – ‘don’t come in too hot, don’t come in too boozy, 
and don’t land on a $100,000 Mercedes;’ relationships with, and trust of, authority – ‘tell the 
[police] officer he’s done a good job;’ finally, Ray buys him a symbol of the superhero genre – 
the spandex jumpsuit.482 During Hancock’s time in prison, the focus shifts between group 
therapy sessions, the prison exercise yard, meetings with Ray, Ray’s domestic life, and 
panoramic views of Los Angeles with clips from radio shows discussing Hancock in montage. 
As Deleuze says,  
 
Montage is the determination of the whole…Eisenstein continually reminds us that montage is 
the whole of the film, the Idea. But why should the whole be the object of montage? Between 
the beginning and the end of a film something changes, something has changed. But this whole 
which changes, this time or duration, only seems to be capable of being apprehended indirectly, 
in relation to the movement-images which express it. Montage is the operation which bears on 
the movement-images to release the whole from them.483 
 
Although Deleuze tends to ignore popular film in his work on cinema, for which he has attracted 
criticism, it is not unreasonable to apply it to my work that deals exclusively with such forms 
of culture.484 The montage sequence in Hancock, then, can be seen as the central moment of the 
film – the whole – in which something changes. This change is from Hancock as subversive 
superhero to Hancock as guarantor of the political system and avatar of American 
exceptionalism. If the montage sequence is the “whole” of the film, or the “Idea,” it can be read 
as a primary encounter that reshapes the end of wars assemblage. 
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After this montage sequence Hancock accepts his role in society as a superhero. He is released 
from prison during a bank heist and, after thanking the police officer in charge, successfully 
saves a wounded police officer, rescues the hostages, and apprehends the bank robbers. As the 
plot of the film progresses and gets increasingly ludicrous, it also becomes closer to what 
audiences expect of a superhero movie. There is a climactic battle between Hancock and Mary 
(Charlize Theron), a female counterpart with similar superpowers that involves the destruction 
of large parts of downtown Los Angeles (with no mention of the cost of the damages this time). 
The film ends with Hancock, dressed in the spandex jumpsuit, having fully accepted his role in 
society and that this role is bound by a certain code of behaviour as superheroes need to act as 
the moral compass of America. Hancock ultimately reaffirms the dominant tropes, conventions, 
language, and imagery of the genre and Hancock accepts his role within American society and 
the wider genre of the action or superhero movie. Thus, the film completes the process of 
recoding exceptionalism and morality into the end of wars assemblage that is initiated with the 
montage sequence. 
 
The values that President Obama criticised President Bush for failing to uphold through torture 
and Guantanamo Bay also feature prominently in his rhetoric, despite his administration’s 
failure to fully close the prison. In his first speech to the CIA in 2009, President Obama says 
that ‘what makes you special, is precisely the fact that we are willing to uphold our values and 
ideals even when it’s hard, not just when it’s easy…that’s what makes us different.’485 Just as 
Hancock challenged then remade the superhero, so too did Obama challenge American moral 
superiority only to reassert it when in office. The implications of this are two-fold. Firstly, it 
induces a political encounter with audiences whereby exceptionalism is recoded into the 
assemblage and politically utilised to justify decisions and actions of the administration. 
Secondly, it demonstrates the power and resilience of these conditions of success. Rather than 
continuing with his critique of Guantanamo Bay, Obama here elides them by claiming that the 
CIA uphold these moral American values despite all evidence to the contrary. Both Hancock 
and President Obama engaged in a critique of the political and cultural artefacts that partly 
comprise the assemblage. Having articulated these alternative lines of flight, they continue by 
reaffirming the conventions and practices that are the inputs of the assemblage. The potential 
to shock the system, either politically or culturally, are then undermined leaving the assemblage 
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and its conditions of victory largely intact. Furthermore, the mask of critique that cinematic and 
political components wore could serve to further strengthen and legitimise these conditions. 
The radical and critical potential of the film and political rhetoric are usurped by a reaffirmation 
of dominant narratives, conventions, and rhetoric that works to reterritorialise the end of wars 
assemblages and allows it to continue in the creation of the conditions of success that have been 
outlined in the thesis. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
While assemblages are always subjected to forces and processes that challenge, change, 
reshape, and destabilise them, this chapter has sought to analyse these forces in the early years 
of the Obama administration is order to ascertain what a simultaneous political and cultural 
challenge might do to the end of wars assemblage. In the previous chapters I outlined how the 
stabilisation of the assemblage allowed for conditions of success to emerge through cinematic 
encounters. However, between 2007 and 2010 both political and cultural artefacts demonstrated 
the potential to undermine these conditions and destabilise the assemblage. Politically we see 
the soaring rhetoric of Obama; his platform of hope and change; his opposition to the Iraq War; 
and his argument that certain practices in the War on Terror undermined American values. 
Culturally, the movies discussed here exhibited similar critical potentials. Inglourious Basterds 
equated Jewish-American political violence with that of the Nazis; Hancock challenged the idea 
of the superhero as avatar of the grand monomyth of American identity and the centrality of the 
built environment to redemption; finally RED, The A-Team, and The Expendables laid bare the 
techniques by which encounters are induced in the genre. All of this had the potential to 
destabilise the end of wars assemblage by bringing new and different cinematic and political 
techniques, conventions, tropes, and narratives to bear. The simultaneity of political and cultural 
change further enhanced this possibility. 
 
However, as the chapter continued, we saw that these critical potentials to destabilise the end 
of wars assemblage was largely unfulfilled and that the assemblage emerges from these years 
with the same conditions as emergent properties and, indeed, potentially strengthened by the 
mask of critique. Inglourious Basterds ends with the reassertion of American moral superiority 
with the use of film to kill the Nazi leadership; Hancock realises that he needs to embrace the 
conventions of a superhero in order to be a model American; and despite their pastiche and 
nostalgia, RED, The A-Team, and The Expendables all conform to the genre type of an action 
movie. Politically, despite his challenge to the existing foreign policy order, Obama continues 
to claim that sacrifice is necessary for redemption; argues that the military are an unbroken 
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chain of heroes; that the CIA upholds the core values of America; that justice was done in the 
Libyan Civil War; and that the use of drone technology is just and proportionate. 
 
This chapter also demonstrates that contemporary Hollywood action genre movies are not 
homogeneous. While it is clear that the five films being discussed in this chapter all ultimately 
engaged in recoding and reterritorialising practices that function to stabilise and reinforce the 
end of wars assemblage and the conditions of success that are its emergent properties, they have 
all, to varying degrees, exhibited some critical potential. While the contemporary action genre 
most often works to territorialise the assemblage and strengthen the conditions of success in the 
War on Terror, it is important to realise that it is an ever evolving category that has the potential 
to articulate alternative lines of flight. As demonstrated above, these films exhibit critical 
potentials that could herald a more critically engaged popular cinema that aligns more closely 
with ideas about the power of culture to challenge, change, and critique political possibilities 
and political modes of being and becoming.  
 
Understanding how these particular movies exploit and subsequently undermine this critique is 
an important point of departure for how such a critical cinema can be constructed. As has been 
shown with reference to Inglourious Basterds, an implicit critique of the assumed moral 
superiority of American political violence is key to the articulation of a popular and critical 
cinema. It may be possible for moviemakers to exploit similar techniques in future films, 
especially given the critical and commercial success of Tarantino’s approach. Hancock also 
expresses a similar critical approach to the conventions of the superhero genre. By depicting 
Hancock as a drunken, vandalous, and irresponsible subject, the film works to undermine the 
role of the superhero as an embodiment of the monomyth of American exceptionalism. Such a 
critical engagement with the role of superheroes has already been developed through films such 
as Batman V. Superman: Dawn of Justice as well as Captain America: Civil War where the 
ambiguous nature of the superhero and their role within the (inter)national realm is explored. 
Finally, by engaging in a pastiche and nostalgia-fuelled intervention into the action genre, RED, 
The Expendables, and The A-Team represent a potential for moviemakers and cinema audiences 
to approach the genre in a more engaged, knowledgeable, and critical manner.  
 
However, as was demonstrated in the final section of this chapter, none of these films actually 
held onto these critical potentials and, in various ways, undermined it much as the presidential 
discourse of Obama also failed to follow through on his critique of Bush-era policies and 
conditions of success. While this is not to say that they have not laid the groundwork for a more 
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critical cinema to emerge, it is clear that these artefacts’ ultimate effect on the assemblage is 
one of territorialisation and stabilisation with the concurrent effect of then stabilising and 
supporting the conditions of success that emerge from that assemblage. As with all analysis in 
this thesis, this recoding, territorialisation, and stabilisation is not an intentional effect of the 
filmmakers. There are many factors that contribute to producing a film and, as noted already, 
movies are there primarily to make money – especially so for big-budget and mass appeal action 
movies. Movies which identify American violence with Nazi violence, or critique the role of 
the superhero, or do not appeal to the nostalgia when that is the main draw are not quite as likely 
to break even at the box office. There are forces that underlie the assemblage of movies, the 
assemblage of genre, and the assemblage of the end of wars that shape them in novel ways and 
would be highly interesting and productive to research further. Nonetheless, while 
acknowledging these other forces and processes at work, they are beyond the scope of this 
project which focuses on the artefacts themselves and their role within the end of wars 
assemblage.  
 
All these films in some way question, critique, or lay bare the dominant genre conventions of 
the contemporary action movie. They also all reassert that dominance by the end of the film. 
While this is perhaps as much to do with the risk-averse studios of Hollywood, out to make 
money rather than art, it also performs a political function. The end of wars assemblage 
articulates systems of power that are created in part through genre conventions such as the moral 
superiority of American violence, conceptions of American exceptionalism, or the necessity of 
sacrifice. By initially destabilising these conventions and, through this, decoding and 
deterritorialising the assemblage, before ultimately reasserting them we find that those 
conventions, the systems of power that the assemblage contains, and the conditions of victory 
that are created, articulated, and reinforced through cinematic encounters have ultimately been 
reasserted and strengthened through the mask of critique that underpins these films and the 
political discourse of President Obama. 
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Chapter Six: Linear, recursive time travelling loops 
 
“This time travel shit fries your brain like an egg.” 
Looper (2012) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter follows on from the previous one by further analysing the stability of the 
assemblage and assessing how potentially destabilising temporal forces challenged it between 
2010 and 2014. Cinematically, chapter five engaged with the questioning of American moral 
superiority, the role of the city, and pastiche and how these could work to destabilise the genre, 
the assemblage, and the conditions of success produced through it. The films under discussion 
in this chapter have the potential to destabilise the assemblage by utilising radically different 
conceptualisations of time than expected in the genre and that we are accustomed to 
encountering. However, as in chapter five, I argue that this critical potential remains unfulfilled. 
I will discuss how portrayals of time and temporality in cinema and politics work to code the 
end of wars assemblage and thus further legitimise the conditions of victory as emergent 
properties of that assemblage. While still assessing potentially destabilising forces and the 
resilience of the assemblage, the conclusion will be that stability is maintained. 
 
Time has become an increasingly talked about aspect of International Relations, from how our 
understanding of time shapes particular political practices and theories to how specific forms 
of temporality frame, narrativise, and historicise ongoing political events. For instance, the War 
on Terror was constructed as a conflict where victory is inevitable. The effect of this on the end 
of wars assemblage is to stabilise and strengthen it by presenting a teleological view of the 
conflict. Concomitantly this also stabilises the emergence of conditions of success. 
Furthermore, by claiming that victory is never in question, the conditions of success that are 
politically utilised carry additional persuasive and teleological power. Cinema participates in 
this ongoing construction of linear and teleological temporalities through narrative arcs, the so-
called “Hollywood ending,” and the franchise and studio system. However, the films to be 
discussed in this chapter have the potential to destabilise this linear temporal construction by 
utilising radically different cinematic temporalities such as time travel and circular time-loops. 
By destabilising conventional cinematic temporalities upon which the assemblage is partially 
predicated, there is the possibility of destabilising the assemblage as a whole and thereby its 
processes of emergence. However, as will be argued in this chapter, despite utilising alternative 
temporalities, each of these movies ends with a reassertion and reinforcing of conventional 
linear temporalities thereby restabilising the assemblage and its emergent properties. This has 
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the political effect of making these conditions of success – American exceptionalism, 
technology, sacrifice, and urbanity – stronger and more persuasive and legitimises armed 
conflict as legitimate, as progressing towards a better future, and as one in which “we,” the 
West, will be ultimately victorious.  
 
The main films that will be discussed in this chapter are Source Code (2011), Looper (2012), 
and Edge of Tomorrow (2014). Each of these films engages with non-linear temporality 
involving, as they do, time loops, time travel, alternate timelines and a general narrative 
trajectory towards either preventing a global disaster, apprehending a terrorist, or saving the 
protagonist’s life. As such, they have the potential to undermine the linear temporality that has 
been inscribed on the War on Terror. Of course, many films have dealt with people travelling 
to the past to avert disaster (Terminator 2: Judgement Day (1991) or 12 Monkeys (1995); people 
stuck in time loops (Groundhog Day (1993)); alternate and converging timelines (Star Trek 
(2009) or X-Men: Days of Future Past (2014)) as well as time travel in literature going back to 
the late nineteenth-century The Time Machine by H. G. Wells. Alternative temporalities must 
necessarily blur across the boundaries of periodization established herein, but the three films 
analysed here “hang together” in a coherent manner and allow me to engage with the role of 
temporality within the end of wars assemblage. Given the work that has been done on time 
within the study of Popular Culture and World Politics and International Relations more 
broadly, these three movies present an opportunity to analyse the resilience and stability of the 
end of wars assemblage to alternative temporalities that may destabilise it. If the War on Terror 
and the end of wars assemblage operate under a linear and teleological temporality, then 
radically different articulations of time have the potential to deterritorialise the assemblage and 
reduce its capability to produce emergent properties. Ultimately however, it will be shown that 
these films occupy a place within the end of wars assemblage whereby they code, strengthen, 
and territorialise dominant conceptions of temporality and therefore the conditions of success 
that were outlined in chapters three and four. In other words, these films reinforce the dominant 
political narrative of the War on Terror where “we” eventually have to win because of our 
values, our exceptionalism, our use of technology, and our sacrifices. 
 
To understand how cinema works to reinforce conditions of victory in the War on Terror, this 
chapter proceeds in two parts. Firstly, I explore how time and temporality have been thought 
about in some recent literature in International Relations as well as how specific temporalities 
have been politically inscribed onto the War on Terror. Secondly, I move on to analyse how the 
three films examined here challenge or legitimise these political temporalities, particularly 
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through the use of montage, and the effect that this has on the stability of the end of wars 
assemblage. I conclude the chapter by arguing that even though these three movies all have the 
potential to undermine the temporal inscription of the War on Terror and thus challenge the 
conditions of victory that have emerged, they fail to do so. This results in the further 
strengthening and legitimisation of the end of wars assemblage as constituted previously.  
 
6.2 Time and International Relations 
Time has become an increasingly discussed element of Politics and International Relations.486 
McIntosh has stated that ‘time and temporality play critical roles throughout all areas of the 
discipline of International Relations.’487 What I want to turn to first is how specific temporalities 
are written into political discourse and what impact this has on the articulation of the conditions 
of victory outlined in chapters three and four. Lee Jarvis has written in quite some depth about 
how 9/11 and the War on Terror were constructed not just politically but also temporally by 
prominent members of the Bush administration. He identifies three types of temporal writing: 
radical discontinuity, temporal linearity, and timelessness.488 All three will be useful for this 
discussion of temporality in cinema, and firstly require a brief outlining. Radical discontinuity 
can be seen in the construction of 9/11 as an extreme event that represents a profoundly altering 
event in history. Jarvis identifies three parts to this notion: a period of stability, a rupturing 
event, and a subsequent period of relative stability. Secondly, linear time is the type of political 
writing that inscribes a more evolutionary nature to the War on Terror. It is considered just 
another step in the history of terrorist attacks on the USA and other countries and the inevitable 
response to those attacks. This form of temporal writing is the one that will be most discussed 
in this chapter as it is this temporality that these movies could have the greatest critical effect 
on. The third style of temporal writing, timelessness, places 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror 
within the broader historical framework of America’s fight against Fascism and Communism, 
and the general inevitability of human conflict.489 While this last category of timelessness 
appears similar to linear time, the difference is that it frames America’s position in opposition 
to conflicting ideologies (Fascism, Communism, terrorism) not as progressive steps towards an 
ultimate liberal end, but rather as aspects of the same situation whereby America’s exceptional 
position renders opposition of various types in similar terms. 
                                                          
486 For a good review of the discussion, see Rahul Rao, ‘One Time, Many Times’, Millennium, 2018, 
0305829818801494, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829818801494. 
487 Christopher McIntosh, ‘Theory across Time: The Privileging of Time-Less Theory in International 
Relations’, International Theory 7, no. 03 (2015): 464, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000147. 
488 Lee Jarvis, Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 35. 
489 Jarvis, 36–39. 
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6.2.1 Temporality in the War on Terror 
It is important to bear in mind that the three types of temporal writing identified by Jarvis are 
not themselves to be understood within a linear time frame. It is not that the Bush administration 
started with framing the War on Terror with radical discontinuity then as linear and 
subsequently developed the conflict within a timeless framework. Rather, all three temporal 
ways of framing the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror exist simultaneously and are subject 
to multiple framings at the same time. 9/11 was fracturing, evolutionary, and timeless 
concurrently. The War on Terror was a radically new conflict that was also just the logical 
extension of other responses to terrorism while also being the same sort of conflict as World 
War II or the Cold War. Richard Jackson has also noted these patterns:  
 
the attacks are discursively constructed as an exceptional tragedy and a grievous harm…Second, 
the official language constructs the attacks as primarily an “act of war”…Third, the attacks are 
described in ways which allow them to fit into a number of pre-existing and highly popular meta-
narratives: World War II (the Pearl Harbour analogy), the cold war.490 
 
Related to the simultaneous construction of various temporal narratives, Tom Lundborg has 
noted that ‘even though the exceptional security measures of the “war on terror” can be said to 
highlight a radical shift and the beginning of something “new,” these measures can also be 
analysed as attempts to reaffirm something rather “familiar”.’491 What is important to bear in 
mind for this chapter, however, is that according to Jarvis, ‘it was simply impossible for them 
[the Bush administration], it seemed, to reflect on the War on Terror’s status and import without 
discussing - or imagining - its past, presents, and futures.’492 Time, and the construction of 
certain temporalities surrounding political events and political violence, is thus beginning to be 
seen as a central feature of politics. Furthermore, ‘representations of temporality worked not 
only to call forth particular violences for the acceptance or condemnation of audiences and 
observers. They also, crucially, worked to obscure alternative violences that may otherwise 
have been quite legitimately invoked or considered.’493 Therefore, the construction of the War 
on Terror according to particular temporal frameworks works not just to justify particular 
political actions, but also to preclude others. From this we can argue that the inscription of 
certain temporal frameworks onto 9/11 and the War on Terror serve to code the conditions of 
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success as not just necessary to victory, but also inevitable. Similar to what was explored in the 
previous chapter around inversion and the mask of critique, this coding serves to reinforce these 
emergent properties temporally as well as culturally.  
 
It is useful here to expand a little on different conceptions of time. On the one hand we have 
‘scientific,’ ‘clock-face,’ or ‘calendar’ time that we recognise as the inevitable pull of seconds, 
minutes, hours, days, weeks, months and years that progresses in an even, linear way and is 
sub-divided into these various parts. But of course, time is not necessarily experienced in this 
way. Our subjective experience of time depends on our activity, position, history, perspective 
and culture. Writing this thesis for example can at times seem like an endless process that 
apparently takes far longer than it appears and it simultaneously feels like yesterday when I 
started.494 While this may seem a trite example, it gets to the heart of how one’s sense of self ‘is 
continually produced in and through time,’ therefore meaning that time plays a constitutive role 
in the production of the subject.495 Furthermore, time can not only alter and construct our own 
subjective experience of life, but also our political subjectivities. In fact, Deleuze and Bergson 
argue that not only do time and temporality shape our subjectivities, but also make them 
possible. Thus, our experiences of time make certain subjectivities come into being. The 
temporal precedes the subject.496 Furthermore, similar to our discussion of the temporal 
inscription of 9/11 and the War on Terror above, for Deleuze time is irreducibly multiple with 
overlap, flow, and interaction between various conceptions of time, the experience of 
temporality, and the quantitative nature of ‘clock-face’ time.497 Thus, if temporality precedes 
subjectivity and politics, differing inscriptions of time onto events, by politicians or cinema, 
carries personal and affective power. 
 
If the War on Terror is politically inscribed with a temporality that implies a long but ultimately 
victorious road, then the conditions of success outlined in previous chapters will be subjected 
to that temporal writing as well. In other words, time becomes deeply and thoroughly political 
and its inscription onto particular events has an effect on how the end of wars assemblage 
                                                          
494 This is also related to Bergson’s distinction between ‘duration’ and ‘spatial’ time. Henri Bergson, Time and 
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497 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 5. 
182 
 
functions and how stable it is. To return to Jarvis’s three forms of temporal writing outlined 
above, he makes the case that these different writings serve to inscribe different political 
meanings on events and texts. As Jarvis mentions early in his work, 
 
it was frequently through specific (and, importantly, contestable) writings of temporality that these 
otherwise disassociable moments were able to be linked or cohered into one seemingly coherent 
political, strategic, discursive totality: one political, strategic, discursive totality that became, 
simply, the War on Terror.498 
 
So rather than seeing political and cultural artefacts as existing within a scientific or clock-face 
mode of time, it is important to bear in mind that these artefacts are constructed within specific 
temporal frameworks such as discontinuous, linear, or timeless. 
 
It is worthwhile expanding on Jarvis’s second, linear, writing of temporality within the War on 
Terror to see whether the movies under discussion in this thesis, and the alternative 
temporalities they employ, can challenge this linear inscription. It is this linear temporal 
framing of the War on Terror that is the most relevant to the end of wars assemblage. The linear 
framing of time imagines a future, it creates a narrative that marches to an inevitable goal, in 
this case the victorious end of war. It is also the temporality most similar to scientific time 
making a linear timeline easy to follow for audiences. As this linear temporality is most relevant 
to the end of wars assemblage’s conditions of victory, it is also most open to critique by those 
cultural artefacts that present different articulations of time. In other words, the movies to be 
discussed here could, through the depiction of alternative temporalities, undermine the linear 
time that is included within the end of wars assemblage. 
 
Jarvis makes an important and perceptive argument when he identifies both a timelessness and 
a linear temporality in the Bush administration’s comments on the War on Terror. He writes 
that the Bush administration increasingly presented the War on Terror as part of a broader 
history of attacks against America and the West and, most interestingly, that this temporal 
framing also ensured America’s and the West’s ultimate victory in the War on Terror. Within 
the context of the end of wars assemblage, we can argue that this temporality works to stabilise 
the conditions of success by placing them in both a historical and teleological framing. An 
example of this linear temporality can be seen in President Bush’s pre-invasion commitment to 
rebuild Iraq when he said that the US ‘has made and kept this kind of commitment before - in 
the peace that followed a world war…In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty 
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found a permanent home.’499 Jarvis goes into considerable depth with this point, using a large 
number of primary sources from the main office-holders of the Bush administration and 
concludes that ‘Victory was, in this writing of temporality, simply assured. If not entirely 
predetermined, it was clearly certain.’500 Deploying elements of American exceptionalism and 
perceived US values here links together these conditions of success with a linear temporality 
that ascribes a certain degree of inevitability onto those conditions, thus coding them with 
legitimacy and power and further strengthening the assemblage. This is also particularly evident 
in a speech by President Obama in 2013 where he says that  
 
Having faced down the dangers of totalitarianism and fascism and communism, the world 
expects us to stand up for the principle that every person has the right to think and write and 
form relationships freely - because individual freedom is the wellspring of human progress, 501 
 
Here then we see American morals and the application of technology being used within a linear 
temporal framework. Jarvis further notes that time and temporality are important within the 
War on Terror because they inscribe significance to events, they create a sense of moral 
legitimacy, they allow the War on Terror to cohere into a structural entity, and they reproduce 
collective identities of America(ns).502 This is created through a number of techniques including 
an appeal to American principles such as the rule of law, defending freedoms, and advancing 
liberty, discussed above and in chapter three. Furthermore, there is the evocation of historical 
precedents for contemporary security practices as President Bush justifying Guantanamo Bay 
through reference to President Roosevelt’s decision to intern people of Japanese descent during 
World War II.503 This ascription of a specific temporality onto the events of 9/11 and the ensuing 
War on Terror demonstrates the power of temporal framing to create a sense of inevitability 
around the conditions of success in the War on Terror that are culturally and politically 
constructed. 
 
6.2.2 Temporality in the end of wars assemblage 
Although Jarvis’s work is largely discursive, Deleuze and Guattari can help us conceptualise 
how these temporal inscriptions function within the end of wars assemblage. Furthermore, 
approaching discussions of temporality through the assemblage allows for a more detailed 
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account of how these temporalities code the conditions of victory in the War on Terror. As 
Deleuze and Guattari say: 
 
a performative statement is nothing outside of the circumstances that make it performative. 
Anybody can shout, “I declare a general mobilisation,” but in the absence of an effectuated 
variable giving that person the right to make such a statement it is an act of puerility or insanity, 
not an act of enunciation.504 
 
So from this we might be able to establish that the political framings of temporality that Jarvis 
identifies are not, by themselves, enough to create the conditions of success that are necessary 
for the declaration of a definitive end to conflict. Rather, these temporal framings work to 
reinforce those conditions of success that emerge from political and cultural encounters with a 
sense of inevitability. As the Deleuze and Guattari quote above recognises, declaring that 
victory will be inevitable relies on particular conditions to be met; it requires that these 
conditions are formed and then subsequently reinforced through political and cultural 
discourses as well as the affective interactions between them.  
 
Temporalities then and, more importantly, the inscription of a specific linear temporality to the 
War on Terror work to legitimise and strengthen these conditions of victory by constructing the 
entire conflict as teleological. This helps to provide the ‘effectuated variable’ mentioned above 
that converts a declaration of victory from an act of puerility to an enunciation. This can also 
be thought of in terms of securitisation, ‘conceptualised as a performative act,’ as it is not just 
‘anybody’ constructing these temporalities, but prominent members of the Bush administration 
including the President himself.505 However, as Stritzel has noted, securitisation theory can 
generally put too much weight ‘on the semantic side of the speech act articulation at the expense 
of its social and linguistic relatedness and sequentiality.’506 Stritzel’s critique of the focus on 
the linguistic aspect of securitisation and, by implication, Jarvis’s discursive approach to 
temporality, can be addresses through an assemblage-orientated method that engages not just 
with the intertextuality of artefacts, but also their pre-cognitive effects. Although Stritzel rejects 
‘radical poststructuralism’ and its focus on power and performativity, his discussion of 
externalism can lead into a Deleuzian approach to security through his concept of the exteriority 
of artefacts that allows rhizomatic connections to be forged through assemblages.  
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Paul Patton’s analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy is useful in this regard as 
it suggests that they approach political concepts and political writings as multiple and 
contingent as they are not a singular entity in their own right, but are made up of components 
each with their own specific history, baggage, and connections. As he says, in each case, the 
outcome is of a ‘singular concept of a social contract [applied here to mean the successful 
writing of a particular temporality onto an event] where the nature of this singularity is 
determined by the components and the complex relations between them.’507 Through this we 
can argue that the creation of an agreement between political discourse and audiences is not 
just dependent on the particular articulation of a politician, as in some securitisation theory, but 
is also dependent on the various complex relationships between that articulation, the broader 
political climate, popular culture, temporalities, and warfare. Tom Lundborg has also 
approached the writing of temporality within the War on Terror, but from a Deleuzian 
perspective rather than a discursive one. Lundborg can be seen as taking up where Stritzel’s 
critique of securitisation left off by saying ‘the point is to precisely get away from the idea of 
static reference points and instead adopt the view that everything and anything is the result of 
making connections.’508 As such, it is not just individual components of the assemblage that 
determine whether a particular claim to truth is articulated and legitimised, but rather how 
various aspects of the assemblage combine and connect at a pre-cognitive level. If popular 
culture undermines linear temporalities, then it becomes more difficult to inscribe an armed 
conflict with teleological force. 
 
By creating the war as a teleological conflict, as a conflict that will take an indeterminate, 
though substantial, period of time, these temporal writings allow for the eventual declaration 
that they have been met or, alternatively, the continued deployment of these conditions as 
unsatisfied. Thus, these temporal writings allow for both the arbitrary end to conflicts to be 
decided and simultaneously, the arbitrary continuation of these conflicts. This is not to say that 
these political speeches and those who gave them do not have any political power on their own, 
but rather that their articulation contributes to aspects of the end of wars assemblage that 
popular culture also contributes to. Conceptualising these political pronouncements and the 
cultural artefacts that relate to them as part of an assemblage allows us to analyse whether they 
stabilise or challenge the conditions of victory that have heretofore been articulated. We have 
now seen how political rhetoric has inscribed a linear temporality onto the War on Terror and 
the end of wars assemblage. By analysing cultural artefacts from the years under discussion 
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here, we can ascertain whether they play a stabilising or destabilising role in this inscription of 
linear temporality. These films are one potential site of critique and challenge to interrogate 
these writings of linear temporalities through their deployment of an explicitly non-linear 
temporality themselves. 
 
6.3 The Films: Montage and Confusion 
6.3.1 Edge of Tomorrow 
Edge of Tomorrow is perhaps one of the most interesting films to emerge from this time in 
regards to its potential to undermine the stability of the end of wars assemblage and its ultimate 
failure to do so. The premise of the film is that there has been an alien invasion of Earth, starting 
in Europe. The opening visuals of the film use news footage from various real events to set out, 
within the first ninety seconds, the Mimics’ invasion of Europe as well as humanity’s first 
victory against them at Verdun, five years after the invasion began. This blending of stock news 
footage with film-specific shots is a common trope within the action genre that helps to 
temporally place the film in a contemporary setting, challenge the fourth wall by merging the 
real with the virtual, and to disorient viewers through remarkably fast edits, quick shots of 
explosions and riots, a large amount of audio and repetitions of spoken, written and visual 
images of ‘breaking news.’ The visual representation of the Mimics’ spread across Europe is 
somewhat reminiscent of World War II and imagined images of a Soviet invasion, starting as 
it does in the middle of Europe and spreading out from there as well as highlighted on maps in 
the news media in red and until ‘Britain stands alone’ against the alien hordes. This can be seen 
as analogous to the temporal positioning of the War on Terror as merely another conflict in a 
long history of ideological wars against Fascism and Communism.  
 
The film progresses conventionally enough, with slick PR-man turned pretend Major Bill Cage 
(Tom Cruise) appearing on various news outlets to wax lyrical about the war machines that the 
“United Defence Force” have developed and how this will turn the tide of battle. Following 
this, Cage travels to the UDF headquarters in London and, despite his pleas that he is ‘not a 
soldier, really,’ is eventually pressganged into the front line of Operation Downfall, a D-Day 
style invasion of Normandy, by General Brigham (Brendan Gleeson). The film then appears to 
take a turn towards the familiar training camp into combat format that is well-known from 
numerous war and action films discussed in this thesis, such as Bataan (1943), Full Metal 
Jacket (1987, including a Hartman-esque drill Sergeant), Training Day (2001), potentially even 
something like Spider-Man (2002).509 This format, along with the visual effects, narrative style, 
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and other tropes, firmly establishes Edge of Tomorrow within the action and broader combat 
genres. And if further evidence of this film’s genre credentials are needed, the amphibious 
landing on the beaches of Normandy (with reference to The Longest Day (1962) and Saving 
Private Ryan (1998) to name two of the more famous) amply provides it.510 The first half hour 
of this film, with the familiar progression of training, combat, and death can potentially be read 
then as participating in the strengthening of the temporal linearity that Jarvis identifies. 
However, having established its bona fides as a genre film, Edge of Tomorrow takes an 
interesting temporal detour. Rather than carrying forward the temporally linear narrative of 
training into amphibious landing into brutal combat slog that other war and action films opt for, 
Major Cage kills an enemy Mimic and somehow gains its ability to travel through time.511 
Having then been killed, Cage wakes up where he started after being pressganged into front-
line duty: the heavily militarised “Forward Operating Base” Heathrow. 
 
The references to World War II and the Cold War in the opening news montage frame this 
cinematic conflict within a longer history of Anglo-American struggles against European 
tyranny and the shock of a sudden act of violence against the West that are both common themes 
in political discourse after 9/11. These themes code the conditions of victory that are articulated 
through politico-cultural interaction with a linear temporality that serves to strengthen and 
legitimise them. For instance, in 2014, President Obama states that 
 
from the Civil War to our struggle against fascism, on through the long twilight struggle of the 
Cold War, battlefields have changed and technology has evolved. But our commitment to 
constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end.512 
 
This makes clear the connection between American exceptionalism (as a shining city on the 
hill), American values and the past victories of the US in conflict. By aligning these conditions 
of victory with a linear temporality, President Obama makes the case that the US will again be 
victorious, just as Edge of Tomorrow is highlighting the inevitability of humanities’ victory 
against the Mimics by placing it within the visual narrative of World War II and the Cold War. 
Similarly the appeal to the idea of a sudden violent shock to the accepted world order as a 
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rallying cry towards victory is echoed numerous times throughout the War on Terror. For 
instance, when President Obama announced the troop reduction in Afghanistan in 2011 he 
stated that 
 
we killed Osama bin laden, the only leader that al Qaeda has ever known. This was a victory for 
all who have served since 9/11. One soldier summed it up well. “The message,” he said, “is we 
don’t forget. You will be held accountable, no matter how long it takes.”513 
 
In this quote we see the inscription of a linear temporality onto the War on Terror. The effect 
of this linearity here and its articulation with reference to American exceptionalism and values 
above is twofold. Firstly, it implies that because the US have been victorious in the past, they 
will be victorious in the current conflict therefore ascribing a sense of inevitability. Secondly, 
within the context of the end of wars assemblage, the association between linear temporality 
and American values serves to strengthen it as a condition of success. As temporality precedes 
the subject, according to Deleuze and Bergson, audiences can associate linearity, inevitability, 
and American values at a pre-subjective level. Edge of Tomorrow, by initially reiterating this 
linear temporality, functions to strengthen the claim that American exceptionalism is a key 
condition of success in the War on Terror. By employing linear temporalities that are 
contemporaneous with similar political discourse, the movie thus assists in the audience’s 
association between linearity, inevitability, and American values. Therefore, this opening 
section can be seen to stabilise the end of wars assemblage and strengthen American 
exceptionalism as a condition of success in the War in Terror. It might be thought that the time 
loop structure that occurs after this opening section would work to destabilise the assemblage 
and the conditions of victory that it allows for through, if not a direct critique of this linear 
writing, at least an implicit challenge to it. It could be read as a challenge to the ordered, linear 
nature of modern political violence that is created through specific framings of temporal 
linearity. Rather than coding political violence as an ordered, linear march towards ultimate 
victory, does Edge of Tomorrow instead present us with a Groundhog Day scenario where we 
are doomed to repeat the same mistakes over and over again? Or does it present a temporality 
where multiple outcomes are possible depending on our commitment to the cause? 
 
Not quite. This alternative cinematic writing of temporality can be thought of not as something 
distinctively new or revolutionary but  
 
just another beginning, another beginning of a world based on history and progress…[an] 
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attempt to reinforce a modern understanding of history, progress and sense of belonging, in time 
as well as space…[and] can be considered as just another attempt to reinforce a historical and 
spatial imaginary based on some rather familiar assumptions about modern subjectivity, 
political authority, and legitimate political violence.514 
 
We can argue that the time loops of Edge of Tomorrow do not challenge and critique the linear 
writing of temporality onto the conditions of victory in the War on Terror but rather utilises this 
structure to reinforce them. So how does this seemingly perfect opportunity to articulate 
alternative lines of flight go unfulfilled? Edge of Tomorrow could have used the “stuck in a 
time loop” structure in order to highlight the futility of war – no matter how many times we go 
through this, nothing gets accomplished, even if we try again and again. Or it could have 
engaged with the endlessly recurring nature of political violence and critiqued it. Alternatively 
it could have been used to mourn the countless dead in each amphibious invasion of mainland 
Europe. These would have had the potential to not only undermine the end of wars assemblage 
with a radical temporality, but could have also challenged the discursive and material practices 
of political violence more broadly. We might expect Cage to grow weary and disillusioned with 
the war with each loop and each successive failure.515 But instead of this critical potential Edge 
of Tomorrow deploys its temporality essentially as a training tool for Cage. This is presaged by 
Master Sergeant Farell (Bill Paxton) stating that “Battle is the great redeemer. The fiery crucible 
in which true heroes are forged…tomorrow morning you will be baptised, born again.’516 The 
sense of combat, and potentially sacrifice, as being necessary to redemption also further to 
strengthen sacrifice as a condition of success. 
 
Not only does this film not achieve its critical potential, it actually works to temporally 
strengthen the conditions of success that emerge from the assemblage by using the same tools 
that might be able to overcome it - that is, the formal aspects of cinema and the conventions of 
the action genre. Perhaps the foremost of these tools utilised in Edge of Tomorrow is the 
montage. The montage has long been theorised in film studies, with Eisenstein seeing montage 
through a Marxist lens where it is ‘any aggressive aspect of the theatre; that is, any element of 
the theatre that subjects the spectator to a sensual or psychological impact…that enable the 
spectator to perceive the ideological side of what is being demonstrated - the ultimate 
ideological conclusion.’517 Adding to this, Deleuze’s own take on montage is that ‘it is montage 
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itself which constitutes the whole, and thus gives us the image of time. It is therefore sometimes 
thought of as the principle act of cinema.’518 Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari, although 
agreeing on the importance of montage within cinema, see artefacts in a very different light to 
Eisenstein saying that ‘Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is 
no ideology and never has been.’519  
 
Montage is used to great effect in Edge of Tomorrow. We see Cage getting progressively better 
at evading the training regime to meet up with the “Angel of Verdun” Sergeant Rita Vrataski 
(Emily Blunt) in order to plan their next move. The main way that montage is used, however, 
is to highlight how Cage gets better at combat with each loop. In Cage’s first experience of the 
Exosuit the camera pans across the other soldiers gearing up and moving in the suits while Cage 
sweats asking ‘what’s that noise? Listen man, I’ve never been in one of these.’ During the 
loadout sequence after a few loops however, he is confident enough to say that he never wears 
a helmet as it is a distraction and is precise in how he requests specific armaments and 
ammunition for it: ‘I need five more clips of 5.56, eight grenades, and an extra battery. Get 
it.’520 This even causes remarks among the other soldiers in his unit who are stunned by this 
“buck private” demonstrating great combat skills, knowledge, and experience. Again, the 
development of Cage that led to this point is achieved through montage cementing it as the 
central moment of the movie. The way that Cage becomes better at combat is not just through 
an increase in skill though this is implied. Rather, he improves because of persistence and 
repetition. He knows exactly where to go during the beach landing, exactly where the enemies 
will be, exactly how many footsteps he needs to take to reach shelter and so forth. Much like in 
a video game where a player can beat a level by learning exactly where to move and when to 
shoot, Cage improves essentially through “respawning.” As Cage says, ‘We fight, that’s what 
we do,’ regardless of the seeming futility and recursiveness of it all and the suffering and death 
he has to go through over and over again.521 Thus, the necessity of conflict, fighting, and 
sacrifice is reinforced through these sequences. Rather than highlighting the futility of political 
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violence by depicting it repeatedly, Edge of Tomorrow legitimises the idea that sacrifice or 
repeated suffering and death is the way to redemption and victory, as discussed in chapter four. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the montage technique used in Edge of Tomorrow is that of 
‘a process in which a number of short shots are woven together to communicate a great deal of 
information in a short time,’ rather than the dialectic mode of Eisenstein discussed above.522 
That being said, this does not make the montage any less interesting or deliberate. The central 
montage of the film depicts the repeated beach attacks, combat, and gruesome death of Cage 
and others and assaults the senses through quick edits, sounds, explosions, and the overload of 
information. As ‘[a]ttention to its molecular articulations takes into consideration the fact that 
film viewing is an embodied affective encounter’, focusing on what is being repeatedly shown 
as well as the iterative aspect of each shot (that is, how much Cage improves with each loop), 
helps to explain the encounter of the film.523 So the response that is induced by this repetitive 
assault on the senses might be read, at first glance, as questioning the linear temporality that 
framed the War on Terror through its repetitive depiction of the horrors of war. However, a 
more productive and careful reading of this montage instead suggests an implicit support of 
those linear temporal writings. Throughout the central montage sequence the focus is on Cage’s 
improvement rather than the repeated horrors of war. For instance, we see a number of 
attempted assaults on the beachhead with Cage and Vrataski being killed each time. The shot 
cuts back to them at the base strategizing and Cage telling Vrataski where to move next time 
round, only for them to be killed again. As the montage progresses they get increasingly far 
into occupied territory. As such, through the focus on Cage’s gradual improvement and the few 
extra steps they are able to take on the beach with each repeat of the montage a linear 
temporality is established rather than a discontinuous or circular one. Edge of Tomorrow 
demonstrates that with each invasion, with each “noble sacrifice,” with each bloody death, with 
each mechanical tool of political violence, that ultimate victory is assured. It might take days, 
weeks, months, or years (and, indeed, the time that Cage spends in each loop and precisely how 
many there are is deliberately vague in the film) but victory is ultimately achieved. Despite the 
looping of time, it is still a ‘cumulative, linear directionality.’524 This is mirrored as a common 
theme of political discourse in the War on Terror, and something articulated by President Bush 
less than a month after 9/11 when he stated that ‘It may take a long time, but no matter how 
long it takes, those who killed thousands of Americans…will be brought to justice, and the 
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misuse of Afghanistan as a training ground for terror will end.’525  
 
As Jarvis states, echoing Lundborg above, 9/11 and the War on Terror were not just predicated 
on ‘claims to historical rupture, breakage, or qualitative disjuncture but, rather, on assertions of 
continuity, evolutionary development, and progress.’526 Just as Cage develops in an 
evolutionary fashion, progressing each time he loops, the development of technique, 
technology, skills, and the resultant sacrifices is also clearly seen in the political discourse of 
the Obama presidency and victory becomes further conditional upon it: we will win because 
we are getting better at what we are doing. For instance, in 2009, during a major speech on Iraq, 
Obama said that ‘thanks to the sacrifices of those who have served, we have forged hard-earned 
progress.’527 In 2009, he states that ‘we’ve made progress. Al Qaeda’s leadership is hunkered 
down. We have worked…to inflict major blows against al Qaeda leaders.’528 The slow but 
steady technological progress that allows the US to more effectively target its enemies with 
drones is also related to Edge of Tomorrow. Just as Cage becomes better equipped as the film 
progresses - thus allowing him to achieve victory more easily - so too does the US military 
become better equipped. President Obama, in a major address on terrorism and drones at Fort 
McNair in 2013 said that ‘We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s leadership’ so they are on the 
path to defeat, that because special forces are not always an option ‘it is in this context that the 
United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, 
including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.’529 The instance of a 
recurring temporality in Edge of Tomorrow allows for Cage to become better and better at 
combating the Mimics, allows him to come closer and closer to victory, allows him to 
(borrowing from video games), “level up”. Similarly, the gradual progress and technological 
improvements gained through recursive drone strikes allow for American political violence to 
be claimed as more effective under President Obama. The result of this simultaneity is to 
reinforce both technology and sacrifice as conditions of success, but the linear temporal 
framework in which these conditions function is also politically and culturally strengthened. 
The effect of this is to allow political violence that is recursive and repetitive is culturally 
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framed within a discourse of securing ultimate victory through incremental or evolutionary 
progress, technology, and sacrifice. 
 
Furthermore, Edge of Tomorrow also reinforces technology as condition of success because of 
its aforementioned similarities to video game affects and temporalities. As Helen Berents and 
Brendan Keogh suggest, ‘representations of modern military technologies through videogames 
and other media as efficient, precise and superior obscures the indiscriminate devastation on 
the other side of the screen.’ 530 Edge of Tomorrow’s video game aesthetics and temporalities 
portray similar ideas about the role of technology as something that is not just invaluable to 
victory, but as something upon which victory is fundamentally predicated. Furthermore, Cage’s 
increase in skill and use of military technology through the repeated training enhances the use 
of technology as condition of victory. Thus, rather than utilising a non-linear temporality to 
challenge the premise of armed conflict and the indiscriminate nature of modern military 
technology, Edge of Tomorrow actually stabilises these conditions through that non-linear 
temporality. 
 
Just as the time that Cage spends looping is uncertain, the War on Terror was also constructed 
as having an uncertain duration. President Bush repeatedly refused to commit to a specific 
deadline for troop withdrawal saying that 
 
some are calling for us to withdraw from Iraq on a fixed timetable, without regard to conditions 
on the ground…That’s the wrong policy for our government. Withdrawing on an artificial 
deadline would endanger the American people, would harm our military, and make the Middle 
East less stable. It would give the terrorists exactly what they want.531 
 
This is a practice that continues into the ongoing fight against ISIS, with President Obama 
remarking in 2014 that ‘I’m not going to give a particular timetable,’ and in 2015 that ‘It is not 
a timetable. It is not announcing that the mission is completed at any given period.’532 While 
each iteration of political violence within the War on Terror is constructed as bringing us closer 
to ultimate victory, the precise timetable for this is left deliberately vague, just as the amount 
of time Cage spends looping is. The effect of this on the conditions of success in the War on 
Terror is clear. It serves to imbue these conditions of success with additional strength so that 
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they can be deployed to arbitrarily end conflicts as well as allow them to be deployed to extend 
or change the terms of these conflicts. The conditions of victory are thus constructed as 
legitimate, coming closer, but also just beyond our reach. While we may not have the jam today, 
we will certainly have it tomorrow. As both Edge of Tomorrow and the political discourse of 
the Obama administration articulate a temporality that is linear, the eventual fulfilment of the 
conditions of success is constructed as inevitable. Cinematic and political haziness about the 
timeframe means conditions of victory cannot ever fail to contribute to the end of wars. Even 
if not achieving immediate success, they achieve in bringing it a bit closer. 
 
6.3.2 Source Code 
Montages like the one explored in detail above are also present in Source Code. The temporal 
structure used here is similar in nature to Edge of Tomorrow. The main differences though are 
that the loops are shorter and of a fixed duration (around eight minutes) and they exist only 
within a computer simulation. The loops themselves recreate the final minutes before a bomb 
explodes on a commuter train in Chicago and this is the problem the protagonist is supposed to 
resolve. Despite the loops being used for different narrative purposes - one being about ending 
an alien invasion of Europe in a futuristic science fiction universe and the other about catching 
a terrorist in the contemporary US Midwest - they function temporally in very similar ways. 
Both involve a lone (male) hero who is pitched into an unfamiliar situation and has a finite 
amount of recurrent time to, essentially, solve a puzzle.533 Each loop allows the main character 
to get progressively better at his set task. Each time Cage and Captain Colter Stevens/Sean 
Fentress (Jake Gyllenhaal) reset their time loops, they have worked out the next move in the 
game. Both movies draw on the styles, gameplay, and temporalities of video games. While 
Edge of Tomorrow feels, at times, like a first person shooter video game, Source Code has a 
slower, puzzle-solving element and aesthetic to it - perhaps more akin to Half-life (1998) than 
Doom (2016). In Edge of Tomorrow the construction and reiteration of a linear temporality 
takes place almost exclusively within the time loop. In Source Code we see this linearity not 
only reinforced through the progressive improvement of Stevens that mirrors that of Cage but 
also an ongoing linear narrative of a bomber at large in Chicago. As Stevens’ looped experience 
on the commuter train exist solely in a simulation and the actual bomber is still at large in 
Chicago and planning to detonate a “dirty bomb” somewhere in the city, the narrative has a 
parallel timeline that progresses in a linear fashion. While it may seem like these timelines 
should be separate, at the end of the film they merge (somehow) as Stevens “breaks” the 
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computer programme and escapes into reality before the bomb detonates.534 There is a narrative 
similarity between the endings of both of these films that is interesting to consider. Although 
both use a non-linear and recursive temporal structure, both are concluded with a reassertion of 
“scientific” or “clock-face” time in ways that are never fully explored or explained to the 
audiences. While the necessity of a “Hollywood ending” almost certainly played a role in these 
decisions, the ultimate effect on the assemblage is to further reinforce its temporally linear 
construction.  
 
Source Code is a great illustration of how pop culture artefacts can help to not only strengthen 
the linearity of the end of wars assemblage but also how they can reinforce dominant political 
constructions of the necessity, legitimacy, and perceived success of political violence in 
general. Source Code works to legitimise ongoing practices of political violence in the War on 
Terror through its suggestion that exceptional security measures are legitimate, necessary for 
protection, and ultimately successful. While this comes through the broad narrative of the film 
and the gradual revealing of the secretive military project that Stevens exists within, it is also 
constructed through the repeated noble sacrifice of Stevens and his near-unwavering 
commitment and dedication to the mission. Indeed, unlike Cage in Edge of Tomorrow, Stevens 
is a remarkably willing soldier even after, or perhaps more so, once he learns of his own official 
“death” and hearing a recording of his father praising him. Lundborg notes that it is not the 
actual event that drives political violence forwards towards an ultimate victory but rather the 
potential occurrence of an exceptional event. ‘As long as something could potentially happen 
it can be argued that it probably would happen and that unless something is being done about 
it now it cannot be prevented.’535 Thus, the exceptional security measures depicted in Source 
Code represent a cultural reaffirmation of political violence as well as domestic security 
processes. Rather than using the looping time travel that Stevens goes through as a critique of 
the never-ending nature of violence and the futility of war, his constant attempts (within the 
“real” timeline outside the programme) to stop a potential event from happening and his own 
perceived attempts to stop an actual event from occurring (within the confines of the source 
code) overlap. 536 Much like Edge of Tomorrow, this narrative structure works to embed the idea 
                                                          
534 There is a narrative similarity between the ending of both of these films that is interesting to consider. 
Although both use a non-linear and recursive temporal structure, both are concluded with a reassertion of 
“scientific” or “clock-face” time in ways that are never fully explored or explained to the audiences. There is the 
potential that the necessity of a “Hollywood ending” played a role in these decisions. 
535 Lundborg, Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, Becoming, 72. 
536 This is an excellent example of the difficulties of coherently discussing time travel within an academic work. 
As Douglas Adams observed, ‘One of the major problems encountered in time travel is not that of becoming 
your own father or mother…The major problem is simply one of grammar.’ Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at 
the End of the Universe (London: Pan Books, 1980), 79. 
196 
 
that exceptional security measures are legitimate and through sacrifice and incremental 
improvements in techniques, policies, and strategies, victory in the War on Terror is inevitable. 
These two films also overlap at the level of the use of simulation and how depictions of this 
help to create a new form of exceptional security practice. Der Derian suggests that in the 
technological drive to map the future, ‘to deter known threats through their simulation,’ we may 
be constructing new and more catastrophic dangers.537 Source Code, through the use of a 
simulation that may or may not exist in “real” time, blurs the border between reality and 
simulation. When Stevens asks Captain Colleen Godwin (Vera Farmiga) under whose orders 
the simulation is being run for explanation, she replies that ‘This is not a simulation, lives are 
depending on you.’538 Blurring the boundaries of the real and the virtual can be seen as 
emblematic of the blurring between cinema and politics that the assemblage allows for. Reading 
this through the end of wars assemblage more generally we can say that conditions of success 
are produced through the audiences that confront both movie and politics. This shift from 
narrative arc to particular “reel” moments that will be remembered in the “real” world is an 
important aspect when engaging with the action genre. Scenes such as Colter Stevens and 
Christina Warren (Michelle Monaghan) kissing while an explosion comes towards us in slow 
motion; Stevens’ tearful conversation with his father; his determination to save Christina 
despite the mission having been formally ended; his gradual improvement each time his loop 
resets. This is some of the imagery that allow for affects to be produced in audiences that they 
can then take outside the cinema to engage with, encounter, and parse political events in various 
ways. Similarly, in Edge of Tomorrow, the use of montage to portray Cage’s improvement, his 
movements through the battlefield, and his training regime with Vrataski are all moments that 
can pre-cognitively induce audiences to accept political articulations of gradual improvement 
and ultimate victory. 
As people encounter cultural artefacts with political events in their mind, thus they must also 
encounter political artefacts with cultural events in their mind. As Louise Pears notes, ‘it is 
through the everyday and emotional interactions with popular culture that people come to make 
meaning.’539 Yvonne Tasker has a similar point to make about our engagement with action 
movies and how it can relate to spaces beyond the screen. She states that we know in genre 
cinema that the hero or heroine (though mostly hero) will survive the various trials that are 
thrown at them and that the narrative arc will be successfully concluded but that ‘the moments 
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that are remembered, the images which an audience may take from the cinematic experience, 
cannot be summed up within the terms of narrative resolution,’ and that cinema is a ‘sensuous 
experience.’540 Within the context of the end of wars assemblage, then, these sequences function 
in several ways. Firstly, bearing in mind Tasker’s point about genre above, the audience’s 
knowledge that the hero will ultimately be successful reinforce the temporally linear coding of 
the assemblage thus strengthening it. Secondly, Stevens’ and Cage’s recurring sacrifice and 
gradual improvements each loop works to reinforce the condition of success that entails 
redemption through sacrifice. Thirdly, the drive to save Christina and reconciliation with his 
father can be read as examples of American values and morality that can strengthen the 
associated condition of success. And fourthly, the depiction of scientific and technological 
expertise to solve a crime and prevent another helps to reinforce the idea that success is 
predicated upon technological superiority. The ultimate effect of these encounters then is to 
legitimise many of the conditions of success that are produced by the end of wars assemblage. 
The potential of non-linear cinematic temporalities to produce diverse lines of flight is eroded 
and it allows for a particularly strong depiction of some of these conditions of victory, such as 
sacrifice and technological progress.  
 
6.3.3 Looper 
Looper, as its title suggests, also uses time loops but in a slightly different way to either Edge 
of Tomorrow or Source Code. Unlike the previous two films where the characters are caught in 
recursive loops and use them to become incrementally better at the military tasks they have 
been set, Looper is a more “conventional” time travel film with the main character travelling 
back in time in order to change the future. Young Joe (Joseph Gordon-Levitt) is a mob assassin 
tasked with killing people from the future where time travel has been invented and outlawed. 
Old Joe (Bruce Willis) is Joe from thirty years in the future sent back to be killed by his past 
self to “close the loop” and so prevent the assassins from informing on the gang. Again, the 
non-linear timeline here could be used to undermine various ongoing political discourses and 
practices. For instance, the use of money to pay for killing could be linked to a disruption of 
the use of mercenaries. The idea of killing one’s future self could be used to depict the futility 
of armed conflict. Or the role of the economy in violence could be highlighted to critique 
neoliberalism’s roles in a global cycle of criminality and violence. Although Old Joe escapes 
his assassination in order to prevent his wife from being killed (in the future, possibly in an 
alternate timeline); Young Joe eventually takes his own life to prevent his future self from 
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killing the mother of a child who may grow up to be the “Rainmaker,” a future mob boss who 
is taking over the underworld and closing all the loops. Through this closed loop that the film 
presents us it removes any possibility of challenging the linear temporality constructed for the 
War on Terror. Looper closes off the possibility of creating a different future by demonstrating 
that no matter how much we may want to travel back in time to change the past the future is 
remarkably difficult, if not impossible to change. We have been set on this course and we must 
follow it through. This resonates with the previous two films that challenged and then reasserted 
the linear temporality constructed for the War on Terror by demonstrating that challenging, 
incremental improvements and a linear time frame are the key to defeating an enemy or 
capturing a terrorist. This determination to follow through conflict until victory is secured is 
something that also appeared in the political views on the War on Terror. President Obama 
makes reference to a similar sentiment in several speeches, including his 2013 State of the 
Union address where he said that ‘thanks to the grit and determination of the American people, 
there is much progress to report. After a decade of grinding war, our brave men and women in 
uniform are coming home.’541  
 
The previous two films also challenged and reasserted dominant conceptions of temporality 
through montage which had the effect of strengthening the linear temporality of the War on 
Terror, therefore confirming the conditions of success that emerge from the assemblage. Looper 
uses montage to convey how Joe ages, indulges, falls in love, and settles down therefore also 
using the technique to reinforce a linear temporality through Joe’s life. There are a number of 
timelines intersecting and overlapping in the film, causing, on first watch at least, almost a sense 
of hopelessness. It leaves the audience in a state of mind where they are unsure what to believe, 
who to trust, or who to support. While Young Joe is the main character in the early part of the 
film and so the audience naturally can develop a bond with him, we also sympathise with Old 
Joe wanting to regain his murdered wife and life of tranquillity; but once Old Joe decides to 
murder children to change the future we become much less involved in and supportive of his 
motives and means. But if Old Joe is just Young Joe thirty years hence, how can we support 
either of the main characters? Eventually this narrative and affective roller coaster is solved 
through Young Joe taking his own life to save the child Old Joe wants to kill, thus “closing the 
loop.” Not only does this neatly conclude the narrative arc of the movie and reconcile various 
                                                          
541 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address’, The White House, 12 February 
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timelines, it also can also have a second order effect on the end of wars assemblage. Firstly, 
Young Joe enacts the classic trope of the noble sacrifice that we know stretches back to at least 
World War Two. The effect of this is to further reinforce the idea of victory through (self-
)sacrifice and a condition of success within the assemblage. Secondly, the reconciliation of 
multiple timelines helps to reassert linear, “scientific,” or “clock face” time. As has been argued 
here, this linear temporal framing is a key component of how conditions of success are 
articulated and framed within the War on Terror. By stressing the importance of linear 
temporality at the emotional climax of the movie, Looper undermines its own potential to 
challenge this temporal framework of victory, therefore strengthening this aspect of how the 
end of wars assemblage functions.  
 
As a final point, not only are these three movies characterised by diverse temporalities, 
violence, and the ultimate reassertion of linear time, they are also driven by gendered narratives. 
In the case of Edge of Tomorrow there is a burgeoning love interest between Cage and Vrataski 
ending happily with his final loop and the potential for romantic involvement (as well as a 
sequel).542 Source Code sees Stevens re-enter the simulation to try to save the Christina Warren, 
again ending happily with them deciding to take the day off to spend together in Chicago. 
Looper, finally, sees Young Joe become romantically involved with Sara (Emily Blunt) and 
sacrifice himself to save her and her son Cid (Pierce Gagnon). As Susan Jeffords argues in 
relation to The Terminator and the Terminator 2: Judgement Day, they take ‘as their focus how 
the future can be born and the extent to which men can control it.’543 As well as signalling a 
reinforcement of gendered roles in Hollywood film and a rejection of critical engagement with 
dominant political narratives, this aspect of these movies gives control of the future to men. 
While the gendered narrative present in these films and the notions of self-reproduction that 
they present are highly important and timely there is not enough scope or time here to delve 
very far into it. Suffice to say that this represents not only ‘the reproduction of masculine 
authority…through the affirmation of individualism,’ but also a failure to further exploit the 
critical potentials of temporally challenging cinema.544 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed whether the end of wars assemblage was destabilised by alternative 
                                                          
542 This sequel, with the working title Live Die Repeat and Repeat appears to be stuck in development hell 
unfortunately. 
543 Jeffords, Hard Bodies, 156 Jeffords presents here a definitive account of masculinity in the Hollywood action 
cinema of the 1980s and 1990s. 
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cinematic temporalities. What has been argued is that while these temporal lines of flight have 
critical potential, the end of wars assemblage is highly resilient to potentially challenging 
political and cultural artefacts. The three movies being analysed presented alternative temporal 
frameworks to the linear writing of the War on Terror.  Despite this initial alterity, all three 
films reassert linear, scientific, or clock-face time at the end thus allowing for a temporal 
linearity to continue within the assemblage. Time has become an increasingly important site of 
analysis in International Relations and one that seeks to uncover how particular writings and 
constructions of temporality shape both the political discourse that allows for events to occur 
and the very shape of the international system itself. As we have seen in the three films that I 
have analysed in this chapter, it is clear that these cultural artefacts participate in this ongoing 
dialogue between politics, the academy, the discipline of International Relations, and practices 
of political violence. There are certainly many films that use time travel in some shape or form 
- going back or forward in time, time loops, alternate timelines and so forth - in order to 
challenge dominant conceptions of time and temporality. Shapiro has noted, for instance, how 
some movies ‘challenge the Hegelian continuous, linear version of historical time.’545 The films 
analysed here all share a potential to engage critically with the linear construction of temporality 
within the War on Terror. Importantly however, they do not exploit this critical potential but, 
rather, they work to reterritorialise the end of wars assemblage in such a way as to reinforce 
these linear temporal constructions, legitimise the perceived necessity of extraordinary security 
measures, and reaffirm dominant political narratives in the War on Terror.  
 
The action genre is an interesting and important site for politico-cultural analysis precisely 
because the innate conservatism of the genre often removes the overt politics from a film, but 
the connections to politics that any cultural artefact demonstrates can still be analysed. Here 
more so because it appears, at first glance, to not deal with questions of victory in the War on 
Terror or the political construction of linear temporalities. At the core of the analysis is the 
argument that these films unintentionally participate in the legitimisation of ongoing practices 
of political violence through their narrative arcs and stylistic choices. This then helps to code 
the conditions of success necessary to end conflicts in the War on Terror with a linear and 
teleological temporality. Secondly, they engage in the construction of an ending to the War on 
Terror. As these conditions of success emerge through the end of wars assemblage, it follows 
that this assemblage is predicated upon a particular construction of linear temporality. This 
temporality and, by extension, the conditions of success in the War on Terror are thus 
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legitimised and strengthened through the reassertion of linear temporality that these movies 
present. While it is clear that “we will ultimately win,” how and when this victory comes about 
is deliberately left vague. Needless to say though, this victory must always come at a cost to 
people and security. The encounters discussed here demonstrates that the conditions of victory 
are being achieved in a linear fashion even though it feels like we are stuck in a recursive loop; 
even though it may seem that we deviate from the path, it is all part of the plan to ultimately 
succeed; and that victory is inevitable, whatever the cost. 
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Conclusion: Cinema and Closure 
 
“Welcome to camp victory. 
Camp victory? I thought it was camp liberty?  
Oh no, they changed that about a week ago. Victory sounds better.” 
The Hurt Locker (2008) 
 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that popular culture is an important site for the 
construction, circulation, and legitimisation of political meaning and contributes to conditions 
of political possibility. I have argued that we can conceptualise war termination in the War on 
Terror as the end of wars assemblage that is partly predicated upon political rhetoric, popular 
culture, and the interaction between the two. Specifically, I have argued that the contemporary 
Hollywood action genre produces intensive and affective encounters that allow for certain 
conditions of success in the War on Terror to emerge. The conditions of success that I have 
identified are American exceptionalism, technology, sacrifice, and urbanity. An assemblage 
orientated understanding of the end of wars allowed me to analyse how particular cultural 
artefacts induce affective encounters in audiences and what type of endings these encounters 
allowed for politically. Furthermore, I have argued that the end of wars assemblage and its 
conditions of success are not static entities but are in a process of constant change, evolution, 
and contestation. Tracing the contours of this assemblage over a fourteen year period has meant 
that I have not just engaged in assessing what conditions of success emerge from the 
assemblage, but also how processes of stabilisation and destabilisation act on that assemblage. 
I have argued that, because of the constraints of genre cinema and the power of intensive affect, 
these conditions of success remained largely intact during the period covered by this thesis. 
 
Understanding how wars end is a critical question for International Relations for a number of 
reasons. Although the start of wars is often seen as the central question of International 
Relations, we must also understand how the violence, destruction, and death of armed conflict 
is brought to a close. Furthermore, war termination has been historically marginalised and 
under-researched within the discipline despite the clear parallels between how wars start and 
how they end. Therefore, understanding how they are brought to a conclusion is not only useful 
for its own sake, but it can improve our knowledge of how they begin. As was shown in the 
Introduction, most studies of war termination have approached the question from the 
perspective of rational choice. As such, these studies are necessarily limited in their scope and 
type of artefact that they can engage with. The changing nature of war in the 21st century also 
203 
 
poses challenges to rational choice methodologies that, in this field, tend to rely on dyadic 
models, cost-benefit analyses, and utility theory. Engaging with popular culture, not just as an 
example of representation of conflict, but also as a site of meaning making, opinion forming, 
and political action can broaden the types of artefact we can engage with productively and can 
deepen our understanding of complex political processes, such as ending a war. By exploring 
how meanings around the end of wars are constructed, circulated, and legitimised through 
popular culture this thesis represents a critical intervention into the literature on conflict 
termination studies, critical approaches to International Relations, and the study of Popular 
Culture and World Politics. It does this by presenting a novel approach to understanding how 
and why contemporary armed conflicts end, engaging with the affective encounters that can be 
induced by cinema and the potentials they produce, and tracing the contours of an assemblage 
over a period of time. 
 
The argument that popular culture and world politics are deeply entwined with one another, that 
they function together to create conditions of political possibility, and that these conditions of 
possibility are then enacted in the world, often in the form of highly problematic forms of 
political violence is an important argument to make normatively and in terms of the discipline 
of International Relations, security studies, and war termination studies. Using popular culture 
generally, and the contemporary Hollywood action genre specifically, is perhaps a controversial 
approach to the study of how conditions of success for armed conflict emerge. However, as has 
been shown throughout this thesis, such an approach is grounded in an existing and expanding 
literature and a theoretical approach that is established within the field and beyond. 
Furthermore, popular culture can tell us things about contemporary politics that would not be 
available through a more traditional study of quantitative data, rational choice models, or a 
discourse analysis of the news media for instance. What such an approach does then, is to 
challenge a representational and mimetic logic that has largely defined studies of war 
termination. By embracing the complexity of politico-cultural interaction, I have sought to 
analyse the affective encounters that popular culture can induce in audiences and the effects 
that these have on the end of wars assemblage – namely the emergence of conditions of success. 
I have also analysed how these conditions of success and the stability of the assemblage more 
broadly have been challenged yet remained intact.  
 
Developing and building on other critical work in International Relations, I engage with the 
emerging study of Popular Culture and World Politics which, although not monolithic from 
either an ontological or methodological perspective, seeks to devote attention to ‘developing 
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theoretical and analytical means for accounting for the manifest influences of world politics as 
popular culture and popular culture as world politics.’546 It is within this sub-field of 
International Relations that my own research, and this thesis, is largely located. Becoming more 
specific I outlined a case for using contemporary cinema as a site for critical understanding of 
how conditions of success in the War on Terror emerge, building on those that have engaged in 
politico-cultural analyses of various political topics but bringing in both affect and an 
understanding that popular culture does not always function to critique dominant discourses 
and articulations of power, but rather often functions to strengthen and legitimise them. Having 
thus situated my work within, and at the intersections of, war termination studies, conflict 
studies, Popular Culture and World Politics, and critical International Relations I then engaged 
in developing a theoretical understanding that could be fruitfully applied to the question being 
posed: how does popular culture help to create the conditions of success in the War on Terror? 
To do this, I framed the question around the end of wars assemblage and the conditions of 
success that are its emergent properties. 
 
Although popular culture influences political action in complex and non-linear ways, I have 
argued that we can bring these connections under analysis through an engagement with 
assemblages and encounters. Assemblage theory, although admittedly dense at times, furnishes 
us with a theoretical and methodological orientation that allows for a conceptualisation of how 
conditions of success are the products of politico-cultural interaction. As has been argued 
throughout, these conditions of success are formed through encounters between screen and 
audience that pre-cognitively connects particular tropes, themes, and imagery with victory. This 
allows for these conditions to then be politically deployed and have a much greater effect in 
concluding a conflict. These conditions can be thought of as emergent properties of the 
assemblage, though irreducible to the components of that assemblage. Chapter one outlined 
how I have engaged with and utilised assemblage theory to help understand these links and how 
they create particular emergent properties. It is important to once again reiterate that the 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari is both complex and multiple. By this I mean that there is 
no definitive understanding or utilisation of their approach and their work and the work of other 
scholars engaging with assemblages makes it clear that it is not their intention to make it 
definitive. Rather, what is made clear through a critical reading of this work is that it is precisely 
this multiplicity, this methodological and epistemological openness that characterises their 
approach and indeed is one of its greatest strengths. Chapter one further demonstrated that the 
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internalities of cinematic and political artefacts (shot, lighting, editing, trope, language, 
narrative, and so forth) are intrinsically linked to their externalities that allow for affective 
encounters to be induced in audiences that can then have political effects beyond the intention 
or design of moviemakers. What this chapter also makes clear is that this thesis was not about 
the internal meaning of a film or about reading the ‘politics of the movies’ in a traditional sense, 
but rather about what connections might be forged between these seemingly separate spheres. 
In this chapter I laid out a number of examples of assemblages including those of popular 
culture, politics, and the end of wars. I then discussed emergence and intensity as key theoretical 
tools that allow us to understand how assemblages form and how they produce emergent 
properties that are not reducible to the components of an assemblage. Engaging with affect and 
encounters provides a methodological orientation in assessing how particular movies function 
within the assemblage and how they can pre-cognitively affect audiences and allow conditions 
of success to emerge. I also discussed the materialist ontology of assemblages, their non-
linearity, lack of intentionality, and the conceptual and practical differences to intertextuality. 
Finally, I outlined my methods as well as engaging in some methodological debates around the 
reasons for, and limitations of, the periodization of the thesis. The purpose of this chapter was 
to outline my theoretical orientation and discuss how it was to be applied in the empirical 
chapters. 
 
Chapter two is an important move to ground the artefacts I engage with and the end of wars 
assemblage historically. I began this chapter by tracking the development of the action genre 
from the World War II combat film to the present day. By mapping how the genre first emerged, 
evolved, was inverted, subverted, and reinvented I make a number of points. Firstly, it became 
clear through this chapter that contemporary cinema, even the generic movies of the action 
genre, have a long and interesting history to them with particular tropes, styles, shots, edits, and 
so forth being grounded in an extensive history. This, in addition to the critical and commercial 
success of the genre, adds to the justification outlined in this chapter for the specific focus on 
contemporary Hollywood action movies. Secondly, chapter one made the argument that genre 
as a category is an important, interesting and useful way to approach the end of wars assemblage 
and how conditions of victory are formed. As shown at various points throughout the thesis, 
but particularly in chapter five, how movies engage with, subvert, and reinforce the tropes and 
conventions of the genre has an effect that can help to decode and recode the assemblage and 
the conditions of victory that it allows for. 
 
I could have structured this thesis in various ways such as according to particular sub-genres of 
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action; or according to dominant themes and narratives; or by how the films were critically and 
commercially received; or in any other number of potential ways. However, organising it 
chronologically has a number of benefits. Firstly, and chiefly, it has allowed me to not only 
analyse how conditions of success emerged from the end of wars assemblage in the early years 
after 9/11, but also to assess diverse lines of flight that arose from culture and politics and how 
these had the potential to challenge, change, or reshape these conditions of success. Although 
the conclusion of later chapters is that these conditions remained broadly similar rather than 
being radically altered as a result of political or cultural forces, this in itself is an interesting 
conclusion as it suggests that the end of wars assemblage is rather resilient to change. Tracing 
the contours of the assemblage over time not only provides a fuller account of how wars end, 
but it also makes the point that assemblages are not static entities but are always subject to 
multiple processes and forces acting on them. This is not to ascribe a teleological direction to 
the assemblage where it must first emerge before it is subjected to challenge. Assemblages are 
always undergoing processes of change and evolution, but structuring the thesis in this way has 
allowed me to explore emergence and change in a clearer fashion. Chapters three and four were 
largely focused on the stabilisation of the assemblage while chapters five and six discussed how 
the assemblage was subjected to destabilising forces. While these two processes – stabilisation 
and destabilisation – are always simultaneous, this division allows for a clearer analysis of them 
as separate but intertwined forces. Placing this analytical division at the election of President 
Obama further allowed me to ascertain what a change to the political rhetoric aspect of the 
assemblage would achieve when combined with potentially radical cinema. 
 
Secondly, there is a methodological justification for this structure as it allowed for a more 
organised approach to the research process itself. By giving each chapter a defined time period 
it simplified the textual selection practices and streamlined how I approached the vast amount 
of films and political artefacts that have been engaged with during the process. Furthermore, it 
has hopefully made for a more structured experience for the reader, allowing them to also trace 
how the end of wars assemblage developed, was subjected to challenge, and emerged from this. 
Thirdly, as this thesis has addressed the question of what conditions of victory are allowed for 
through the interactions between cinema and politics, it has allowed for a more concrete 
analysis of this through artefacts that were contemporaneous with one another. As discussed in 
the Introduction and chapter one, concurrence between political and cultural artefacts allows 
for more intense affective encounters to be induced therefore making pre-cognitive effects more 
apparent. While it could be said that this has elided the question of causality, I would argue that 
it has addressed it directly by arguing that there are not necessarily direct, linear causal 
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interactions at work but rather that these seemingly separate fields are mutually involved with 
and through one another in an ongoing and symbiotic way. In other words, this thesis has not 
approached the issue of politico-cultural interaction by looking at how art imitates life or life 
imitates art but rather by addressing the more fundamental and complex question of how these 
areas interact with one another through factors and processes that are not immediately apparent 
and what politics this interaction allows for. 
 
To discuss what each chapter has said individually as well as reiterate how they all fit into and 
support the main argument of this thesis is now useful. While each section of the thesis has its 
own internal logic, structure, meaning, and argument, they can all clearly be shown to support 
the central case of the thesis which is that the intensive and affective encounters allowed for by 
cinema allows for particular conditions of success to emerge from the end of wars assemblage. 
Because the assemblage is not a static entity, analysing destabilising forces was also important. 
Because these conditions of success emerge from cinematic encounters, when they are 
politically deployed to make the case that a war has ended or will end, audiences that confront 
both politics and cinema can have pre-cognitive affects retriggered thus making the claim to 
truth that has been politically articulated more acceptable. Chapter three addresses how initial 
conditions of success emerged from the assemblage between 2000 and 2003, that is, from just 
before 9/11 until the invasion of Iraq. What was argued in this chapter is that the movies under 
analysis – X-Men, Spider-Man, Training Day, and Tears of the Sun – all included sequences, 
shots, styles, and stories that allowed for affective encounters between audiences and cinema 
to help two conditions of success emerge as properties of the end of wars assemblage. These 
conditions were American exceptionalism and the morals it exemplifies and the use of 
technology as an amplification of this morality and exceptionalism. The occurrence of these 
motifs simultaneously in political and cinematic discourses, while sharing a long history, helps 
with the inculcation of these encounters and allows them to function in a territorialising way. 
American exceptionalism and the values it embodies as well as the use of technology as a moral 
amplifier are strongly territorialising forces on the assemblage as they not only emerge as 
conditions of success, but they strengthen already-existing discourses that surround the use of 
American military force in the world. This chapter demonstrates that from the outset of the War 
on Terror, and indeed even before it began, the basis for these conditions of success was already 
in place. In other words, the conditions of success discussed throughout this thesis did not 
emerge as a response to 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq’s spiral into violence, opposition 
to war, or American foreign policy but were actually already in circulation. Nonetheless, the 
War on Terror provided the outlet for these conditions of possibility to become actualised and 
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enacted through cultural and political discourses and physical and material practices of political 
violence. 
 
Moving through time, cinema and political events into chapter four, we witness The Ultimate 
End. Apocalyptic imagery and the built environment allow strong encounters to be inculcated 
in audiences that allow for sacrifice and urbanity to emerge as conditions of success from the 
assemblage. Simultaneous with these cultural artefacts we also saw violence in Iraq peaking 
and resulting in the troop surge of 2007 designed to secure urban areas within a political 
discourse of sacrifice begetting redemption and victory. The three films analysed in this chapter 
– I am Legend, Children of Men, and War of the Worlds – all share apocalyptic imagery and a 
visual and narrative focus on urban or built environments of New York, New Jersey, and 
Bexhill and have sacrifice and redemption at the core of their narrative and highlighted visually 
throughout. Drawing on literature about the apocalyptic, post-apocalyptic, and dystopian as 
well as concepts of urbicide I argue that apocalyptic imagery and urban environments in these 
movies worked through affect to pre-cognitively allow audiences to fall into particular patterns 
of thought regarding sacrifice and urbanity as being essential for victory. As such, the 
encounters allow for these themes to emerge as conditions of success from the end of wars 
assemblage. Thus, when sacrifice and urbanity are politically articulated as important concepts 
and sites of victory, audiences have been pre-primed to accept this claim to truth. Again, not 
only do these narratives and images allow for the assemblage to be stabilised, but they are also 
the conditions of success that are then politically deployed to bring about a conclusion to 
conflict. The use of these themes suggests a political narrative of victory through sacrifice or, 
alternatively, sacrifice guaranteeing victory. The location of these sacrifices within an urban 
landscape and built environment further territorialises the assemblage and strengthens the 
sacrifice as a condition of victory in the War on Terror. Furthermore, by utilising the Judeo-
Christian imagery of redemption through sacrifice and an apocalyptic narrative, the films, 
politics and assemblage through which they are connected helps to create the conditions of 
possibility for endings to be constructed. If we make enough sacrifices in the right places at the 
right time it will lead to redemption. Mapping this onto Iraq and the troop surge of 2007, it is 
clear that these contemporaneous themes, narratives, tropes, imagery, and language work to 
create the conditions of success that are politically necessary to make a claim to truth about the 
ending of a war. 
 
Having established four conditions of success that emerge from the end of wars assemblage in 
the early years of the War on Terror, I began to analyse the effect of destabilising forces on 
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these emergent properties and the stability of the assemblage itself. The years under discussion 
in chapter five covered the 2007 election campaign and President Obama’s election on a 
promise of hope and change. As such, it was possible that different conditions of success could 
have emerged from the assemblage or that existing conditions would have been undermined by 
this changing political rhetoric. As such, chapter five engaged with the potential of critique and 
alternative lines of flight. However, as was argued in the chapter, this critique was only 
superfluous and I concluded that such a critique is transient, ineffectual, and ultimately 
unfulfilled. While the end of wars assemblage is composed of many different elements, artefacts 
and components and is subject to multiple forces and processes, the subjects of this research 
have been action movies and political speech. Not only did the election of President Obama 
change the political aspect of the assemblage, but during these years there were a number of 
films within the action genre that challenged the conventions, norms, and structure of the style 
as part of the ongoing evolution of genre. As such, it was productive to engage with these 
different artefacts in order to analyse what effect they may have had on the assemblage and its 
emergent properties.  
 
In chapter five, I therefore argued that the evolution of the action genre and the rhetoric of 
President Obama apparently functioned to undermine the stability of the assemblage and its 
emergent properties. These critical potentials functioned through moral equivalencies between 
American and Nazi violence in Inglourious Basterds, challenges to the role of superheroes in 
Hancock, and the use of pastiche to consciously reference previous iterations of genre 
conventions in RED, The A-Team, and The Expendables. However, while all of these films 
exhibit the potential to challenge and undermine the functioning of the assemblage, what we 
find is that by the end of the final act, the conditions of success that emerged in previous years 
were reasserted. In other words, American violence is reaffirmed as superior to that of others; 
the wayward superhero of Hancock fulfils the expected role of such a superhero; and the 
pastiche proves to have no critical attitude at all. This failure of cinematic critique here parallels 
with the rhetoric of then-Senator Obama during the 2008 election campaign articulating a 
different foreign policy to the previous administration, but ultimately reasserting the same 
policies, tropes, and conditions of success for the War on Terror. These reterritorialising moves 
thus strengthen the end of wars assemblage and its emergent properties. Indeed, because these 
films and the rhetoric of senator and then President Obama wear what I termed the mask of 
critique at their outset, the reterritorialising force is significantly strengthened as it carries the 
legitimacy of having gone through a challenge and emerged in much the same ways as before. 
The outcome is that while we may critique genre conventions, discourses, foreign policies and 
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conditions of political possibility, we will inevitably find that they are, in fact, correct and 
legitimate. 
 
Chapter six, finally, engaged with questions of temporality in politics and cinema. In this 
chapter I drew on existing literature on time and politics which argued that the War on Terror 
was inscribed with a linear temporality that worked to create a teleological view of conflict. 
This teleological view suggested that victory is inevitable because of the conditions of victory 
that had been analysed in previous chapter – American exceptionalism, technology, sacrifice, 
and urbanity. As I argued in chapter five that these conditions are somewhat resilient to critique, 
in chapter six I analysed whether a cinematic disruption to the temporality inscribed into the 
War on Terror would destabilise the assemblage and its emergent properties. Chapter six thus 
represents an expansion on how these conditions of success have been formed as well as how 
time functions within the end of wars assemblage. Much like in chapter five, the three films 
discussed here – Edge of Tomorrow, Looper, and Source Code – have, at first glance, a potential 
to critically engage with dominant conceptualisations of time as linear and progressing towards 
an ideal end. While the use of time travel in each of these films presents us with such a potential, 
it is argued that this is unfulfilled and that, through the reassertion of dominant temporalities, 
such critical moves are undermined, the assemblage avoids radical change, and the conditions 
of success continue as its emergent properties.  
 
One of the primary ways that these films function within the assemblage is through montage 
and the affective encounters it can induce. But rather than use montage sequences to disrupt 
linear temporality and thus the stability of the assemblage, these movies use montage to reassert 
this temporality which therefore allows the assemblage to continue to produce conditions of 
success as emergent properties. Through a discussion of the use of montage in these films, as 
well as some other key scenes it is argued that this cinematic technique is central to the 
undermining of the films’ critical potential and the reterritorialisation of the assemblage. As in 
chapter five, it is argued that the ultimate reassertion of dominant discourses is further 
strengthened by the potential for critique that these films exhibit. This chapter, standing at the 
end of the substantial portion of the thesis argues that temporalities - and how they connect to 
other themes discussed throughout - work to strengthen the end of wars assemblage. This 
strengthening then allows for the conditions of success to be further legitimised at a pre-
cognitive level. As such, the ability of political leaders to deploy these conditions as political 
articulations of the end of war is further legitimised. 
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The end of wars assemblage is composed of multiple component organs – military strategy, 
tactics, alliance structures, economies, societies, elections, discourse, geographies, and so many 
more – all of which can be thought of as assemblages in their own rights. What I have argued 
throughout this thesis is that popular culture is also a component organ of the end of wars 
assemblage. While not a total account of how wars are brought to an end, engaging with popular 
culture as a site of political meaning making, circulation, challenge, and legitimisation is a novel 
approach to the study of how and why wars end. Engaging with all aspects of how and why 
wars end is beyond the scope of any single research project, and even analysing all of popular 
culture would be a significant challenge. As such, I have focused exclusively on the 
contemporary Hollywood action genre because of its box office dominance, global reach, high 
budgets, mass audiences, and its particular connection to historic combat movies. I have argued 
that the movies analysed in depth in this thesis function as part of a broader assemblage and 
work through intense and affective encounters to pre-cognitively form patterns of thought in 
audiences that allow conditions of success to emerge in the War on Terror. These affective 
encounters work to embed ideas of exceptionalism, technology, sacrifice, and urbanity as 
central to victory and success in armed conflict. Therefore, when political leaders deploy these 
conditions to make a claim to truth that a conflict has or will end, audiences are pre-primed to 
accept them as legitimate. These conditions of success are not the only ones that emerge from 
the end of wars assemblage and so there is scope to expand this research to include other 
articulations of military or political victory. 
 
No work on the end of wars is ever total and this research has its limitations and potential for 
expansion. There are multiple ways that this work could be built upon by myself or others. In 
particular, a Marxist perspective could lend more focus to questions of production and 
dissemination, as well as how cultural artefacts function in terms of political economy.547 
Related to this is the potential for a more explicitly materialist approach to politico-cultural 
interaction. As discussed in chapter one, the material and discursive are not mutually exclusive 
from one another however an analysis that focuses more on the material creation and global 
circulation of cultural artefacts would be a welcome addition to the study of how wars end. A 
more explicitly feminist engagement with questions of conflict termination through popular 
culture and the particular masculinities and affects that are circulated through, and allowed for 
by, cultural artefacts would also be a useful addition to this research. The assemblages based 
                                                          
547 Matt Davies, for instance, has already written on this Matt Davies, ‘“You Can’t Charge Innocent People for 
Saving Their Lives!” Work in Buffy the Vampire Slayer’, International Political Sociology 4, no. 2 (1 June 
2010): 178–95, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2010.00099.x. 
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approach of this thesis has been an important and novel intervention into the field and answers 
a question on war termination that has traditionally been marginalised, but these are questions 
and approaches that can be greatly expanded on in the future. 
 
Furthermore, by expanding the genres and locations of cinema to include romantic comedies, 
drama, horror, science fiction, musicals and historical films; European, Korean, Chinese, 
“Bollywood” and “Nollywood” cinema we can build up a picture of how meanings, themes, 
narratives, imagery, tropes, and language circulate globally and where potential sites of 
resistance to the territorialising forces of the cinema discussed here might be articulated. As has 
been reiterated above, the central argument of this thesis has been that the cultural artefacts 
discussed throughout work through the encounters to allow for particular conditions of success 
to emerge from the end of wars assemblage. However, chapters five and six suggest that there 
may be other articulations, forces, and lines of flight that are emerging within Hollywood action 
cinema that can shock the assemblage in such a way that it could change. This has been 
furthered through recent films such as Captain America: Civil War (2016) and Batman V. 
Superman: Dawn of Justice (2016) which problematise dominant cinematic representations of 
mass violence in various ways and potentially undermine or at least question the role of 
superheroes as saviours and the embodiment of the American monomyth. As these films lie 
outside the temporal focus of this thesis I have not engaged with them at the same level as others 
discussed, but it appears that they function in a similar mode to those in chapters five and six 
in that they might initially destabilise the assemblage and its emergent properties only to 
reassert them in the final act of the film. Nonetheless, such critiques are potential ways forward 
for a more critically oriented action cinema. Genre is a fluid category and one that, as has been 
shown, evolves slowly. The action genre is especially affected by what is popular and what, in 
the end, makes money at the box office. It remains to be seen whether such a critical approach 
will be continued and slowly expanded on, but I remain hopeful that such a cinema can be 
developed. As mentioned above, understanding how the end of wars assemblage functions and 
how it is subjected to change, challenge, and evolution is an important step towards 
understanding how we can resist regressive political effects both culturally and politically in 
order to challenge conditions of political possibility. Although not explicitly discussed in the 
empirical chapters, this has been a normative thread that has informed the research and my own 
political approach to it. 
 
To conclude, this thesis has demonstrated a number of arguments that are relevant to the study 
of conflict termination, popular culture and world politics, and the broader discipline of 
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International Relations. It has shown that popular culture is an important site of political 
meaning making and that through affective encounters, movies can have a strong impact on the 
emergence of conditions of success in the War on Terror. Conceptualising all of this through 
the assemblage allows for an engagement with affect that moves our understanding of politico-
cultural interaction beyond the intertextual. The conditions of success that emerged from this 
affective interaction and discussed here are American exceptionalism and the values it 
exemplifies; the use of technology and its co-production of moral subjectivities; the necessity 
of sacrifice; and the centrality of the built environment. These conditions of success can then 
be politically deployed in order to make a claim to truth that a conflict will end or has ended. 
The end of wars assemblage and its emergent properties are not, however, static entities and are 
always subjected to forces that strengthen them and weaken them, stabilise them and destabilise 
them, and code and decode them. By structuring this research in a chronological fashion, I have 
been able to trace the development of the assemblage over a period of time not only to assess 
what conditions of success it allows for, but also forces of stabilisation and destabilisation. As 
has been demonstrated in chapters five and six, these conditions of success and the assemblage 
as a whole are somewhat resilient to change. However, this does not preclude the possibility of 
the assemblage changing either radically or gradually. Engaging with popular culture to 
understand how affective encounters help to produce the end of wars is a critical and novel 
intervention into the study of how wars end, the interaction between politics and culture, and 
critical approaches to International Relations. By understanding the crucial question of how 
endings to conflict are culturally created we can begin to ask questions of how, why, and to 
what end these conflicts have been concluded and how, why, and to what end they may start 
again. 
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